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The question ofthe present study concerns the relationship between language and
nature as it has been taken up in the history of Western philosophy. The goal ofthis study
is to show how language and nature are held together by thinking the transition between
them, through the figure of silence. I will show this by drawing primarily on the work of
Merleau-Ponty, who, as a phenomenologist expressly concerned with the senses, the body,
and language, attempted to describe and understand the passage between language and
nature in a manner that could maintain their ontological continuity. Silence was the hinge
of this passage, in which language, in its emergence from the silence of nature, turns back
to disclose nature as already expression. Merleau-Ponty's late interrogation into how
philosophical language might both emerge from and return to silence turned on the
example ofProust's literary language. This study will also draw on Proust's meta-
L.- ~_ _
vnovelistic awakening to his literary calling, as it is recounted near the end ofLe Temps
Retrouve, which discusses explicitly how Proust's language makes a turn through silence in
order to emerge as literature. This provides an example of the emergence which Merleau-
Ponty describes. I will then make the case that Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy can be
read as the thinking ofbeing as nature, and that it begins to think how language roots
human beings in nature as it blossoms out ofnature's soil. I will show how Merleau-Ponty
repeats a structure of thought traversed by Schelling in his essay on freedom, which will
further show how philosophical attention to language discloses nature as a radical excess.
Finally, I will discuss how the negotiation between language, nature, and silence, as it is
practiced by Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, is another turn in a long story of the
human place in language and in nature, a story which is at least as old as the mythical
thought ofancient Greece.
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1CHAPTER T
TNTRODUCTTON
"What do I know?" is not only "what is knowing?" and not only "who am I?" but
finally: "what is there?" and even: "what is the there is?" These questions call not
for the exhibiting of something said which would put an end to them, but for the
disclosure of a Being that is not posited because it has no need to be, because it is
silently behind all our affirmations, negations, and even behind all formulated
questions, not that it is a matter of forgetting them in its silence, not that it is a
matter of imprisoning it in our chatter, but because philosophy is the reconversion
of silence and speech into one another. .."(VI 169/129).
A good book is like the world itself. The interrogation of such a book is unlike
the reading of all those books that are to be taken up, argued with, mined from, accepted
or r~iected, and finally abandoned. It is a call to meditation, a task of sustained
disclosure, a reconversion of the silence beyond what the book says into our own thought,
and perhaps into our words. Our response to a good book, and to the work of a great
writer and thinker, is likewise an attentive reconversion of that work, a work which
always requires more from us than it gives straightaway. Having read the phrase
"philosophy is the reconversion of silence and speech into one another," a phrase taken
from Merleau-Ponty's book The Visible and the Invisible, we do not yet know what
phIlosophy is. Neither do we know what silence is, or speech, or the manner of their
mutwil reconversion. And least of all do we know what being is, beyond an empty
phrase, what this being is that must be disclosed, but already lurks silently behind speech.
- -
2The overall question of the present study concerns the multiv~lent relationship
between language and nature, a relationship that, in all its valences, rocl<.s pack and forth
from unbridgeable difference to absolute identity throughout the history of philosophy.
The simultaneous truths of the proximity and distance between language and nature are
held together by the thought of the transition between them, through the :figure of silence.
The following dissertation attempts to show this togetherness through transition in the
work ofMerleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling. My claim is that the theme of excess
which drives Merleau-Ponty's thought should be thought of as nature, and that the
figuration of this excess as silence provides an image through which to think the human
work of language as it blooms forth out of, returns to, and yet utterly affects, the
excessive character ofnature.
The question of the proximity and distance of language and nature could very
well be the oldest question in philosophy, and the very question that begins philosophy in
earnest, at least in the form in which it has been preserved as the history of philosophy.
Premonitions of it resound in Parmenides' poem, beginning in the title, Peri phuse6s, On
Nature, and perhaps most provocatively in Fragment Three: to gar auto noein estin te /cai
einai. 1 It is the same to think and to be. No being without thinking, no thinking without
being - yet when the fragment is taken from the level of bare assertion to a reflection on
this assertion, a difference already cracks open the claim of sameness, for now we are
thinking about the identity of thinking and being. And is this thinking without language,
1 David Gallop, ed. and trans. Parmenides qfElea: Fragments. Footnotes will give author, title, and page
or section number; full references are to be found in the bibliography.
3and this being other than nature, or are language and nature already there when thinking
and being are asserted in their identity or difference?
Heraclitus, supposedly on the opposite side of the battle between the one and the
- - -
many, wrote that nature loves to hide, that identity flows like a river, that the change and
destruction of fue and the strife ofwar2 are what always are. From this it would seem
that the determinative character of language, the apparent fixity ofwords, will never
catch nature's movement, if that is what they are supposed to do. Yet another
Herac1itean fragment tells its readers to listen to the logos, and to know that all is one,
and moreover, that phusis is logos.3
It is Plato's Socrates, however, who puts the question in the exact terms in which
it will sail forward through the history ofphilosophy. In the Phaedo, at the scene of his
death, Socrates explains how as a young man, he had been "wondrously desirous of that
wisdom they call 'inquiry into nature.,,,4 But after studying the nature-philosophy ofhis
time, the various and contradictory stories told about which substance or being was the
cause of all the others, he found that all of the "looking" directly at nature, though it gave
plenty of facts, had no way of encountering the causes of anything if those very causes
could not be observed directly. So Socrates made his famous "second sailing in search of
2 Paul Potter, trans., "Heracleitus' 'On the Universe," Fragments 10,20,36,41,81.
3 Ibid., Fragments 1,2.
4 Plato, Phaedo 96a.
4the cause,"s the tum to logos as a method for the study of nature, when the direct method
had failed. Nature in its truth turned out to be inaccessible without a detour through
language. This detour, it would seem at first glance, would put nature at one remove
from philosophy, insofar as philosophy is a work of language. Indeed, when Socrates
introduces his own tum to the logos in the Phaedo, it seems at first that he is proposing
the necessity of logos as a way to nature at one remove, a second-best way: "I feared I
might be totally soul-blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and attempted to grasp
each of them by the senses. So it seemed to me that I should take refuge in logoi and
look in them for the truth of beings.,,6
Yet Socrates immediately qualifies this image which he has given of the logos as
a second-order reflection of an originary nature. The very next sentence reads: "Now,
perhaps in a certain way it isn't quite like what I'm likening it to. For I don't at all
concede that anyone who looks into beings in IOf(oi looks at them in likenesses to a .
greater extent than one who does so in actions."? This qualification is itself ambiguous; it
is not at all clear, and Socrates does not go on to explain, whether he who looks into
beings "in actions" also looks at them through "likenesses," that is to say, indirectly, or
5 ibid, 99d. The second sailing refers to the use ofoars when the wind fails. See Sallis, Being and Logos,
38-43, for a discussion of the tum to logos as the way to beings that reminds us of our own ignorance, or of
the necessarily hidden and limited way in which beings are disclosed: "the way of logos is to 'mediate' the
difference between the things that can be manifest and that which lets them be manifest, Le., that it is such
as to let man maintain himselfwithin the dispersion ofthis difference; it is to say also that the way of logos
is such as to institute the appropriate restraint against seeking a grasp on things as they are immediately
manifest, Le., that it is such as to open up that distance in which things can become more truly manifest,
manifest in their proper being" (42). The truth of beings is not manifest in a direct and immediate way, but
manifest more truly, as they really show themselves, through the logos.
6 Phaedo, 96e.
7 ibid, 9ge-IOOa.
5whether in fact one who goes through the logos is somehow looking "directly" as well.
In fact this difference between immediacy and reflection is far too simple. The tum to
the logos is not a matter ofan indirect likeness, reflection, or representation of nature in-
itself, which then would be more true, more original, even if inaccessible. Instead, it is
an original and necessary mode of nature's disclosure.
This issue continues throughout the history of philosophy, although the terms
change. A brief historical overview might serve to provide a handle on the issue by
showing, in very rough form, how it has been passed down from Plato to the twentieth
century. Put in the very simplest historical terms, terms which over-simplify and distract
from the phenomena of language and nature as we live them, but which are no doubt
useful as a way of fixing two words which move around like a shell-game which could
just as easily contain nothing, the relationship between language and nature at stake here
might be thought as a matter of the difference and relation between the Natural Attitude
and the Transcendental Attitude. These words deserve to be capitalized because they
might as well function as proper nouns, as if they were official schools to which we
might assign various philosophers.8 It should go without saying that this assignation
must be somewhat forced, and that a more nuanced reading of most of these thinkers'
8 A choice between many dual terms presents itself. Merleau-Ponty, and many commentators, have used
terms such as realism/intellectualism (Barbaras, Being ofthe Phenomenon, xxxiii, 6, 13,20,23-24) and
immanence/transcendence (Dillon. Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, 35-50) to trace a similar history. The
general theme of these studies is to show the way to a more subtle space between these truths. Detractors
ofMerleau-Ponty have said that, like all of phenomenology, he is too much on the side ofthe
Transcendental Attitude, or conversely, by basing his thought on perception, he is too much on the side of a
version of the Natural Attitude, too much concerned with the silence of things, which in the end negates
philosophy insofar as, being language, it is the opposite of silence. John Sallis raises the latter concern,
more as a warning against certain anti~philosophical readings of Merleau-Ponty than a detraction against
his work itself, in the last chapter of his book on Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology and the Return to
Beginnings.
texts would show that they hardly thought nature and language in so reified a manner.
Despite this, it is useful to identify and name very strong tendencies, in order to situate
the present question in the history of philosophy.
The Natural Attitude, famously described by Husserl as that which the
phenomenologist must reduce and eliminate from his work in order to make it
transcendental, tells us that things are things, nature is nature, in itself and having
nothing, necessarily, to do with us. As Schelling put it in the System afTranscendental
Idealism, "the one basic prejudice, to which all others reduce, is that there are things
outside of us," a pr~iudice that "makes claim to immediate certainty," and is "innate and
primary," but "no less a prejudice on that account.,,9 The extent to which the apparent
opposite of this pr~iudice, that there is nothing outside of us and thus that we are
everything, does a little violence to common sense even in the philosophical reader only
demonstrates the thorough-going extent of the Natural Attitude in all of us, or as
Schelling says, its status as the "most natural" of prejudices.
6
But of course nothing is so simple. The proponent of the Natural Attitude must
admit that human beings are certainly part of this supposed nature-in-itself, which is
supposed to be outside of us, and that human language, rather mysteriously and, it would
seem, fortuitously, functions in this world of brute things. We name things, talk about
them, and would rather not wonder why this should be so, or what language has to do
with nature and its things, which seem to rest in-themselves without it. Nature as a
collection of things has the conceptual priority here, to the extent that language can be
9Schelling, System ofTranscendental Idealism, 8.
.- - ._.- ._- - -- -- ------
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explained, quite satisfactorily within this realm of inquiry, as a physical and social
- -
process for which the theory of evolution provides a compelling account.
The Natural Attitude is widespread and obvious because it seems to work, as far
as it goes. Of course things are things, and nature is a collection of things, most of which
have nothing to do with language, except for us. Maybe we humans will be a little lonely
in the cosmic sense, but at least we have each other to keep company, and we have nature
to talk about. The most important truth here for comparison with the Transcendental
Attitude is the germ of exteriority in nature, its excessive relationship to language. It is a
germ which resists the transcendental purification, but will not undergo it without a
fundamental change. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in the Preface to Phenomenology of
Perception, "The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the
impossibility of a complete reduction" (PhP viii/xiv). After the reduction, when this
lesson has been learned, when the Transcendental passage has been undergone, the germ
leftover on the other side is not the simple exteriority of the Natural Attitude. It is an
excess whose recognition required a passage through language. The recognition of this
excess, the necessity of a movement between language and nature for its recognition, and
finally the kind of language that communicates this awareness, rather than smothers it
over, is the theme of the present work.
This is the question of Socrates' second sailing, in which the experience of the
impossibility of the first sailing, of looking directly into nature, opens u'P the necessity of
a "sailing" towards nature that goes through the logos, but then reaches a different sort of
nature than the in-itself that the first sailing had set out to find. This different nature is
8not the simple excess, in essence nothing else but a "larger amount," of nature as the stuff
over there which has not yet been described, that which the Natural Attitude leads us to
think is "before" or "beyond" language and thus, to use Schelling's terms, "outside of
us." Rather, its excessive character is somehow tied to the necessity of language in its
disclosure.
The Transcendental Attitude takes its life from the reflective exercise which
forces us to admit that language or thought, which are not easily separated,10 color all of
nature for us, so thoroughly that the nature-in-itself assumed by the Natural Attitude is a
dream or a mirage, a hypothetical reality situated on the other side of the impenetrable
wall of language. Socrates' second sailing is a move in this direction, as are Platonist
theories of the ideas which govern nature, and Descartes' vision of discoverable natural
laws ruled by a mathematical system accessible to thought. 11
10 And which, in being artificially separated, would lose touch with the historical constellation at stake here,
which runs between these terms and benefits from their proximity in its historical transmission. Descartes
and Kant, for example, do not discuss language, but speak of thought as if it had nothing to do with words.
Twentieth-century philosophy's obsession with language, on the other hand, tends to give up thinking
"thoughf' without thinking "language," and moves the locus of the event at stake to language rather than
thought alone. For the present purposes, it should be clear that today we no longer conceive of ourselves
precisely along the lines ofDescartes, invention of a Mind holding Ideas before itself, Ideas which have
nothing to do with language. Rather, we find it difficult to conceive of abstractiorts called Thoughts or
Ideas which do not almost immediately become words, or which are not supported, held as it were, by
language.
11 Many studies ofMerleau-Ponty's inheritance from Russerl, including almost all book-length treatises on
Merleau-Ponty, emphasize some version ofMerleau-Ponty's decisive movement beyond the
Transcendental Attitude as found in Russerl. See, for example, Fran~oise Dastur, "World, Flesh, Vision"
for a particulary thorough and textually grounded exposition. Merleau-Ponty is, of course, a con~u'mmate,
generous, and very critical reader ofDescartes, devoting chapters to him in both Phenomenology df
Perception and The Visible andthe Invisible, both of which bear on the impossibility ofsuch a rigId
separation between the language/invisible/thought/cogito realm and the nature/visible/sensible realm. It is
the mediation of the body, in both of these works, that makes the rigid separation unthinkable.
9The Transcendental Attitude takes its name and its thoroughgoing formulation
from Kant, and receives its radicalization in Hegel. In the Critique ofPure Reason (on
the first page ofthe introduction, no less), Kant asserts that empirical experience (of
nature) provides no universal knowledge, and that universality in knowledge is provided
only by a priori cognitions; that is, from necessary structures of thought not based on the
empirical experience of nature. 12 The very first line of the Introduction to Hegel's
Phenomenology ofSpirit introduces the necessity of understanding "cognition" (das
Erkennen) before reaching "what truly is": "It is a natural assumption that in philosophy,
~ ~
before we start to deal with its proper subject-matter, viz. the actual cognition of what
truly is, one must first of all come to an understanding about cognition, which is regarded
either as the instrument to get hold ofthe Absolute, or as the medium through which one
discovers it. ,,13 These structures of thought, in their accessibility, are articulated, in the
pages of the Critique ofPure Reason, the Phenomenology o,fSpirit, and everywhere else,
only through language, although this necessity of language had not become an object of
inquiry in Kant or Hegel's time in the way that it is today. What this means, for the
purposes of the present simplification of the historical problem, is that the universal and
necessary, as it is accessible to the human, occurs in human thought (and thus language),
not in nature. Thus thought, including its necessary intertwining with language which is
only emphasized after well Kant and Hegel, is valorized over nature in the philosophical
search for the universal, necessary, and certain, because the universal and necessary
12 Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, 127-128, A1-A2.
13 Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, 46.
10
structures of human thought and language, if they could be isolated and identified, would
inescapably color or determine the impermanent experience of nature. It becomes, then,
pointless to talk about nature as something in any way exceeding the structures of thought
and the language that articulates them; nature is always-already a matter of thought, or to
use Kant's specific terminology, a matter for the more restricted understanding. It is as
if, as Merleau-Ponty put it, "the effective world were a canton oflanguage" (VI 130/97).
Hegel deepens the transcendental insight by thinking the becoming of thought at
the same time as its necessity, putting nature at a very early stage in the game, which is
quickly overcome, and taking over the experience of becoming, which since Heraclitus
had been the truth of nature, as a conquest of Geist. But this overcoming was perhaps not
as easy as it seemed.14 Much of the tradition which follows Hegel, starting with
Schelling and including Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and most ofthe rest of
20th century continental philosophy, has faced the necessity of the germ which remains,
what Schelling called the indivisible remainder (F 456/239).15 Yet all of this tradition
has upheld the insights of the Transcendental Attitude and refused to return to the naIve
obviousness of the Natural Attitude.
Part of the Transcendental lesson, then, is that language gives nature to us just as
surely as vision or touch, but none of them ever give nature-in-itself, the "stuff over
14 Not that it was all that easy; the strain of thinking along with The Phenomenology C!fSpiri/ attests to its
difficulty.
15 See also Slavoj Zizek, The Indivisible Remainder. "Indivisible" is a potentially misleading translation;
the German is nie a~fhedendeRes/e, perhaps closer "the remainder which never emerges." "Indivisible
remainder" does provide an elegant mathematical image ofthat remainder that cannot be integrated into the
operation being carried out, but misses the sense of what does not emerge from the ground, which is so
important in Schelling.
11
there" ofthe Natural Attitude. The sensible is always already mediated by language,
such that a pre-linguistic nature, the existence of which is obvious on naturalistic terms, is
impossible on phenomenological terms, just as the "stuffover there" is unthinkable when
sensibility is understood as communication with the world, as Merleau-Ponty described
again and again. Language and nature, especially nature as what is given in sensibility,
are not divisible. Yet neither are they identical. In their equation, or in the reduction of
"the effective world to a canton of language," in the transcendental move, something
escapes, which is why the story does not end in complete linguistic reductionism, or even
solipsism. It is this escapee, this insistent yet elusive remainder, that the post-Hegelian
inheritors of the Transcendental Attitude have been confronted with,
A general schema presents itself to describe the situation between nature and
language at this point, when the Natural Attitude has been overcome by the
Transcendental move, yet the elusivity of that which remains refuses the Transcendental
clarification. It is much like the image ofthe second sailing in the Phaedo, 2,000 years
later. We might conceptualize it as a 3-step process:
1) 1st Sailing: Nature in-itself, the attempt to say what it is directly. Fails in
aporia: for Socrates, the contradictions and lack ofevidence of the pre-
Socratics; in the late-modem era, because of the lack of the structures of
thought/language/perception through which nature is always presented.
2) 2nd Sailing: Turn to the logos as focus ofphilosophical inquiry.
12
3) Return to nature, but not to nature-in-itself; rather, to nature as it gives itself to
the human: through an apprehension of the world saturated with meaning, and
thus with language. Recognition of the necessity of this turn to language and
return to nature in order to reach "nature-as-it-really-is." The only way nature
"really is" is as it is for us, and the apprehension of this requires the thinking
of language. This move, in turn, reveals the true "excess" of nature, which is
no longer its truth as "outside of' or "beneath" language. Rather, it is given in
the transition between the sensible presentation of nature and literary and
philosophical language.
The focus ofthe present inquiry is Step 3, the step which Socrates already
forecasts in the Phaedo, if! am correct in insisting on the force of his qualification that
the turn to logos is not a matter of reflecting a prior nature in-itself in a second-best way,
but thinking nature in its truth.
Merleau-Ponty's frequent imagery of the expression of what is otherwise silent,
is, I believe, a move to think Step 3. It is potentially easy to misread as a sort of Step 1
expression, as a direct speech of or from nature. I hope to show, especially in Chapters II
through IV, that this is not what he means, and that most of Merleau-Ponty's use of the
words "language" and "silence" is working at Step 3 in the schema above.
This schema should serve as a conceptual outline to return to for each chapter that
follows. Hopefully, the present work will end with a better understanding of Step 3,
through the examination of the step in Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling. This, in
turn, should provide a better, both more sophisticated and more true, understanding of the
13
circular proximity and distance of nature and language. Although this schema is intended
to serve as a conceptual structure, and while each chapter will show how this structure is
at work in Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, it should be emphasized that the
identification of this structure alone is not the goal of the present work. This schema
should be familiar to anyone who is a careful reader of the Western philosophical
tradition, as discussed above; merely identifying it again does not add much to the
conversation. The conceptual structure is worth returning to and re-stating only because
it discloses something essential about human life as it is immersed in nature and in
language. What I wish to point out in Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling is the force
with which the sensible discloses itself as already carrying that excessive remainder
which is also reached, at Step 3 of the second sailing, in the return of !o/?os to nature.
Meanwhile, some precision is required about these words, "nature" and
"language." Both have the confusing tendency to mean almost everything, which is very
close to meaning almost nothing. In the present work, then, I intend them to be read as
follows.
"Nature" is an especially all-or-nothing word, because it can come very dose to
meaning The All. A wide enough conception of nature puts everything that is withiti its
bounds, so that it becomes quite compelling, to say that everything is nature, and ndthing
is outside ofnature, including human beings, and including language.
14
This, however, means very little. First, "everything is nature" only empirically;
transcendentally, one might as well say "everything is language," and it is of course the
movement beyond this distinction that is at issue. In either case, if we are talking about
everything, then we are not talking about anything, or any thing; we must reach the level
ofdifferences between things if we are to talk about them at all. For the present
purposes, then, nature is much closer to "the sensible" - but precisely not as it is thought
in a sensible/intelligible dualism. I intend to speak of nature as the world that presents
itself sensibly, not as it is hypothesized to exist invisibly; rocks and trees and sky rather
than sub-atomic particles, in other words. Yet "the sensible" may also miss something
absolutely essential, that which occurs at Step 3 of the schema above. Nature as it
presents itself sensibly, "that which really is," always presents itself saturated with and
giving rise to elements that we are not used to thinking of as primarily sensible: meaning,
language. The latter, of course, is sensible, either audible or visible, yet the meaning in
language is not simply a matter ofwhat is seen or heard. Merleau-Ponty and his favorite
example, Proust, are interesting and somewhat distinctive precisely because, while the 3-
step process outlined above could be applied, with some stretching, to much of nineteenth
and twentieth century philosophy, Merleau-Ponty and Proust give incredible attention to
how the sensible both carries and becomes language. Since he begins with perception,
Merleau-Ponty cannot avoid the necessity ofthis kind of attention and inquiry. This, as I
hope to show in Chapters II and IV, is the central concern of The Visible and the
Invisible, not to mention, with some gain and loss in the transition from sensiblellanguage
to visible/invisible, the meaning of its title.
15
Nature is, then, close to the sensible, especially if we think the sensible as
Merleau-Ponty attempts to. Language, then, is in a peculiar place with respect to the
sensibility of nature. Of course it is sensible and natural, visible or audible. Yet the
meaning-space of language seems to float somewhere, at once carried by the natural, and
not identical to it. If language were identical to the natural in its sensible presentation,
none of the present problems would exist, and neither would the history of philosophy.
There would be no "invisible." Yet for us humans, nature, as Step 3 of the schema sees,
is full of language.
This is the sense oflanguage which the present work will address: a field for
meaning and communication in which human beings live and share their lives, and which
is an essential moment in the presentation of nature to human beings, a moment without
which our lives are unthinkable. Terms like "thought" or "idea" or "concept" require
language to have any currency; none of them get very far in humah life without language,
although we might quibble about whether we have certain thoughts or images in our
minds that have nothing to do with language. This is why language is a better term than
"thought" for the broad sense ofhuman meaning-making and communication which I
intend. I do not mean, by language, a system of signs in the structuralist sense, or any
particular spoken language, or a physical capacity given by the shape of our vocal cords,
or any system of communication between beings, in the sense that bees or whales or ants
or practically anything living thing might be said to "have language." Language, in this
sense, is not something we have, but something we are, something essential to the being
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in human being. It is also something essential to the givenness of nature, after the failure
of the 18t sailing.
Hopefully this precision serves to restrict the words "nature" and "language" from
some ofthe confusion they could potentially lead to. Yet, as words, they remain
essentially unruly, especially with respect to a conception of philosophical rigor that
- - - -
would see them tamed. Merleau-Ponty himself moves freely between the visible, the
sensible, and sometimes nature, and the invisible, the sentient, and language. Sometimes
this movement helps to keep his conceptual reach sufficiently broad to grasp the
phenomenon he is talking about, but sometimes it leads to potential confusions between
terms, and perhaps even misleading problematizations. One of the challenges of reading
Merleau-Ponty is to tell which of these is happening at any particular moment, especially
when, as Chapter II below shows, Merleau-Ponty explicitly and very clearly rejected, and
even condemned, a practice ofphilosophy that would both prefigure its own results and
miss the truth in the phenomena at stake by restricting the power of words to what it
already understands. 16 He called for and attempted to practice philosophy as
16 This was true for Schelling as well. Schelling's vision of how philosophy might proceed in such a
manner is a consistent theme throughout Jason Wirth's study of Schelling, The Conspiracy ofNature.
Writing ofSchelling's warning in the Freedom essay to those who might not be prepared to read it, in a
discussion of Schelling's understanding of his work at this point as almost a dialogue with hature, "a
dialogue between bodies and their animas, between the light and its concealed, indwelling darkness," Wirth
writes, "The will to the hard word and the unswerving determination, the bread and butter ofthe
Verstandesmensch, will not only lead one astray, but those who would enter this kind of dialogue and who
must make those kinds of determinations should abandon Schelling's project altogether. .. A strong contrast
between these two types emerges in the treatise. On the one hand, there is the dialogical word, always in
medias res, caught up within a mobile or 'living' Wesen, that attempts to address this very Wesen, but can
do so only through a kind ofstammering, through incomplete determinations and a certain kind of turbidity
that can never free itself from an integument in the living forces of darkness and obscurity. On the other
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interrogation, as a questioning-knowing that would attend to the silence in things and
bring it to language, in the Step 3 sense as outlined above. Schelling demanded that
philosophy proceed from the utter loss of its own ground, from its utter inability to
recapture its own beginning. Both ofthese demands, in rough form, amount to a move
beyond the Transcendental Attitude, a move to think: the transition between language and
nature such that their togetherness and their distance are not simply opposites, indeed a
move to think the excessive character ofnature transcendentally, and not as the naive
"outside" of the Natural Attitude. This move requires that the struggle not be pre-empted
by thinking in advance that we know what we mean when we say "nature" and
"language." These words are unruly, and it is the task of the philosopher to follow them,
not to lead them. Hopefully, this following will lead somewhere, and we will benefit
from a richer understanding of "nature" and "language" after doing this kind of work. It
is unlikely, however, that we will end up with fixed delineations of the meaning and
function of these phenomena, such that we could add them to the storehouse of
knowledge and move beyond their thorny problems.
Nevertheless it is tempting, and satisfying to philosophical instincts honed since
the time of Socrates, to distinguish and categorize the meanings of these words in
hand, there are those who demand sharp distinctions and exact definitions. They should, from the outset,
abandon Schelling" (159-160). The Verstandesmensch is Schelling's term for those workers ofthe intellect
who compile information, those who do not take part in the struggle of thinking, a struggle which certainly
has no guaranteed outcome and must be undergone to be understood. Wirth makes the strong case that
Schelling, both early in his career and more strongly later, understood his work very explicitly as a thinking
along with the movement and germination of nature, of its conspiracy, an understanding which explains
Schelling's off-cited, first by Hegel. "failure" to fmalize his "system." Proust, perhaps not surprisingly as
someone who chose the novel as his form, holds a similar opinion ofwhat he calls the "intellect" and its
prospects, which is discussed in Chapter III below.
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systematic fashion, so that their meanings could be rigidly corralled into a systematic
argument that would function like a mathematical formula, describing, predicting, and
controlling the natural state of affairs. This tendency requires a little more attention here.
It is essential to understand that this would be to make an early decision in favor of the
Transcendental Attitude, to think that words like these, and, more to the point,
phenomena like these, work best when meanings are unilaterally assigned them by the
writer so that they serve his purposes. It is the germ of excess that gives life to these
words. Working with such words becomes more difficult when we must attend to the
multiple meanings which arise from them, rather than stripping them of this multiplicity
in advance so that they become definitive.
It must be emphasized that this is not at all a matter of abandoning the distinctions
between words. Another, more phenomenological approach would be to work through
the distinctions in the manner called for by the phenomena at hand. At times, this may
call for strict precision, which may disclose the phenomena more clearly, or may show
--
the inadequacy of our distinctions in a demand for some new way of speaking. At other
times, it may call for the transition between words, for attention to how they work
together and slide into one another, or how two or more words recall some shared aspect
which itself lacks a single word, but which is communicated in many words. The power
of the word "nature" lies in its confluence of the sensible, the non-human, the human in
its belonging to nature, and perhaps even being-as-a-whole. This potential contradictions
of this confluence, such as that between the "non-human" and "that to which the human
belongs" may require attention to the distinction between meanings, or may require the
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insistent holding together of apparently different meanings. It is impossible and
misleading to commit in advance to a categorical methodological preference between
distinguishing the meanings of words and moving between words. Thinking, of course,
works both through distinctions and through gatherings. It is quite disingenuous to fear
that the possibility of one or another of these two precludes the necessity of the other, as
if we would either collapse all distinctions into a meaningless humming sound that would
no longer be language at all, or on the other hand, write a dictionary instead ofa work of
philosophy. All one can do is attend to the phenomena at hand, and remain willing and
open to think in whatever manner they demand.
So much for broad narratives in the history of philosophy and for the laying out of
methodological expectations. The point of the present work is to suggest that silence,
understood as an excess in its relation to language, has a place in thinking the relationship
between language and nature, specifically as the linchpin of the transition between them
in human expression. I will make this suggestion by drawing primarily on the work of
- --
Merleau-Ponty, who, as a phenomenologist expressly concerned with the senses, the
body, and language, attempted to describe and understand the passage between language
and nature in a manner that could maintain their ontological continuity. Silence was the
hinge of this passage. Silence, like nature and language, is a figure for a constellation of
words, including Proust's darkness and Schelling's Ungrund, all words which connote
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absence, loss, and distance, but which function positively in effecting the passage
between language and nature. I ?
The matter of silence and its intertwining in language, as well as in the
intertwining of language and nature, is thus the phenomenological task of the present
study. The English word "matter," as it takes its present meaning from the senses of
material, stuff, substance, reality, is like the German word "die Sache," as in Heidegger's
use of the phrase "die Sache Selbst. ,,18 Heidegger speaks in the lecture entitled Hegel's
Phenomenology oISpirit, regarding the task of philosophy, of "the matter itself, which
has remained the same from Parmenides to Hegel," and which is Being, even where the
question of Being is forgotten. Schelling addresses die Sache in a similar sense near the
end ofthe Freedom essay, as something ofpower and substance that goes beyond, or
underlies, the definition of a word: "The name means nothing; everything depends upon
the matter" ("Der Name tuts nicht; aufdie Sache kommt es an") (F 506/279). Die Sache,
or the matter, is not just a subject for conversation or the topic for a piece of writing. It is
not merely a problem to be addressed and resolved. A matter is a matter of substance, a
question and an experience coming out of something with a certain weight in the world.
17 The word "silence" sometimes functions in Merleau-Ponty in a more restricted fashion to connote forms
of expression which are not language, such as painting, which is described a silence ih "Cezartne's Doubt"
and "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence." Commentaries on Merleau-PontY which deal with the
word "silence" sometimes do so in this narrow form, for example Gary Madison's The Phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty, pp. 86-89. Most., ifnot all, commentaries mention silence once or many times, jfonly
because it is a word that figures in so many ofMerleau-Ponty's evocative passages on language and
philosophy. The role ofthis word usually remains at the level of a silence of nature or the sensible that
somehow becomes language, a silence that, as Merleau-Ponty tells us and as the commentaries tell us again,
philosophical and poetic language must express in their work.
18 Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit, 13/18.
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It is something that partakes of reality so deeply that our life is utterly shot through with
the matter of which we speak. It designates the sense that there is a certain excess over
language and ofthe web ofmeaning in which philosophical terms function, a certain
something, and something of substance, which we try to reconvert into language.
As such an effort, the present study hopes to remain faithful, and will argue that
Merleau-Ponty always remained faithful, to an earlier, perhaps more naive but by no
means less genuine, Husserlian sense of phenomenology as the bringing to word of the
mute world, ofthe logos of phenomena It is language cutting close to the bone, coming
close to the matter at hand. Indeed, directly following the passage quoted above, ending
the chapter of The Visible and the Invisible entitled "Interrogation and Intuition," is the
famous briefpassage regarding the task ofphilosophy from Hussed's Cartesian
Meditations: "It is the experience... still mute which we are concerned with leading to the
pure expression of its meaning.,,19 Husserl' s vision of the "pure expression ofmeaning"
has, even by Merleau-Ponty's time, already changed into halting attempts at
reconversion, ofevocation and indirect language.2o The purity and directness ofthe
19 Husser!, Cartesian Meditations, 77/38-39. It is cited in the Preface to Phenomenology ofPerception as
well, pg. viii/xiv. It is significant, in a transcendental sense, that Husserl wrote "mute experience,"
Erlebnisse stumm, not mute nature. The transcendental truth, of course, is that nature is given only in
experience, and that its muteness is always a matter of a muteness-for-us, not a muteness-in-itself.
20 Indeed, one can see already in Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry" (Appendix VI to The Crisis of
European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology) that the expectation ofa pure statement of original
meaning, in this case the confrontation with the original self-evidence ofgeometry, but also for "all
spiritual structures which are to be taken as unconditional" (377) has already become impossible purely on
historical terms, for, as Husser! begins to think towards a sense of philosophy as historical, as in-time, he
begins to see that the task ofcataloguing the passage of an idea through history to its original self-evidence
to be an infinite task. "Making geometry self-evident... is the disclosure of its historical tradition. But this
knowledge, if it is not to remain empty talk or undifferentiated generality, requires the methodical
production. proceeding from the present, of differentiated self-evidences... Carried out systematically, such
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Husserlian project are no more, but the practice of phenomenology, as the logos of
phainomena, of the shining~forth appearing of things, 21 remains the same. I wish to
continue in that spirit, with the goal of bringing the matter itself, the intertwining of
language, silence, and nature, to some kind of philosophical language.
The present study is at once an inquiry into the matter of silence and language
through Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy, and an inquiry into the late Merleau-Ponty
through the ideas of language and silence. The intent is thus dual, both original and
interpretive. First, if the interplay of language and silence is a particularly powerful and
essential moment in Merleau-Ponty's late thought, an inquiry focused in these terms will
serve as a gateway into the whole of his thought, a whole which bears on nature,
ontology, and the future of phenomenology and philosophy. Second, the matter, the real
practice, of "the reconversion of silence and speech into one another," the coming-into-
being of speech and the reticence of silence, may be interrogated.
The task of this introduction, then, is to establish, in a preparatory way, the value
and possibility of such an inquiry, and to layout its plan and its terms.
Why think about language? It has certainly been thought about before,
thoroughly, for a long time, and without consensus. One could make the case that
language is the philosophical problem of the past hundred years at least. If a single word
could draw together the disparate strands of the philosophical traditions of the twentieth
self-evidences result in nothing other and nothing less than the universal a priori of history with all its
highly abundant component elements" (371).
21 As discussed in Heidegger, BeinR and Time 29(25.
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century, the word would be language. The thought of language ranges from an
acknowledged obsession of philosophy, to a barely-mentioned element which quietly
exerts its force, to a question mark arrived at, and repeatedly interrogated without fixed
result.
Much, if not all, of the analytic tradition turns on the matter of language, in large
part through its self-conception as an attempt to rigorously establish the rules of
permissible speech so that the scientific cataloguing of the world can proceed in clear
terms, so that empirical science can avoid tripping over its own feet, as it were. The
difference between Merleau-Ponty and this effort is vast, yet the importance of language
as a primary task for philosophy, if for different reasons, is paramount in both, and this
wide parallel is worthy of note. A grasp of the rules of speech and the possibilities for
speech to make sense and to describe the o~jectiveworld is understood in the analytic
tradition as critical to the Western project of science as rigorous knowledge. This could
be understood as a certain response to a task first articulated by Kant in the First Critique,
as a continuation and continual update of the effort of the Transcendental Analytic,
combined with an insistence on banishing the confusions of the Transcendental
Dialectic.22 Merleau-Ponty quickly puts these efforts aside, calling them the "positivism
of language," criticizing them for taking language, that which structures being as a whole,
as an ontic o~jectwhich could be described and understood through scientific
22 As Jason Wirth puts it aptly in the different context of the Kantians of Schelling's time, "Rather than
confront the disorientation ofKant's severing ofthe umbilical cord between thinking and nature, they
rebuild the village of thought around the tower of thinking's transcendentally deduced structures" (The
Conspiracy o/Nature, 81). Contemporary "philosophy of language," in its focus on introspectively or
logically established rules of speech, is a Kantian project of further consolidating the basis of science as
rigorous knowledge.
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methodology (VI 130196, PW 7-14, 3-8). Frege's efforts to distinguish between the sense
and nominatum, or the meaning of a statement, which carries communication, from that
to which it refers, is another source for the analytic tradition, which in its own way also
seeks what Merleau-Ponty calls, in The Prose ofthe World, "the specter of a pure
language," in this case the clarity of the connection, which must exist but which is hard to
pinpoint, between sense and nominatum.
The apparent optimism of Frege and Kant seems to dwindle as more recent
philosophers in the analytic tradition, rather than accumulating a systematic body of
knowledge, have instead added up problems and confusions that threaten the Kantian and
Fregean bases of their projects. These range from Davidson's and Rorty's moves to
downplay the connection of language to the extra-linguistic world in favor of working
within the rules oflanguage itse1f,23 to Quine's and Hempel's doubt about the possibility
of establishing rigorous rules of language that would not accidentally borrow from either
empirical facts or metaphysical speculation.
Much of the continental tradition of the past hundred years, including Merleau-
Ponty, has engaged in a continual fascination with the insights of Ferdinand de Saussure,
whose work can be taken as at once a cipher and preview of much, if not all, of the
linguistic philosophy of the twentieth century. The basic idea that there is no necessary
connection between signifier and signified was a door to freedom for philosophers eager
to escape the bonds of the signifier or ofthe signified structure. Meanwhile, the concept
23 These studies are reminiscent of the problematic weakness of the connection between language and the
sensible in Kant, and the pivotal role of the transcendental imagination, which receives so little attention in
the Critique. See Heidegger's Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics and John Sallis's The Gathering of
Rea.<;nn.
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ofthe generation ofmeaning in the changing relations between signs became the basis of
both structuralism and post-structuralism. This project of freedom and excess over the
structure of the sign is the basic vision of Irigaray and Foucault; and both see it as
fundamentally a matter of language. Deleuze's project of the logic of sense and of the
power ofdifference also takes its impetus from the sign-structure of language, most
importantly for the present study in Proust and Si~ns. Derrida's decades-long meditation
on the necessary absence in all presence is very much a thought of language, of the
multiple orders of remove between speech and being, and a constant castigation and
suspicion of claims to presence and immediacy in speech.
These examples should serve more for a sense of the breadth and density of the
inquiries into language than for any decisive evaluation of their character, success, or
importance. At a certain level, no doubt, langua~e is simply a word. The permutations
of this word are so wildly varied that it would of course be fair to say that nothing at all,
much less a century, is unified by a word so empty that it can be filled with whatever
anyone puts into it. Nevertheless, somethin~, or some things, in the hazy nebula of
speech, meaning, communication, words demands to be thought, and causes its echoes to
resound in ever-widening circles, everywhere, from Frege to Foucault and from Davidson
to Derrida.
For that reason alone, approaching a philosopher of the contemporary era through
the thought of language affords one some chance ofcoming close to what is
contemporary in their work, and to understanding how their originality will echo in the
history of philosophy. In a certain manner, it may be the case that, due to his constant
26
insistence on the perceptual faith, and on what will be described in the following pages as
an emphasis on the excess of the sensible to language, Merleau-Ponty may run somewhat
against the grain of the dominant tendency in the thought of language in the twentieth
century, which is to find an increasing, perhaps unbridgeable, distance between language
and the sensihle.24
The essential to~etherness of language and nature is the goal ofthis work. In the
sense ofthe Transcendental Attitude, this togetherness has already been suggested in
introductory form. Yet despite the glaring obviousness, which Merleau-Ponty constantly
emphasizes, of the fact that language does indeed speak of the sensible world, despite the
fact that this togetherness is not something we must work at or accomplish, we must at
the same time admit that in an obvious ontic sense, language is oddly out of place in
nature. It seems to have no phenomenal place, because the events of expression, sense,
and meaning,2S which, as speaking human beings, we live in constantly and irremediably,
do not, apparently or as far as we are accustomed to notice, occur outside humanity.
24 Douglas Low, in "Merleau-Ponty's Concept ofReason," makes the argument, similar to that made by
Martin Dillon in Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, that Merleau-Ponty forges a path betweert a positivist/analytic
conception of language as the double of the world, and an equally hopeless, according to Low and Dillon,
"postmodern" conception of the world as nothing but language. According to Low, it is Merleau-Ponty's
idea that "language is a sublimation of the body's openness unto the world and others," an idea which, just
as I wish to show here, makes language and nature (the body and the world) continuous, that accomplishes
this middle way. Apart from the problems with throwing aside the "postmodern" arguments so blithely, a
tactic which could be nothing but a refusal to take seriously the permeation of our world with language, it is
possible that both Low and Dillon emphasize the easy, natural togetherness of language and the body too
much. Language and nature are still a strange togetherness, and the goal of thinking their togetherness
should not solve all problems and paper over all aporias by precluding their strangeness.
25 It is, of course, a major concern ofMerleau-Ponty's Nature lectures in particular and of his "tum to
expression" in general to show that this is not at all true, that expression and sense are alive in nature, and
that human language borrows and grows from structures already present.
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Yet this seeming, if empirically and ontically straightforward, is perhaps
transcendentally and ontologically meaningless. If the brief history above gives a sense
for the force of the transcendental tum insofar as it shows that nature is unthinkahle
without language, then this apparent placeless-ness of language would appear to be a sort
- - - .
of antic illusion, a mistake of the Natural Attitude. If, as the Transcendental Attitude
shows, and indeed as Step 3 of the second sailing schema that I have outlined claims,
nature's truth as it discloses itself is full of language and given in language, then the
simple observation that non-human nature does not speak in words seems to simply miss
the transcendental point.
This may very well be, and in that case, this persistent concern is naIve, ontic,
pre-transcendental, and thus has no place in a dissertation such as the present one.
- -
However, a major intention of the present work is to show how Merleau-Ponty, Proust,
and Schelling think the intertwining between language and the sensible by thinking how
the sensible carries, supports, and gives birth to the invisibility of language. A potential
consequence of this is that there is no merely empirical, merely ontic sensibility - the
natural attitude itself is the illusion. To move beyond the empirical or the ontic is not to
cast aside the sensible; it is to interrogate the ontological significance of the sensible. On
this logic it is not impossible that an observation about the occurrence and lack of
language as it presents itself throughout the sensible, the observation that only human
beings speak and that the rest of nature is silent, has some significance beyond the
"merely empiricaL" Returning to the sensible without the prejudice of the natural
attitude, thinking the sensible not as the empirical, or the merely ontic, is perhaps, to
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borrow and modify a phrase from the beginning of Merleau-Ponty's lectures on nature, to
think the sensible in its very sensibility as the soil which already carries the excessive
germ revealed in the undergoing of language.
The suggestion I wish to make is that the apparently "merely ontic" strangeness of
language in the natural world, the facticity of the silence of nature and the speech of
humans beings, may also have something to do with the excessive germ that remains
after the transcendental move.
As will be made very clear in Chapter II below, the purpose of this investigation
is as much, or more, to make a reading of Merleau-Ponty through the thinking of
language, rather than to arrive at a conclusive grasp of the view of language that he may
articulate. The matter to be thought is thus not only "language" as an ontic oqject among
others, about which one could hold certain hopefully accurate views. There may very
well be a Merleau-Pontian "philosophy of language," and it will be an important part of
the present task to understand what this is, but this will be the beginning of the inquiry,
rather than the goal.
The focus for this work will be on the last works of Merleau-Pol1ty's 1ife, because
this is when Merleau-Ponty's thought reached its greatest originality and radicality in
thinking language ontologically, and in practicing philosophy in a manner that had
learned its way from the matter to be thought. As Barbaras puts it, language was already
at the center of Merleau-Ponty's thought at the time of The Phenomenolof!Y of
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Perception, but Merleau-Ponty didn't know it yet. 26 After Merleau-Ponty's studies of
literature and painting in the fifties, the thought of language, and expression, became the
key to pass beyond the problems of the subject that, as Merleau-Ponty himself said
repeatedly, remained in the earlier book?7 It is in the later work, especially in The
Visible and the Invisible, that language, silence, nature, and excess become primary
matters for thought, rather than received ideas or regional sub-questions.
Merleau-Ponty's own trajectory throughout his career, and the trajectory of many
insightful secondary studies,28 all tend to converge toward language as a defining
problem of his work and of philosophy as a whole. The matter of language receives only
a single chapter in Phenomenology ofPerception ("The Body as Expression and
Speech"), and this editorial structure emphasizes the thought of language in that book as
26 I would like to avoid, or ignore, the long-standing debate on whether there is more continuity, or more of
a distinct break, between the early and late Merleau-Ponty. All the analyses of the changes throughout his
career are certainly important, but choosing whether to call them "continuous" or identifY "a m~ior break,"
seems to me quite impossible, even though definitively distinguishing between these two options would, if
it were possible, certainly orient one's thought. Barbaras, for example, claims that he recognizes
continuity, but consistently emphasizes a break, leaving one to wonder whether it would not be better to
simply make a reading of Merleau-Ponty's tr~iectory rather than qualify it as continuous or radically re-
oriented at some point. For analyses that show convincingly that the more radical, explicit statements
about language and the subject in Merleau-Ponty's late work are continuous with his early work, especially
Phenomenology o/Perception, see Douglas Low, "The Continuity Between Merleau-Ponty's Early and
Late Philosophy ofLanguage," and Dillon, MerIeau-Ponty's Ontology, 85-150.
27 See also Thomas Holler, "The Limits ofLanguage and the Threshold of Speech," which sees the locus of
a shift toward language specifically in Merleau-Ponty's reading of Saussure. Holler tries to show that it
was the reading of Saussure that led Merleau-Ponty to reconsider the of primacy of perception in favor of a
primacy of language. It seems to me that it goes too far to say that there is no primacy of perception for
Merleau-Ponty after the early 1950s; The Visible and the Invisible is full of references to the fundamental
nature ofperception for its analyses, and its central chapter begins with an analysis of perception before
moving on to language. Instead, we might think of it as a co-primacy of perception and language which
requires us to think them together, rather than arguing for the primacy of one or the other.
28 For example, Barbaras' The Being o/the Phenomenon, Carbone's The Thinking o/the Sensible,
Madison's The Phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty, Waldenfels' "The Paradox of Expression," Sallis'
Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, to name a few of those which focus heavily on language as a
derIDing theme, not just in one section or chapter but throughout each text.
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an ontic matter, as one region ofhuman life which can be opened and closed in the space
of one chapter. It is a very important chapter in the structure of Phenomenolo?;Y of
Perception as the book develops its argument, because the chapter comes at the end of
Part One, devoted to the phenomenology of the body, before the investigation of "the
world as perceived," the title ofPart Two. Yet, as Chapter Four below will show,29 the
movement between body and world in expression is hardly articulated here, despite
comments such as "the analysis of speech and expression brings home to us the enigmatic
nature of our own body even more than did our remarks on bodily space and unity," (PP
230/197) and the line that ends Part One (but in a summary of the whole Part, not in the
context of expression and speech), "Obscurity spreads to the perceived world in its
entirety," (PP 232/200). Language is left in an ontic role, as a region ofthe body-suQject,
and the insights of the gestural theory of expression are not taken outside of this region
until the studies of painting and language undertaken in the 1950s. Throughout this
period, language becomes more and more the explicit focus, up to the point of The
Visible and the Invisible, which is engaged in a constant meditation on language. It will
be the task of Chapter One below to articulate how the vision for philosophy that comes
out of The Visible and the Invisible is intertwined with the thought of language.
The final reason for the present focus on language as a term with which to work is
that, despite the ontological goals of the present work, putting the prQject first in terms of
language may help to avoid a too-hasty move into thinking in terms of ontology, at least
in a facile manner, in terms of "being is X." While Merleau-Ponty was manifestly and
29 see also Barbaras, The BeinR ofthe Phenomenon 5-14,41-48,50,60.
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clearly in the process of, as he puts it, elaborating "an ontology" in his final years, at the
same time he found it necessary to undertake an intense interrogation of the practice and
possibilities of philosophy. With the task and the stakes of philosophy so profoundly in
question, it seems necessary to begin by taking a step back, to think through the meaning
of philosophical speech, the place of the human in nature, and the relation of philosophy,
language, and nature, before saying "being is X." For example, one might read the last
chapter of The Visible and the Invisible and feel inclined to say quite straightforwardly
that "Merleau-Ponty thinks that the structure of being, or what he calls 'the flesh,' is a
chiasmic relationship between sensible and sentient or visible and invisible." Yet this
would be an empty phrase, or worse, an ontic image of some substance structured in such
and such a way. Thinking these strange terms would instead require a prior thinking of
how the phenomena of language and expression lead Merleau-Ponty to create such an
"ontological" image, and more importantly, would require undergoing the interrogation
of the meaning and practice of philosophy which attention to these phenomena end up
calling for.
Philosophy has repeatedly, in times ofconfusion, made a sort of retreat of this
kind, from Socrates' second sailing, to Descartes' methodical doubt, to Kant's critiques,
to Heidegger's necessity, in Bein~ and Time, to think the being of that being who
questions about being, before thinking the being of Being itself. Even more apropos for
the present project is Heidegger's later tendency to further abandon propositional
language about beings or Being, in favor ofmeditations, suggestions, and silence,
centered on the matter and task of language. As Heidegger says in the first paragraph of
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Bein~ and Time, regarding Plato's and Aristotle's explicit investigations into the since-
then-forgotten question of Being, "what then was wrested from phenomena by the
highest exertion of thought, albeit in fragments and first beginnings, has long since been
trivialized.,,30 In Heidegger one finds not only an incomplete attempt, in Bein~and Time,
to [mally reach the possibility of speaking directly about the question ofBeing itself via
the necessary starting point of the being of the human, but the subsequent abandonment
of even this indirect approach. Speaking very generally, the vast volume of philosophy
that comes in Heidegger's wake is extremely reticent in speaking directly about Being;
indeed, Merleau-Ponty uses this language more than most.
Nevertheless, in the past eighty years, philosophy after Heidegger overflows with
the thought of ontology. It is the practice of its elaboration that changes. As a self-
described work of ontology that uses both the language of "being is X" and
simultaneously attempts to elaborate a thinking of language and a practice of philosophy
that would be different, The Visible and the Invisible is a work under tension in this
respect. The present study thus seeks to be cautious and to move slowly by restricting
itself, as much as possible, to an interrogation of language, rather than of being. As I will
suggest in Chapter Four, even the matter fundamentally at issue, as being, flesh, nature,
or language, remains unclear. Using the word "being" as a quick placeholder for amatter
that has yet to be thought would be to take part in the historic trivialization which it was
Heidegger's lifelong task to point out. One should take the advice of Aristotle, who
usually gives good advice, in Book B ofthe Metaphysics: "It is profitable for those who
30 Bein~ and Time 1.
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want to get through something well to do a good job of going over the aporias. ,,31 It is
not the intent of this inquiry to cross over the aporia ofthe question of being.
The preceding, then, should provide an at least provisional answer to the question,
why language? But the next question is, why silence?
The whispering of silence runs through, behind, and underneath the history of
philosophy since the Greeks. Silence is an old, old figure in philosophy. It is the
necessary opposite of philosophicallo~os,and thus cannot fail to appear wherever one
looks, whether it is the abyss ofdark, mute nature that must be filled with speech, or the
always-beyond of speech, which both sets a limit and marks out a task. As the opposite
of lo~os, silence, as a matter for thinking, is as old as philosophy, or older. It plays
various roles, sometimes coming to the aid of speech when speech fails us, sometimes
standing, darkly, outside the circle ofspeech as that which we essay to illuminate, or as
that which sometimes gives birth to speech. In the long strain ofphilosophy which has
tried to recuperate silence, to successfully think silence, or at least to let it come into
thought, the matter of silence often makes a sort ofanti-philosophical gesture, or at least
an anti-lo~os gesture. It starts in myth, in the silence of the gods and the oracles, which
thunders forth to human ears only occasionally, and with the obscure authority of
language that is not the lo~os.32 As Roberto Calasso puts it in The Marria~e ofCadmus
31 Aristotle, Metaphysics 995a24.
32 See the discussion of the peculiar non-lo~os authority of myth in Jean-Luc Nancy, "Myth Interrupted."
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and Harmony, «a god is never a constant presence,,,33 and the absences and mystery of a
world shot through with divinity functions as a kind of silence, a silence of (divine)
nature that only fmds its way to speech through the uncertainty ofmyth, through a form
of speech that leaves much unknown, a form through which silence speaks.
The Platonic dialogues are filled with myth, often as a way around aporias, myths
that are brought up when the subject at hand cannot be addressed through the logos, and
must have recourse to a mythos. One ofthe cruxes of Plato's Republic, the image ofthe
sun for the good beyond being, of which "a god doubtless knows if it happens to be
true,,,34 ends in a failure ofspeech, in what ofwhich Socrates cannot speak and Glaucon
cannot hear:
You wouldn't be able to follow, my dear Glaucon," I said, «although there
wouldn't be any lack ofeagerness on my part. But you would no longer be seeing
an image ofwhat we are saying, but rather, the truth itself. 35
Silence interrupts Socrates' speech because what must be spoken ofcannot be
spoken of, except in images, and this is as far as the logos ofthe good beyond being gets
(or has ever gotten).
33 Robert Calasso, The Marriage ofCadmus and Harmony, 19. Many passages in this book capture the
explosive sudden appeanace ofthe gods on to the human -scene, and their equafly sudden disappearance.
Perhaps the most explosive is Dionysus, bound to the erotic and violent as he is: "Dionysus is the river we
hear flowing by in the distance, an incessant booming from fur away; then one day it rises and floods
everything, as if the normal above-water state of things, the sober delimitation of our existence, were but a
briefparenthesis overwhelmed in an instant" (45). One ofealasso's meditations, indeed the theme that
gives the book its title, concerns the chronological movement in Greek myth from an early conviviality
between gods and humans, to a relationship ofdistance and sudden exchange typified by the image ofrape:
"The image of rape establishes the canonical relationship the divine now has with a world matured and
softened by sacrifices: contact is still possible. but it is DO longer the contact ofa shared meal; rather, it is
the sudden, obsessive invasion that plucks away the flower ofthought" (54).
34 Plato, Republic 517b
35 Plato, Republic 533a
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There's a several hundred year-old Romantic tradition of opposing silence to
speech, which goes along with a sometimes naive and metaphysical36 opposition between
tOKoS as "logic" and its many Others. In this vein, speech, or at least philosophical
speech, undergoes a tragic failure when confronted with some root wildness that it cannot
grasp, cannot put into words or thought. Nietzsche and Schelling are particularly rich,
and far from naive, examples of this line of thinking, where silence, as the impossibility
of at least certain kinds of speech regarding the most serious matters, stands as a mark of
finitude. Thus the recourse to myth and story, as more true than philosophicalloKos, or
as opening a realm for human thinking inaccessible, at least to the conceptions of
philosophy heretofore attempted. Nietzsche tells the story of Zarathustra, and thinks the
eternal return as "what if," while Schelling's constant effort, from the myth of God's
birth in the Philosophical InvestiKations Into the Essence ofHuman Freedom to the AKes
ofthe World and the "Divinities ofSamothrace," is to accomplish, via narrative, a grand
synthesis that would think the trauma, or the unspeakable silence, at the creation of the
world.37
The goal of the present work, to think language according to a certain silence, will
require a constant dialogue with the history of philosophy as it has engaged in a continual
working over of silence, for the matter of silence as it is broached in Merleau-Ponty
36 Metaphysical in the precise manner that Heidegger, in the Nietzsche lectures, found Nietzsche Gustly or
unjustly) to be the highest expression ofmetaphysics, even as he began its overturning. The reversal that
values the sensible or the in-articulable over the logos, understood as rational, is metaphysical because it
lives from the divide between the sensible and the intelligible, or as Merleau-Ponty would put it, the visible
and the invisihle.
37 See Chapter V, below. See also David Farrell Krell, The Tragic Absolute, for many beautiful chapters of
attention to Schelling's attempted synthesis, which Krell takes to be a matter of expressing the fundamental
languor, Sehnsucht, at the heart of the world.
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stands in and emerges from this tradition. However, it is not enough to say again what
Merleau-Ponty said, what Heidegger said, what many others have said time and time
again, that there is a silence beyond speech, the silence of Being, or Nature, or the
Visible, words that would be capitalized to emphasize their obscure authority. We have
already been told, many times and by many illustrious philosophers, that it is the task of
philosophy to heed this silence and to carefully bring it to Word, also capitalized. To
avoid this self-silencing debacle, in which nothing more will be able to be said because
one would be trying to say silence itself,38 it is perhaps better to start in another place, to
refuse to tackle silence directly from the beginning, for two reasons.
First, it is the claim of the present work and a focus of its investigation that
Merleau-Ponty offers the beginnings of a grasp of philosophy which would not have to.
fail in the face of silence, or at the very least, would fail in a very different way than the
failures of lo,g-os-as-rational speech. In short, and in the broadest terms, if the history of
philosophy, when it has experienced silence at all, has experienced it as a sort of trauma,
as failure and as a mark of the tragic, Merleau-Ponty may help us to think: silence and
speech in a more peaceful relation, one which would not have trauma and failure as its
primary character. Second, by beginning from another place, by abstaining from
38 John Sallis' book Merleau-Ponty and the Return to BeRinninRs ends with a warning against the tendency
that a reader ofMerleau-Ponty might have to valorize silence at the expense of speech, without attending to
the subtleties of the closeness ofspeech. silence, rmitude, and determination as it is practiced by
philosophical speech. To abolish speech in favor of silence, Sallis points out, is to eliminate the distance
between them that is essential, while to eschew the determining function of speech is to forget the tie
between determining speech and the finite, as Kant and Fichte realized. Part of what makes finitude finite
is the necessity to determine what is properly indeterminable, the necessity to name. The book points out
that Merleau-Ponty is not so naive as to eschew the necessity of determination oflanguage for a mysterious
silence which would conveniently avoid this problem.
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speaking about silence ad nauseam for 150 pages or more, this study will attempt what
Merleau-Ponty intended by "indirect language,,,39 approaching the matter laterally, by
diffusion from coordinated issues, by following out a necessity to think silence that will
be revealed through a study, not of silence itself, but of language.
Insofar as a grasp of "Merleau-Ponty's philosophy oflanguage" is a prerequisite
for the wider goals outlined above, the obvious place to start will be the various
examinations of the task of philosophy which Merleau-Ponty makes in his late years. It
is here that the matter of language comes most explicitly to the fore, because the
possibilities of language as it becomes philosophical speech, and also as it works as
literary and poetic speech, are here directly in question. This process, already at work in
PhenomenoloKY QfPerception, becomes more pronounced in Merleau-Ponty's writings of
the 1950s. The essay "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" seeks to understand
how painting, literature, and philosophy express what is silent by an indirection or a
lateral meaning, by finding a way to express "the allusive logic of the perceived world"
(871/57). A similar reference to the necessity of an indirect method for ontology is made
the course summaries compiled in Themesfrom the Lecturesfrom the ColleRe de France,
in the summary ofa lecture dealing with Heidegger (RC 156, TFL 156). The course
notes, recently published in French but not available in English, of Merleau-Ponty's last
courses in 1958-59 and 1960-61, "The Possibility of Philosophy Today" and "Cartesian
39 RC 156/156; "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in SiW/s, 95-103176-83; The Visible and the
Invisible. throughout.
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Ontology and the Ontology of Today," as well as "HusserI at the Limits of
Phenomenology," involve thinking toward the task ofcontemporary philosophy as
articulating a relationship of humanity and being around the multiple loci of absence,
language, and nature.40
The most sustained and focused interrogations oflanguage in MerIeau-Ponty's
corpus occur in all four chapters of The Visible and the Invisible, and many of the
individual Working Notes bear on this question. The first three chapters, in their
dialogue with Descartes, HusserI, Sartre, and Bergson, all dance around the issue of the
proper mode of philosophical speech, or the mode of language that would correspond
best to the matter at hand in philosophy and to the necessities of its interrogation. The
fourth chapter, in sketching out the thought of the chiasm and the flesh, repeatedly
attempts to think the movement between sensibility, carnality, and speech, and to imagine
and practice a philosophical speech that would bring this movement to word. The task of
philosophy is most closely a matter of language, and of silence, its "tnost difficult point"
"the bond between the flesh and the idea, between the visible and the interior armature
which it manifests and which it conceals" (VI 193/149).
In this text there is an attempt to imagine and practice a philosophical speech that
would bring to word the movement between the silence of the sensible and language, to
understand this transition and to interrogate the point when silence becomes language. It
is not only an attempt to discuss this movement, but to outline a practice of philosophy
40 See the essays in Mauro Carbone, The Thinkinj? Qfthe Sensible for readings of the course notes oriented
in this direction.
19
that could discuss it. In Merleau-Ponty's text there is an understanding of philosophy as
a certain manner ofpassing through this bond, a manner that is subtly, if perhaps not
fundamentally, different from its cousins, literature and poetry. This will be the goal of
Chapter II below, to begin the overall task of thinking the passage from things to word in
the most direct way possible, through Merleau-Ponty's explicitly stated "philosophy of
language" and practice of philosophy. The principal claim of this chapter will be that the
motifof silence is a key to thinking this passage, both in the silence of the sensible and in
the necessity for philosophical language to remember this silence, to find ways of speech
which do not only erase it.
It is clearly Merleau-Ponty's view that part of this practice of philosophy should
be an openness to learning from literature and art, at times even a borrowing of literary
modes ofexpression, at the very least a weakening of the sense of strict division between
the philosophical and the literary. Thus it is reasonable to turn to literature for an
example of the practice oflanguage which Merleau-Ponty is after. The example of
Proust runs throughout Merleau-Ponty from the beginning. It is so dense in the fourth
chapter of The Visible and the Invisible that one could almost say that chapter turns
entirely on Proust's thought of the sensible idea, expressed most clearly, for Merleau-
Ponty, in the experience of the "little phrase" ofVinteuil's sonata which strikes SWann so
powerfully, and which the narrator finally comes to understand as well. Proust stands
here as an exemplar because Proust's ability to transform the experience of the sensible
into language, to understand it already as language, and to move fluidly between the
realms of the word, the sensible, the affective, and the concept is singular and impressive.
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Proust writes phenomenologically, in the sense to which Merleau-Ponty returns again and
again, of describing the appearing and shining forth of the world, at once as what appears
and as the appearin~ itself. Merleau-Ponty mentions Proust frequently but always
briefly, never devoting a thorough exposition or reading to him. Thus Merleau-Ponty
provides the starting points for a reading of Proust that might carry further Merleau-
Ponty's own themes of the transition between silence and language, and the necessity of a
passage through silence in creative expression, themes to which Proust devotes explicit
attention. A chapter on Merleau-Ponty's inheritance ofProust is worthwhile here in
order to understand more precisely what Merleau-Ponty learns from Proust and how this
marks his project, to follow "what Proust knew very well" (VI 198/153) about the sense
of language and its intertwining in the sensible, and perhaps even to take Proust as a sort
of ethos of the conversion of attention into language, of the reconversion of silence and
speech into one another. What Deleuze calls Proust's "apprenticeship,,,41 the life (and
3,000 page) long process by which the narrator comes to aesthetic and ethical terms with
his life as a "man of letters," or more broadly, as a thoughtful and sensitive human being,
will be thought here as the enrichment of life through attentive speech, or
phenomenology. Proust's own inquiry is most precisely focused near the very end bfthe
Recherche, when the narrator, separated by years from most of the events of the bobk and
disillusioned by his failures as a writer, undergoes the final event of involuntary memory
that motivates a sudden barrage of insights into life, experience, and most importantly,
writing. The narrator realizes that his own task, what Proust himselfso clearly excels at,
41 Deleuze, Gilles, Proust and SiRns, 3.
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is to bring his life to word, to practice the very passage between thing and word which is
the focus of the present work. The narrator's description ofand interpretation ofthis
process, and of its ethical dimensions as a way of life, are best given in a passage of about
35 pages, which is the focus Chapter III below. If the practice ofphilosophy must learn
from literature and art, Proust is understood by Merleau-Ponty as a great teacher, and the
chapter will seek to understand what Proust appears to learn himself and how his
experience reflects on the present reading of Merleau-Ponty. Proust is an example of
Merleau-Ponty's own effort of ''the expression of what is before expression and sustains
itfrom behiruf' (VI219/167). Furthermore, Proust accomplishes this expression of the
silent excess before expression not against, but by virtue ofa fundamental obscurity and
passivity, the obscurity of depth, time, and silence, as well as the passivity, and necessity,
ofcoming after, of remembrance. Thus Proust helps to show the necessity of traversing
the obscurity, or what I wish to call silence, out of which language emerges and which it
must then re-inscribe in its practice.
Merleau-Ponty's last courses at the College de France involved literature
(including a section on Proust), art, and the practice of philosophy on the one hand, and
nature on the other. The togetherness of these two questions, which, as must be shown, is
not just coincidental, lies, again, in the passage from nature to word, thought in the course
on nature as a lo~os already present in nature. Continuing Merleau-Ponty's interrogation
ofnature as the soil from which we grow should further clarify and deepen the issue of
this passage, now to be thought as the passage from the muteness ofnature to the
reverberations of language, eventually of philosophical language.
42
If Proust figures as an example of the effort to bring the intertwining of sensibility
and idea to word, then the basis ofthis effort is a thought of nature as already expression,
arrived at during the same late years as the investigations into the task ofphilosophy
today.42 The thought of nature as expression, elaborated in the Nature lectures, helps to
bring the matter of language and expression to the foreground ofMerieau-Ponty's
ontological thinking. 43 But despite outlines in the Working Notes describing sections of
a larger work to be devoted to nature, mentions of nature in The Visible and the Invisible
are only occasional and oblique. Thus taking the thought of nature beyond the Nature
lectures to the radicality of The Visible and the Invisible becomes a task for interpretation
today. The goal of Chapter IV is to make a case for reading Merleau-Ponty, occasionally
against himself, as a thoroughgoing thinker of nature. To do this, the chapter will have to
start with the thought of nature as expression and language, and build on this to think
nature as the excess, perhaps the excess of silence, which lies beyond and sustains
sensibility and philosophy in the thought of The Visible and the Invisible. Continuing
Merleau-Ponty's interrogation of nature as the soil from which we grow should further
clarify and deepen the issue of this passage, now to be thought as the passage from the
muteness ofnature to the reverberations of language, eventually ofphilosophical
language. IfMerieau-Ponty, and much ofthe philosophical and literary traditions with
which he is intertwined, from French post-structuralism to Heideggerian phenomenology
42 Carbone's ThinkinR ofthe Sensible, pgs. 28-38, gives a brief analysis of the parallels between the lectures
on Von Uexkull's concept of biology as melody, on Proust's little phrase, and on the thought of the
invisihle as a dimension in The Vi~ihle and the Tnvb:ihle.
43 See Renaud Barbaras, "Merleau-Ponty's Concept ofNature."
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and its Romantic predecessors, is engaged in an attempt to work with something which is
in a certain way beyond language, an excess, or a remainder, then perhaps it is possible to
name this exce~s a~ nature.
The necessity and difficulty of this naming may be illuminated by a parallel with
Schelling. Schelling also struggles with a naming of the excess beyond the most
primordial categories of his thought. In the Philosophical Investi~ations into the Essence
ofHuman Freedom, Schelling elaborates the most powerful version of the creation myth
that repeats itself throughout his work, in which God, as the power of language to say the
world, is preceded and prefigured by a "dark longing," Sehnsucht, which comes from
nature.
Tracing a heritage of Schelling in Merleau-Ponty, who cited and discussed
Schelling occasionally but never thoroughly, is apropos because Schelling marks a major
step towards the recuperation ofan effort to practice philosophy in relation to a certain
excess, or perhaps silence, and to think this nature as this excess. Merleau-Ponty is
certainly a part of the tradition which has been fascinated by this excess at least since the
reaction to Hegel motivated a thinking beyond the interiorizing power of the concept and
ofthought.44 The evidence for this necessity ofnaming nature as the excessive ground at
the root ofthought is perhaps even more powerful in the case of Schelling than in
44 For this formulation of the reaction to HegeL see David Farrell Krell, The Traf{ic Absolute, and Dennis
Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks for historical overviews and analyses, as well as Derrida's "From
Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve," in Writinf{ and Difference. The work of
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bataille, Derrida, and Sartre all work out of and against what they see as a
Hegelian domination ofder Bef{rif(, the Concept, or ofReason., as the highest work and necessity ofGeist.
As Jason Wirth puts it in The Conspiracy ofLife, "Hegel had decided to favor the moment of speech and
hence was not silent enough about silence." But, as Wirth continues, the opposite pole would be a stubborn
refusal to speak at alL a muteness before stubborn facticity (15).
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Merleau-Ponty, so the experience of Schelling in this regard should provide an
illuminating and forceful parallel for the present claim concerning nature in Merleau-
Ponty.45 Specifically, Chapter V will try to show that, running throughout and
underneath Schelling's beginning of thought in nature is a sort of crypto-thought of place,
which functions both in a concrete sense, and in a sense like the chora ofPlato's
Timaeus, as the place which is required for any beginning. This reading will make use of
certain passages in Schelling's dialogue Clara by focusing their suggestions on the birth-
scene of the Freedom essay in order to show this place/chora at work.
Running through each of these interrelated issues is a reticent silence.
Throughout there is the peculiar demand that silence be heeded, brought to word,
maintained as silence, and finally, discussed in philosophy. As already stated, the present
work will not seek to address silence directly, from the beginning to the end. But each
chapter will end up pointing toward the necessity of thinking silence, as the opposite of
speech and as the form of excessive nature, as that which comes to word. Chapter II will
show that the practice of philosophy requires a "reconversion" between silence and
speech, a bringing the silence of the sensible to language. Chapter III will show how
45 Two pieces in the secondary literature come close to this sort of parallel between Merleau-Ponty and
Schelling. One is Antje Kapust's "The So-Called 'Barbarian Basis ofNature , and its Secret Aoyo~,",
which makes the claim that Merleau-Ponty's reading of science in the Nature lectures moves beyond a
Schellingian equivocation between nature as the Ungrund that supports thought and nature as that whose
whole meaning is exhausted by thought, because Merleau-Ponty tries to explain the secret lOJ4oS ofnature.
My claim is rather that it is precisely this unresolved equivocation, or ambiguity between nature and
thought, that drives both of their philosophies and that maintains the tension that I wish to bridge through
the theme of silence. The other is Marcio Suzuki's "Le double enigma du monde: Nature et langage chez
Schelling et Merleau-Ponty," which describes the doubling ofnature as both creator and created, as effect
and as ground, as a mirror of the doubling oflanguage as active, creative language and as passive, received,
sedimented language. Suzuki finds both ofthese doublings in Schelling and Merleau-Ponty.
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Proust accomplishes this reconversion both by writing phenomenologically, and by
making a claim for the necessity of a passage through obscurity, darkness, and silence
before the flowering of language can occur. Chapters IV and V will show, by applying
the findings and methods of The Visible and the Invisible to the thought ofnature and by
learning from Schelling, that the obscurity or excess in question at the root ofMerleau-
Ponty's thought should be named as nature. In terms of the relation between nature and
language, the form of this excess may be thought through the figure of silence. A silence
in nature, more precisely, a lack of speech, is both the soil of language, that from which is
springs, and the matter which it is always trying to express. The essential task in
Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, is thinking and enacting the being of language in a
way that does not cover over or forget the obscure silence form which it springs, but
which, in a higher form ofreflection, remembers the silence of nature in the speech of~
human beings.
For Schelling, the necessity of silence, and the way to think the excess of
language, leads back, beyond the Greek beginnings of philosophy to Greek myth. The
obscure origin and multiple repetitions ofmythic tales maintained a silence at the heart of
meaning, while the Gods figured as the otherwise impossible combination of the excess
of nature and human language. What are we to make of Schelling's insistence on the
necessity of mythic telling for matters of philosophy? Is there anything in the divine-
nature-human-Ianguage structure of mythic existence, to the extent that we can surmise
anything of such an existence today, that might show something of the between of nature
and language?
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Chapter VI will show that this ambiguity and withheld silence that is still sought,
and sometimes found, in literature and art, as Merleau-Ponty explains it, and in the
practice of philosophy that Merleau-Ponty elaborates, is the heritage ofmyth. Thus the
present work concludes with an attempt to show how, along the lines of the interpretation
ofMerleau-Ponty so far established, philosophical practice, like literature and art, can be
thought as a link in the strange togetherness ofhuman language and silent, excessive
nature, a strange togetherness that has defmed the situation of Western thought since the
mythic time of the Greeks.
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CHAPTER II
THE PRACTTCE OF PHTT ,OSOPHY
Roberto Calasso, in Literature and the Gods, digs up a fascinating comment made
by Antonin Artaud on Lautreamont: "he couldn't write a simple letter without feeling the
epileptic shudder of the word."l I am not interested in Artaud, Lautreamont, or epilep.sy,
. . -
but in the image of an uncontrollable shudder, a spasm that could be fatal, on one hand,
or that one might pass through and come out almost the same on the other end. It seems
to recall an experience of speech that is at once dangerous, excessive, but at the same
time quotidian, insofar as language is part and parcel of our everyday reality, of writing a
simple letter, for example. What I wish to interrogate in this chapter is Merleau-Ponty's
focus on this radical strangeness in language that runs right alongside, or underneath, its
everydayness. It is ihis strange and difficult upsurge, which so often fails, which does not
always dti what the phenomena seem to ask, that what I wish to situate as the
fundametltal undergoing of language in its relationship to nature and to silence, an
undergoing which, as Merleau-Ponty begins to show, is at the center of philosophical
practice.
1 Calasso, Roberto, Literature and the Gods, 92. Artaud, Antonin, "Lettre sur Lautreamont," Supp6ts et
supplications, in Oeuvres complets, XIV/7, 32.
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This chapter will organize its inquiry with an attempt to organize the results of
Merleau-Ponty' s most sustained interrogations of language in his later work. It will
begin by making clear how Merleau-Ponty's reflections on language have nothing to do
with what he calls the "positivism" of language, which thinks language only ontically, as
a region of being whose functions might be mapped and charted. Next, it will take up the
question of "indirect language," but only with the result that the concept of indirect
language remains unclear in Merleau-Ponty's work. The chapter then turns to the point
in The Visible and the Invisible just before language becomes that book's chief concern:
the discussion of Sartre and dialectic. An extensive interrogation of dialectic and what
Merleau-Ponty calls "hyper-dialectic" lays the groundwork for the turn to language and
to the creative work in the last chapter of The Visible and the Invisible. This
interrogation also necessitates a confrontation with Hegel, and a treatment of the sense of
philosophy as movement and as the interrogation of a being which is already
philosophical, which Merleau-Ponty claims that we learn from Hegel. The goal of this
chapter is to explore the sense of language which Merleau-Ponty opens in his late work,
and to take seriously the visions for the practice of philosophy which come out of that
sense of language.
"He couldn't write a letter without feeling the epileptic shudder of the word." As
much could be said of Merleau-Ponty, as well as ofHeidegger and most of the post-
Heideggerean, post-Nietzschean tradition in French thought, ofDerrida, Blanchot, and
Lacoue-Labarthe, for example, although the focus and form of this shudder, and where it
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strikes the event of language, would differ for each. An "epileptic" shudder is only a
rough image for whatever runs throughout this undergoing of language, but an apt image
nonetheless. Throughout this tradition, language is something much more than a means
of the transmission of thought, a sort of unproblematic translation. Its stakes are high, yet
it is also utterly normal, for we speak and listen everyday. Like epilepsy, which strikes
the epileptic suddenly and with unforeseeable consequences, the realization of the power
and consequences of language provokes a sort of incapacity, an failure to describe and
understand this strangeness, or to work it into the familiar categories of philosophy.
"The epileptic shudder of the word" would name, in Merleau-Ponty at least, the
birth of language in every attempt at creative speech, the event of crossover from silence
to language and back again, which sometimes resonates in literature and philosophy. It is
both the recognition of this shudder and the response to it, or more precisely, the attempt
to think it, that motivates language as a theme in Merleau-Ponty. Artaud's phrase is
again apropos here because the silence beneath the word is a matter of darkness, a sense
of something great, unimaginable, and perhaps frightening, a matter to make one shudder.
Thus the silence beneath language is not just the lack of sound, but something abyssal.
Something dark. This alone is reason enough that Merleau-Ponty, especially when he is
coming close to describing this passage between silence and language, becomes quite
hard to read, as if something very difficult is going on which succeeds only indirectly.
The question oflanguage in Merleau-Ponty's later work is always entwined with
the question of the practice of philosophy; indeed the question is precisely how
philosophy is to be practiced, or is to conceive of itself as a practice, in the space between
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silence and language, the space of an epileptic shudder. That the two questions, of
language and of the practice of philosophy, should revolve around each other is not
surprising, even before all considerations of shuddering and abysses. Philosophy is made
ofnothing more than words; it is perhaps even exemplary among human pursuits for the
extent to which its substance and product remain a matter of words, words, always more
words, and, directly at least, nothing more than words. The reverberations of the shudder
of the word, and, historically speaking, the reverberations ofphilosophy's attention to
this shudder, should make the practice ofphilosophy reverberate as well. The character
ofour undergoing of language, its strangeness, difficulty, or its ease and grace, once we
attend to it, should inform our conception of philosophy and the manner in which we
practice philosophy. That is part of the reason why Merleau-Ponty turns his attention to
philosophy as practice and to the form of this practice, why he is no longer content to
simply modify and continue the project of Husserl, for example, or to continue in the
same vein as a contemporary such as Sartre. Philosophy as a practice must be rethought
in light of the shudderihg of language.
The failure of much ofwhat goes by the name of philosophy to think its own
substance and product, to meditate on language in a manner that would be true to the our
undergoing ofthe event bflanguage, the "decadence of express philosophy, and the
philosophic charactet ofart, of literature, etc" (NC 39) becomes, for Merleau-Ponty, a
motivation to think both language and the practice of philosophy itself differently.2 What
2 On Merleau-Ponty's attempt to re-think philosophy along the lines of literature, see Daphna Erdinast-
Vulcan, '''That which has no name in philosophy': Merleau-Ponty and the language of literature," which
concentrates on the ethical ramifications of philosophy as literary expression, as wen as Robert 1.
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philosophy is and must be has to emerge from a meditation on language, and conversely,
can shed light on a thought of language that is by no means clearly established. It would
seem that the practice ofphilosophy, and its character as apractice, should take their cue
from a thinking ofthe place oflanguage in relation to nature, from the character ofthe
- -
event of speech as a shudder, a trembling. The goal of the present chapter is to layout,
and attempt to take seriously, the outlines of the undergoing oflanguage and the practice
of philosophy as they are thought late in Merleau-Ponty's career.
It is simple enough to say that philosophy depends on language. But what can be
said about philosophy, based on our own undergoing of language, based on a sort of
phenomenology of language, a second order logos of the logos of phainomena? First, it
must be clear that the dependence of philosophy on language is not completely grasped
through a positivistic explanation, one that would determine the possibilities of
philosophy through an empirical study of language. This is perhaps the simplest and
easiest error in thinking the importance of language in the task of philosophy, an error
that Merleau-Ponty calls "the positivism of language." It is quickly dismissed over the
space of a few paragraphs in Chapter II of The Visible and the Invisible. In elaborating
the importance of some kind ofthought of language for the practice of philosophy, one
would do well to get the positivism oflanguage out of the way as summarily as Merleau-
Ponty does.
Morrison's "Merleau-Ponty and Literary Language," which is concerned with parallels in style and
substance between Merleau-Ponty and various nineteenth and twentieth century novelists and poets.
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The .positivism of language is the empirical study of the function and rules of
. -
words and speech. "The question concerning the meaning of the world's being is so little
solvable by a definition of words - which would be drawn from the study of language, its
powers, and the effective conditions for its functioning - that on the contrary it reappears
within the study of language, which is but a particular form of it" (VI 129/96). This
o~lection to a positivistic approach is essentially Heideggerean; it sees the unanswered,
and even unaddressed, question of Being reverberating within ontic questions, those
which would purport to elaborate the world of beings, in this case, the function of
language conceived ontically.3 The problem, as Merleau-Ponty explains, is even a
relatively simple matter of Saussurean linguistics: a positivistic definition and outline of
language would require clear and unequivocal significations for words like "world" and
"thing," which in fact take their force from a "halo of signification" which makes "the
meaning of the word itself into an enigma" (VI 130/96),4 It is this halo, this working with
powerful words like language, thought, reflection, nature, the sensible, the visible in a
manner that allows them to live through the enigma ofthis halo, that allows, and perhaps
. .
even compels, Merleau-Ponty to move between these words without always demarcating
the meaning of one from another in a clear manner which we might follow. Such a
demarcation, though it might make things seem more clear by making them appear more
3 The "Introduction" to Beinf,f and Time is a good explanation of this method, as a well as The Basic
Problems ofPhenomenology, sects. 3-5, a lecture course which begins with the simple and brazen claim,
"We assert now that beinf,f is the proper and sole theme o(philosophy" (11).
4 This brief argument recalls the much longer "exchange" between Derrida and John Searle pubJished as
Limited Inc, in which Derrida tries to show that words such as "meaning," "speech-act," "signification,"
which Searle's effort to rigorously establish the rules of speech-acts requires to be clear and univocal, are in
fact multiple and essentially out-of-control.
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controlled, could work to push us back toward the ontic function of words, the sense that
these words refer to a more or less clearly defined region of a being which we essentially
understand. It is this that, in the case of language, Merleau-Ponty explicitly and
repeatedly warns against.5
Thus one should not be misled by the still vague sense that the thought of
language holds the special key to philosophy: it is not a simple matter of explaining the
function of language in order to set forth the rules, limits, and requirements of
philosophy, and not a simple matter of laying down the laws of language so that its
connection to nature, which would also be clearly understood, could be mapped. As it is
put more simply in the course notes of 1959: "for philosophy, the problem oflanguage is
not a regional problem" (NC 123). This is so in two ways: first because it is as much
coming to terms with language that will bring philosophy to a clearer knowledge of itself
as it is a matter of "philosophy" approaching the problem of language to better explain it,
and second, because a philosophy that would understand language as a function and
understand itself as operating according to strict rules and limits according to that
function has not yet grasped language as a total problem that implicates all of philosophy.
Despite the statement that language is not a regional problem, but the problem, a
problem implicated in all other problems, one will not find a work or passage where a
5 But which, as discussed in Chapter 1 above, should not raise the anti-philosophical specter of a
undemarcated and undisciplined mish-mash of meaningless words. At this point, the problem Merleau-
Ponty is raising is essentially structural: if a positivistic study oflanguage requires perfectly reliable and
clear definitions, this system is unattainable if the perfection of these definitions is unattainable. That does
not, however, mean that we do not attempt definitions, demarcations, and distinctions, or that any of this is
not helpful or worthwhile or even essential to the work of philosophy.
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definitive Merleau-Pontian philosophy of language is laid out, outlined, or even clearly
proposed. This is not to say that Merleau-Ponty did not write at length about language, or
that the phenomenon of language is not the explicit concern ofmultiple books and essays
and an implicit or major concern everywhere. Nevertheless, there is no final result of all
this, no last word, no "philosophy oflanguage." In a sense, this is as it should be, if
language is not to be taken as an ontic object to be explained by a philosophical view
from above. Instead of this, one finds suggestions, often at the ends of chapters in The
Visible and the Invisible, and in enigmatic working notes, ofhow language might be
thought. The closest thing to a direct and thorough treatment of language as a sUQject
might be the essay "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,,,6 yet its results, in
terms of the being and force of language, are vague and fleeting, a bare beginning to what
will he fleshed out much more in The Visihle and the Tnvisible.
"Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" begins, literally on the first line,
with Saussure: "What we have learned from Saussure is that, taken singly, signs do not
signifY anything, and that each one of them does not so much express a meaning as mark
a divergence ofmeaning from other signs" (84/39). The import ofthis lesson from
Saussure is the same for painting as it is for language, and makes up the essay's
conclusion about language and silence: like painting, "all language is indirect or allusive
- that is, ifyou wish, silence" (854/43). The essay speaks of a "second-order language,"
hidden in everyday language, "in which signs once again lead the vague life of colors" (8
6 As well as the unpublished text The Prose ofthe World. Much of this work is a long chapter, "Indirect
Language," which presents this phenomenon in a similar manner to the published essay. Another chapter is
a long reflection on Saussure, and two chapters arguing against ontic explanations of language.
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56-57/45). Although Merleau-Ponty doesn't mention it here, this is certainly reminiscent
of the "original, creative language" of Phenomenology o/Perception, where new
meanings occur, as opposed to everyday language, which is a repetition of worn out
meaning (PhP 214/184). The language that leads the life of colors is Saussurean, and to
understand language, one must hear the unspoken concatenations that hover around what
is said, must listen to a sort of silence (8 58/46). This unspoken halo is silent, but it is an
active silence, indeed a very loud silence. The work of the writer is like that of the
painter (8 56/45), in that it evokes and lives from "our sheer power of expressing," and
questiens "how we can be grafted to the universal by what which is most our own"
(65/52). The painter grafts himself and the art lover to the universality of vision, to the
constant birth of a sensuous world. But to what universal, and to what that is most our
own, are we grafted by the writer, by the work of language? Is the reconversion of
silence and speech indeed a sort ofgrafting to the universal, a movement between
individual speech, perhaps what is most our own, and anonymous silence? The essay
leaves this unclear.
Without detracting from "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" as an
overall work, and as a key work for Merleau-Ponty's theory ofpainting, it must be said
that it does not take the matter of language and silence much farther than what is stated in
the title. Language evb'kes indirectly what otherwise must stay silent; language is a sort
of silence, or works by silence; in that it is like painting, which is obviously "silent." But
how, why, with what implications for philosophy's future and practice?
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Merleau-Ponty makes much the same brief and open claim in the course summary
of 1959: philosophy must seek an indirect method to express being, because it is
impossible, or inappropriate, to say being itself. Is this simply a case of refusing to speak
directly of some matter about which we have a clear idea, because the idea is bound to be
inadequate, or in this case, intellectually taboo? Not exactly. In indirect language, one
does not know what would be said if it could be said directly. Whatever is direct is
misleading, and direct speech is here sometimes impossible. It is not perfectly clear here
what "direct" means; it seems close to "propositional," or even "declarative," and it is at
least clear that Merleau-Ponty is suggesting the impossibility or inappropriateness of a
form of ontological speech that would declare, "Being is X." But how else, really, do we
ever speak?
All this is simply to say that "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" is no
more, and perhaps less, of a thorough-going interrogation of the question of language and
silence than The Visible and the Invisible or any of the course notes, even though it has
"language" in the title.
Much as that essay speaks of language and art as "how we can be grafted to the
universal by that which is most our own," a working note to The Visible and the Invisible
describes creative language as the only sort of "adequation" that occurs in language, as an
adequation that is at the sanie time creation: "A creation that is at the same time a
reintegration of Being: for it is not creation in the sense of one of the commonplace
Gebilde that history fabricates: it knows itself to be a Gebilde and wishes to surpass itself
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as pure Gebilde, to find again its origin. It is thus a creation in a radical sense: a creation
that is at the same time an adequation, the only way to obtain an adequation" (VI 247-
248/197).
The simple thought of language as the adequation of words to things, linked to the
history of "truth-as-correctness" that Heidegger revealed,7 is already incommensurable
with any kind of indirect language, where a simple adequation is clearly impossible. Yet
language's creativity, and the individual work of expression, "what is most our own" as
"Indirect Language" puts it, is not foreign to the things, indeed is exactly the kind of
adequation they call for and the only kind available. This tension is certainly an old
matter for thought, old and thorougWy worked over: philosophical language knows itself
to be a creative construction, but wishes to surpass itself and to find its origin in
adequation, in sayinK beinK itse(f Yet Merleau-Ponty, even in the "re" that prefaces
"integration" in the "reintegration of being," is not out to think a simple "return to the
origin" of speech in being, or in silence, or in things; this would be, to use the conceptual
schema of Chapter I, a kind of fIrst sailing. Rather, the creative adventure of language
will continue to be haunted by this tension, already present in the fIrst epileptic shudder
ofthe word, the tension of the where oflanguage's origin: from the human or from the
things? A few lines later, the same working note calls for "an analysis of literature in this
sense: as inscription of being" (VI 249/197). The "adequation" of "creative adequation,"
the inscription of being in language, whether in literature, philosophy, or anywhere else,
7 See, for example, The Essence o[Truth, 1-17, 85-104, and 220-229; Parmenides, 10-49, Beinf( and Time
sect. 44.
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is at least a Step 3 process in our schema, the revelation of being, nature, the things,
- -
through language.
Surely part of the violence of the "shudder" comes from the awesome
responsibility of the creative aspect of language, a responsibility only increased by the
loss of pure or direct adequation as a hope and a goal, by the failure of the first sailing. It
is this responsibility that helps to characterize philosophy as a task, as a work which must
find a way to conceive itself and to put itself into practice.
Again, at the very beginning of The Visible and the Invisible: "philosophy is not a
lexicon... it does not seek a verbal substitute for the world we see" (VI 18/4). It does not,
Merleau-Ponty goes on to explain, even seek to install itself in the order of words. "It is
the things themselves, from the depths of their silence, that it wishes to lead to
expression" (VI 18/4). This, on the second page of the book, is the first definition of the
practice of philosophy, and it holds throughout the text. The movement from silence to
speech is the very being of philosophy. "Lead" in the French text is conduire, for which
''to lead" is a good translation. It is also close to the English "conduct." A subtle
difference should be noted from the more common English phrase "to bring to
expression" - here it is perhaps more that the things themselves come to expression, but
require guidance, or a path, a conducting, through philosophy. Philosophy will conduct
the things themselves to expression.
Here there is both continuity and a subtle change from the first paragraph of the
preface to PhenomenoloKY ofPerception: "phenomenology... is also a philosophy for
which the world is always 'already there' before reflection begins - as an inalienable
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presence; and all its efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive
contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status" (PhP
i/vii). Continuity because it is always a matter of making philosophy out of a direct
contact with the world, but change because the temporality of this contact and this
philosophy are stated differently. It is no longer a matter of re-establishing something
primitive and forgotten, something "already" and "before." More simply if less certainly,
it is now only to "bring the things themselves to expression." Perhaps for the fust time,
or more likely, perhaps, again, in a sort of eternal repetition. Philosophy, as we have
seen, is not to be an act of proper adequation, but a creative event which brings to word
and enacts the strange proximity-distance between individual and universal already
spoken of, if we can take "individual" as each person's capacity for and immersion in
language, and "universal" as nature or the sensible things. Indeed, as we see in what is
one of the main themes of the chapter entitled "Interrogation and Intuition," "the
philosophical language which we seek is not to be a perfect coincidence of language and
world, a coincidence so perfect that it would be an abdication of language, a sort of quiet
contemplation" (VI 165/125). It is true that "language lives only from silence, everything
which we cast to the others has generated in this mute land which we do not leave" (VI
165/126). But it is the manner of this living from silence that must be interrogated.
"Because he has experienced within himself the need to speak, the birth of speech as
bubbling up at the bottom of his mute experience, the philosopher knows better than
anyone that what is lived is lived-spoken, that, born at this depth, language is not a mask
over Being, but - if one knows how to grasp it with all its roots and foliation - the most
------_.--- - --- -
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valuable witness to Being, that it does not interrupt an irnmediation that would be perfect
without it" (VI 165/126). What is lived is lived-spoken, not lived prior to speech and then
requiring recapitulation by speech. Language is "born at this depth," a matter both rooted
and foliating, and the world is already shot through with this speech. Philosophy knows
this because of its own experience, because of what it has undergone, in the bubbling rise
from silence to speech that all creative language undergoes. Attention to this very
undergoing, then, should show, at the least, that language is not fundamentally other to
nature, or to its silence. Rather, language comes from the silence of nature, "born at this
"depth" of "this mute land which we never leave."
Philosophy is continually spoken of, especially in The Visible and the Invisible, as
a matter of bringing to word the world that is already prepared for speech, but is silent at
the same time. Such a philosophy would be the result of what Merleau-Ponty proposes as
sur-ref/exion, that reflection that would "take itself and the changes it introduces into the
spectacle into account" (VI 60138), which would have to take up the "perhaps difficult
effort" using the significations of words "to express, beyond themselves, our mute
contact with the things when they are still not things said" (VI 60/38). This effort must
"plunge into the world," it must "make it say, finally, what in its silence it means to say"
(VI 60/39). The hints and suggestions which sketch the outline of this new practice of
philosophy, of what it will be and what it must not be, and of the thought of language on
which it turns and which it must in tum try to think, are scattered throughout The Visible
and the Invisible, and become more focused in the last chapter.
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The discussion of language in The Visible and the Invisible begins in earnest near
the end of Chapter II, a chapter which is taken up mostly with a discussion and criticism
of Sartre's BeinJ? and NothinJ?ness. From the end of Chapter II to the end of the
unfinished text, language and the practice of philosophy are a constant theme on almost
every page. It is worth paying some attention to this transition, from the critique of BeinJ?
and NothinJ?ness to the explicit consideration of language, since the move to language as
an theme in the text's progression emerges from the problems which Merleau-Ponty finds
in Being and Nothingness.
The discussion of Same ends on the matter of how to understand the dialectic,
which in Being and NothinJ?ness takes a form too rigid, almost ossified, so that the
movement that is integral to it is only possible in a precise pattern that leaves out the
transitions and crossings between Being and Nothingness. It is these transitions, and the
possibility of a between-space which they require, that, to Merleau-Ponty, are closer to
human life. The chapter is thus an attempt to think, or rather re-think, the very old
question of dialectic, and it is this question that provides the bridge to the interrogation of
language which takes up most of the rest ofthe unfinished text. Merleau-Portty's reading
of Sartre takes up forty pages of The Visible and the Invisible. The generosity in the
nuance of its exposition makes its eventually very harsh judgment of Being and
NothinJ?ness all the more compelling. Since this is not the present su~ject, the following
will be only the briefest of summaries in order to provide a background for the transition
to language in the movement of The Visible and the Invisible. Thus it will necessarily
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fail to communicate the richness of Sartre's text, which could easily take up forty pages
or many more, in the way that Merleau-Ponty's exposition does.
In what Merleau-Ponty calls the philosophy of the negative, "One seeks being and
nothingness in the pure state, one wishes to approach them as closely as possible, one
aims at being itself in its plenitude and at nothing in its vacuity, one presses the confused
experience until one draws the entity and the negentity out of it, one squeezes them as
between pincers" (VI 117/86). It is precisely the "confused experience" that one thus
misses in one's haste to find the purity of Being and Nothingness, a purity that,
conveniently, can be isolated in clear and distinct philosophical terms whose relation can
follow a rigorous logic. Yet despite this compelling logic, one misses the "confused
experience" of human life: "Far from opening upon the blinding light ofpure Being or of
the Object, our life has, in the astronomical sense of the word, an atmosphere: it is
constantly enshrouded by those mists we call the sensible world or history, the one ofthe
corporeal life and the one of the human life, the present and the past, as well as by a pell-
mell ensemble ofbodies and minds, promiscuity ofvisages, words, actions, with,
between them all, that cohesion which cannot be denied them..." (VI 115/84). Merleau-
Ponty's choice ofwords, "enshrouded," "mists," "promiscuity," "cohesion," can hardly
be casual. These words carry the sense ofa movement that occurs somewhere between
the ideal poles of everything Sartre means by "Being" and "Nothingness," the movement
and confusion that is our life as it is lived, which never reaches the pure Being or the pure
Nothingness. The sensible world and history, time, the faces ofothers, language, and
action form an atmosphere which never reveals any "pure Being" or "pure Nothingness."
Such a thought as Sartre's in BeinK and NothinKness, which structures itse1fby a constant
back-and-forth, a sort of dialectic no doubt, between two ideal poles, does not come from
a description of human life, but from a logic too attached to its own form.
Yet the power of this dialectical movement is one that Merleau-Ponty does not
underestimate; indeed he devotes almost thirty pages to a convincing and exciting
reiteration of it,8 one that is so convincing as one reads it that it is difficult to tell that all
this is only the explication of a thought that ultimately fails. If dialectic, in the Sartrean
sense (a descendant of a certain Hegelian sense) which Merleau-Ponty is working with
here, is a matter of thinking movement, then the problem is to think dialectically in a way
that can think the character of movement which we find in human life, confused as it is,
in the border between language and the sensible.
The basic form of Merleau-Ponty's argument against Sartrean ontology and
Sartrean dialectics is that it is not close to life, that the thinking, the writing, and the
arguments used do not arise from, and fail to give a sense for, much less explain, the in-
between spaces, the ambiguity of human being, in all the manners in which it does not
conform to the sparklingly dual logic laid out by Sartre. The form of the argument
against Being and Nothingness is thus reminiscent of the Platonic sense of dialectic
outlined by Socrates in the Republic. The dialectical man, Socrates says, is he who
8 Dialectical thought in generaL rooted in Hegel, was always a concern for Merleau-Ponty, and perhaps a
principal focus of the changes in his thinking towards the end of his life. See Mariana Larison, "Autour du
concept de nature dans Ie derniere Merleau-Ponty," for a reading that situates Merleau-Ponty's vision of the
"good dialectic" in the context of post-war French Hegelian thought, between Kojeve and Tran Duc Thau,
and for a brief argument that Merleau-Ponty's explicit concern with nature as an ontological problem grew
partly out of the dialectical problems of thinking the source of negativity as not only human consciousness.
This analysis seems to be supported by passages in the Nature lectures, which speak ofa "non-Parminidean
being of the negative" in the nature disclosed by science.
~ -- ~---------------
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"grasps the logos of the being (ousia) of each thing.,,9 The logos, in this earlier dialectic,
should by carried out in a way that fits with the being of each thing, with the substance
(ousia) of the matter, 10 and not with an imposed form. The dialectic of visible and
invisible will have to think the movement hetween visible and invisihle as it occurs in
human life, and it will be a matter of ambiguities, of slipping from one to the other, of
being both at the same time, more so than the back and forth between Being and
Nothingness. "The sort of being to which fthe dialecticl refers, and which we have been
trying to indicate, is in fact not susceptible of being designated positively. It abounds in
the sensible world, but on condition that the sensible world has been divested ofall that
the ontologies have added to it" (VI 124/93). The dialectic, as a logos of beings, must
maintain itself close to beings in order to remain itself, but "it has never been able to
formulate itself into theses without denaturing itself." Yet paradoxically, philosophy has
been full of theses at least since Socrates first laid down the nature of the dialectic, in the
form ofa thesis. Thus it becomes another task of the dialectic to be "autocritical," to
become a practice of self-awareness. But, "it is also essential to it to forget this as soon
as it becomes what we call a philosophy" (VI 124/92).
A philosophy of ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty tells us, can expect to lose the
particular form of philosophical rigor that results in fixed terms and in clear paths
between the terms. Indeed, it may even lose the name "philosophy." "The bad dialectic
does not wish to lose its soul in order to save it" (VI 127/92). The changes required of
9 Plato, Republic 534b.
10 See John Sallis, Being and Logos, Chapter 5, especially Section 5d, for a thorough reading ofthe
"divided line" section ofthe Republic.
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philosophy, apparently, are such that it must be prepared to lose its name and its soul.
Or, more precisely, to remain philosophical means to abandon the pretense oflaying
down "a philosophy," and to save the true soul of philosophy by being prepared to
abandon what seems to be most at its heart. Philosophy, as we are told in The Prose of
- .
the World, "begins with the awareness of a world which consumes and destroys our
established significations but also renews and purifies them" (PW25-26/17). Perhaps it
is also at risk ofconsuming and destroying its own established significations, including
its self-conception. In Chapter II of The Visible and the Invisible it becomes clear that
philosophy as sur-r¢/lection must also consume and destroy itself, even as it is renewed
and purified.
What, then, will these changes look like, and what, at the heart ofphilosophy, is
to be abandoned? We can say, at least, that such a philosophy will no doubt have a
strange relationship with its own results and conclusions. The auto-critical sur-r¢/lection,
which immediately puts in question the answers to which it arrives and always seeks to
go beneath itself, even at the risk of unearthing itself, of losing its soul in order to save it,
will, at the very least, understand all of its thought as fundamentally temporal. It will
have to come to grips with its own eternally provisional nature, even when it gets written
down in a book, rather than becoming tricked by the apparent permanence ofthe written,
and even spoken, word, of which Phenomenology ofPerception warned (PhP 2211190).1l
Philosophy's status as a search for eternal answers has been in question forever, but the
II "For speech implants the idea of truth as the presumptive limit of its effort. It loses sight of itself as a
contingent fact, and takes to resting upon itself; that is, as we have seen, what provides us with the ideal of
thought without words, whereas the idea of music without sounds is ridiculous."
L-- . _
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problem, for Merleau-Ponty, is now to practice philosophy, to speak and write
philosophically, in a manner informed by ambiguity and temporality. 12 Philosophy "must
tell us how there is openness without the occultation of the world being excluded, how
the occultation remains each instant possible though we be naturally endowed with light"
(VI 48/28). Philosophy must think our position between darkness and light, and must
practice in a manner appropriate to this position. "How the occultation remains each
instant possible though we be naturally endowed with light" - we are here in question, the
light that is the basis ofvision, the phainomenon, the shining, in phenomenology.
"Philosophy is the set ofquestions wherein he who questions is himself implicated by the
question" (VI 46-47/27). As the implication of the questioner, philosophy is not just the
effort to find an answer, to accumulate another bit of positive knowledge. It is better
thought of as a practice, as in the practice of an art, a discipline, or a spiritual practice.
Hegel stands, for Merleau-Ponty and for the history of philosophy since Hegel, as
a point of departure both for thinking the proximity and continual re-encroachment of
philosophy and experience, and for the path away from this proximity into the rigidity
and formalism of philosophy as a system of science. In The Prose ofthe World, Merleau-
Ponty summarizes his view ofthe importance ofHegel in the following sentence: "In the
center ofhis thought is the moment in which the internal becomes external, that turning
or veering by which we merge with others and others in us" (PW 119/85), a phrase
echoed in a haunting working note, "There is that line, that frontier surface at sorne
12 One result of this will be a consistently interrogative approach to the history of philosophy, as discussed
in the working note ofJune 4, 1959: "a philosophy, like a work ofart, is an object that can arouse more
thoughts than are 'contained' in it... Does this lead to conclusions that are relativistic? that is, that will be
overthrown by another time? No, ifthe philosophies in their integrality are a question" (VI 250/200).
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distance before me, where occurs the veering I-Other Other-I-" (VI 311/263). The
proximity and encroachment of the Outside, of what is excessive, whether that is the
Other in some sense, or the excessive character of the absolute over thought and
experience, is what Merleau-Ponty learns from Hegel.
In the 1961 course on Hegel,13 Merleau-Ponty reads Hegel as opening the way to
the philosophy that would practice the proximity of the absolute and experiencel4 (NC
275-278). He focuses especially on the famous line from the "Introduction" to the
Phenomenolof!Y ofSpirit: "From the beginning, the absolute: 'was already in and for
itself close to us of its own accord' ran undfur sich schon bei uns ware1" (NC 296). The
"goal" of philosophy, whatever would be the product or the result of philosophical work,
or perhaps whatever place or status it would finally reach, is already close to, or already
present in, raw experience or brute being. The entire Phenomenolof!Y oISpirit, but
especially its "Introduction," is especially attuned to the becoming of thought out Qfthe
unreflective, and thus attends carefully to the closeness of thought and the unreflective, to
the seed of thought in the unreflective, and to the constant backwards-refetence to prior
stages in the development of thought towards the Absolute. As Merleau-Ponty sees it, in
Hegel, the final resting place of thought in the system of science becomes more
13 English translation "Philosophy and non-philosophy since Hegel," in Philosophy and non-Philosophy
Since Merleau-Ponty, " Hugh Silverman, ed.
14 Merleau-Ponty tends to use the Hegelian terms "absolute" and "experience" in this course, but
occasionally switches them with other doublings, all along the lines of"invisible" and "visible," without
laying out precisely what is gained and lost in these terminological interchanges. I will follow Merleau-
Ponty's lead in recogni7Jng a history between the Hegelian thought of the Absolute and the MerIeau-
Pontian thought of the invisible, despite the very uneven matching of these terms.
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predominant in his later works, so that the Phenomenology oISpirit comes to be seen as
nothing but a preliminary, a stage to be surpassed and left behind.
What Merleau-Ponty sees as so valuable in the Phenomenology ofSpirit is an
- . -
ambiguity and fragile equilibrium between reflection and the unreflective, or between
thought, or language, and nature, or the invisible and the visible. On Merleau-Ponty's
admittedly brief reading ofHegel in the Notes de cours, this ambiguity is lost farther
down Hegel's path toward purely thinkable being. IS But what we learn from the
experience of Hegel, and of reading Hegel, is that the results of philosophy are not to be a
clarification or a higher version of experience, but a form ofexperience itself. If
philosophy were to mean the attaining of the absolute as system, then phenomenology
- .
would be a-philosophical: "Thus the phenomenological theme [phenomenology not just
on Merleau-Pontian terms, but already on the terms ofHegel's Introduction to
Phenomenology qfSpiritl (erscheinende Wissen, the blossoming ofknowledge) seems to
imply an overthrowing of philosophy" (NC 304). Merleau-Ponty summarizes the
importance of Hegel most succinctly as the practice of a form ofphilosophy, that is,
phenomenology, that is a-philosophical, in the sense that it conceives of the absolute, to
use Hegelian terms, not as something to attain but as "the other side of the Ersheinung or
the phenomenon" (NC 304). It is the blossoming ofknowledge as phenomenological
movement, between the phenomenon and the invisible. Or, it is the return to nature by a
15 I follow Mauro Carbone's outline ofthese points from Merleau-Ponty's course on Hegel in his essay "Ad
Limina Philosophiae," in The Thinking a/the Sensible. Carbone also points out Merleau-Ponty's emphasis
on the transition precisely in paragraph 15 of Hegel's "Introduction," where the task of philosophy, which
had been a form of "pure seeing," becomes erroneous, blind, and in need of the clarification of philosophy
("Ad Limina Philosophaie," 20, and NC 308n).
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passage through language, by a passage that would reach the invisible in the visible not
directly, but as a way of access to "the other side."
This leads to the question of "How the occultation remains each instant possible
though we be naturally endowed with light," the demand of The Visible and the Invisible.
Our endowment of light, the possibility ofphainomenon and phenomenology and also the
coming to word ofnature through philosophical practice, whether Hegelian or Merleau-
Pontian, is inextricably intertwined with occultation, with the raw unreflective, that which
lies at the beginning of this movement. Hegel attempted to think the possibility,
necessity, and meaning of this intertwining, and pursued this thought in the direction of,
and perhaps to the limit of, the continual brightening of the light of reason until all
darkness would be obscured and forgotten. We might say that this means pursuing light
to the point of blindness, looking directly at the sun. The point, for Merleau-Ponty, is to
think, in the manner of sur-r~flection, the between of reflection and the unreflective, or of
language and nature. As Mauro Carbone puts it: "The affirmation of a reversibility
between unreflective life and reflective life implies that philosophical expression,
traditionally conceived as a progression from the dark polymorphism of the unreflective
- -
to the conceptual consciousness of the reflective, is always doubled by a regression from
conceptual consciousness toward the dark unreflective.,,16
It is this doubling that interests us here, this appearance of a regression. This
doubling is the true dialectic, in the ancient sense, discussed by Socrates in the Republic,
16 "Ad LiminaPhilosophae," The Thinking ofthe Sensible, 27. See Chapter V below, and Marcio Suzuki,
"Le double enigma du monde: Nature et langage chez Schelling et Merleau-Ponty" for a reading ofthis
doubling in Schelling.
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of the IOf?osfor the being, given by the human, that is the logos l?fthe being itself, that
which most belongs to it.17 It is "true" as true to life, as the logos of the being, the being
in question being the movement of philosophy. It is also the good dialectic in the
~ - -
Merleau-Pontian sense of the sur-r~flection that immediately doubles back on itself to
interrogate its own origins in the dark unr~flective. This interrogation is what Merleau-
Ponty calls for in the practice of philosophy.
This practice, this interrogation, could be thought simply as bringing language
and silence closer to each other. Each doubling of reflective and non-reflective, the
absolute and nature, the visible and the invisible must pass through silence, through a
point where language bursts into bloom, or vanishes into the inexpressible. Silence is a
moment in the doubling, where there is a passage out of silence and back into silence, or
where silence, once left behind, returns to overtake philosophical language.
Thus the constant recurrence of the figure of silence in the end of Chapter III of
The Visible and the Invisible, the part of the text which makes a transition between
Merleau-Ponty's attempts to make a start through a critical re-working of Husserl, Sartre,
and Bergson, and his move in Chapter IV toward a radically original thought.
Philosophy is "~al1ed forth by the voices of silence," (VI 166/127), and knows that
"language lives only from silence; everything we cast to the others has germinated in this
great mute land which we never leave" (VI 165/126). It is the life oflanguage in this
great mute land that is the point of reversal between the light and darkness. Philosophy
must find its practice in this point, at the first few paragraphs of the Phenomenology l?f
17 Plato, Republic 534b; see also John Sallis, Being and Logos, 443.
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Spirit. The necessity of remaining close to this point informs Merleau-Ponty's plan for
The Visible and the Invisible in a working note of February, 1959. "What is at issue is to
operate the reduction, that is, for me, to disclose little by little - and more and more - the
'wild' or 'vertical' world... we will close the circle after the study of logos and history as
Proust closes the circle when he comes to the moment where the narrator decides to
write. The end of a philosophy is the account of its beginning" (VI 228-229/177). The
practice ofphenomenology, operating the reduction, should disclose, not all at once but
little by little, by cumulative effect, the silence of the wild, the vertical world. Proust's
work is a work of remembrance, ofcoming closer to the source of his own words in the
obscure depths of his life, and likewise, philosophy, and Merleau-Ponty's text, will press
closer and closer to the obscure transition point of silence and speech, which should
contain, in germ, the beginning of philosophy, or the possibility and necessity of
philosophy, just as Proust's great work ends with the thought of its own genesis (See
Chapter III below). It is the task, a Schellingian task, of"the expression ofwhat is before
expression and sustains it from behind" (VI219/167). That is to say, a task of the
expression of silence.
Philosophy, as such a process of uncovering what is below itself, must be "an
original manner of aiming at something, as it were a question-knowinR, which by
principle no statement or 'answer' can go beyond and which perhaps therefore is the
proper mode of our relationship with Being, as though it were the mute or reticent
interlocutor of our questions" (VI 168-169/129). Thus philosophy, as a practice, must be
indirect language, as in Zen practice - it must not rush forward wishing to procure direct
72
results, but must move along half-sideways, as if it were talking to itself, to come at what
it will learn obliquely, indirectly.
Philosophy is thus the expression of silence, "the disclosure of a Being that is not
posited because it has no need to be, because it is silently behind all our affirmations,
negations, and even behind all formulated questions, not that it is a manner of forgetting
them in its silence, but because philosophy is the reconversion of silence and speech into
one another: 'It is the experience... still mute which we are concerned with leading to the
pure expression of its own meaning'" (VI 169/129).18 Merleau-Ponty, returning to his
own beginning of sorts, here borrows from Husser! for the last line of The Visible and the
Invisible's Chapter III, in a formulation of the practice ofphenomenology. But how to
express what is silent? Should this be thought of as an impossible task?
The answer to this is no - the task, rather, is to understand the paradox by which
the "reconversion of silence and speech into one another" does in fact occur. Quality, the
character of phenomena, "appears opaque, inexpressible, as life inspires nothing to the
man who is not a writer. Whereas the sensible is, like life, a treasury ever full of things to
say for him who is a philosopher" (VI 300/252). This passage is from a working note
entitled "The philosophy of the sensible as literature." Philosophy must understand the
conversion of silence into speech, and the enrootedness of speech in silence, which
appears impossible, but which occurs in creative language, and whose possibility hovers
there where words will not quite come, where the phenomena rest, quivering, wanting to
18 The quote is from HusserI, Cartesian Meditations, 77/38-39. It is also quoted in the Preface to
Phenomenology ofPerception.
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become speech. Such philosophy is to be "painstaking as the work of Balzac, Proust,
Valery, or Cezanne." It is to the second of these authors that we shall turn for an example
of the practice of speaking silence, and for an awareness of the necessity of traversing
something obscure, some kind of silence itself, to reach the true sensible, not "in-itself,"
but as it presents itself already full of reflection, or full of the invisible.
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CHAPTER III
PROUST
Real books should be the children not of daylight and casual talk, but of darkness
and silence (R 2,2861III 934).
What should occur in a book? This is a central question ofA fa recherche du
temps perdu, a central question of the narrator's life, a source ofhis anguish for most of
both. It is a question that, as we shall see, is not very far from Merleau-Ponty's question
ofwhat should occur in philosophy, and this proximity is proofof the intermingling of
philosophy and literature that Merleau-Ponty suggests and Proust practices.
The previous chapter, through its attempt to focus the Merleau-Pontian question
of language by reference to indirect language and to the question ofdialectic, ended up
insisting that creative language must somehow traverse a sort of silence, must reconvert
silence and speech into each other. It suggested a Merleau-Pontian vision ofphilosophy
as the expression of silence, indeed of the silence ofnature, disclosed in Step 3 of the
famous second sailing of Socrates, as discussed in the schema outlined in Chapter 1. Yet
it remains unclear what this looks like in practice. The present chapter will turn to one of
Merleau-Ponty's most frequent examples of the literary language from which philosophy
must learn: Proust. Proust's use oflanguage, as this chapter will show, not only discloses
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nature and the sensible as that which carries and opens up language, thought, and
memory, but constantly reflects upon this disclosure and takes it up as an explicit concern
of Proust's narrator. This happens in the frequent explorations and descriptions of the
sensible idea. The present chapter attends to a long passage late in Proust's Recherche
where the narrator takes up these questions explicitly, and tries to explain how Proust's
language is ultimately phenomenological. It argues that a reading of the sensible idea in
Proust is the hinge of a critical turn in the final chapter of The Visible and the Invisible,
and emphasizes, partly through a critical reading of Deleuze's work on the sensible idea
in Proust and Signs, that the sensible idea is not to be taken as a conceptual system to be
decoded and organized, despite some passages in Proust and in Merleau-Ponty which
make this seem to be the case. The chapter ends with a sustained illustration of the role
of silence, darkness, and forgetting in Proust's prose, which is intended to show how
attention to this passage through silence is critical in thinking how sensible nature carries
and motivates language.
The question of what should occur in a book is very much a question of
philosophical practice, and Proust's statement quoted above, that real books come from
darkness and silence, addresses the same phenomenon of the language/nature
intertwining which comes out of the late Merleau-Ponty.
The question receives a resounding, clear, and even aggressively worded answer
at the end of Proust's Recherche. The end is precisely where one would expect to find
the answer, if the novel is read as a Bildungsroman, or as Deleuze puts it, the story of an
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apprenticeship.l As such, it is not just an academic question, a question of the curious
intellect that can fmd any answer it wants, and thus never confronts necessity, as does the
artist, in the essential difference between intellect and art which we finally learn with
Proust's narrator at the end of Le temps retrouwJ (R 2,2721R III 914). It is the question of
a life, and thus a question of the ethos according to which that life, even while not
knowing it, has been lived. The answer comes near the end of life, and indeed makes it
possible for life to end, gives "a joy which was like a certainty and which sufficed,
without any other proof, to make me indifferent to death" (R 2,263/R III 900). As the end
of an apprenticeship and as the meaning of a life, the question is also the meaning of a
vocation, and of the successful merging of life and vocation. This merging comes with
the realization that, despite not having had worldly success in literature up until the end
of his life, the narrator finds it possible to say that "my whole life up to the present day
might and yet might not have been summed up under the title: A Vocation." (R 2,288IR
III 936).
Thus the stakes, for Proust, are high. As the fluttering vision on the steps at the
entrance to the Guermantes' party seems to say, at the end of the book where the answers
to these questions come, '''Seize me as I pass if you have the power, and try to solve the
riddle of happiness which I set you.'" (R 2,2631R III 899). The stakes are thus the living
of a happy life, the complete good of ethics, as Aristotle tells us, the only good that is
pursued for itself, and not for the sake of some other, higher good?
1 Deleuze, Gilles, Proust and Signs, 3
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a 17-20, 1097a 28 - 1098a 7.
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The stakes are also high for Merleau-Ponty. We shall first have to make clear
these stakes by showing precisely how the insights of Proust, cited so frequently but
rarely discussed at length, figure into the thought of language and silence in Merleau-
Ponty, the way in which Merleau-Ponty interprets Proust explicitly and works from these
interpretations into his own thoughts. But beyond this, a reading of the insights of
Proust's narrator about the task of a book and the ethos of his life will reveal the
argument that both may be understood as a sort of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology
themselves, and thus are a sort of example of the kind of language which Merleau-Ponty
is addressing, which I have tried to layout in the previous chapter. Proust writes
phenomenologically: he describes the appearing and shining forth of the world, at once as
what appears and as the appearing itself, as its form and manner, as its character. Proust
offers a sort of ethos ofthe conversion of attention into language, and of the reconversion
of silence and speech into one another. What Deleuze calls Proust's "apprenticeship," the
life (and 3,000 page) long ptocess by which the narrator comes to aesthetic and ethical
terrns with his life as a "man ofletters," or less specifically, as a thoughtful artd sensitive
human being, is the enrichment of life through attentive speech, which is vety close to a
broad conception ofphenOlhenology.
This coming to terms is most precisely focused near the very end of Proust's
Recherche, when the narrator, separated by years from most of the events of the book and
disillusioned by his failures as a writer, undergoes the final event of involuntary memory3
3 "Involuntary memory" is the process, repeated throughout the Recherche (5-11 times, depending on
importance, according to Samuel Beckett's Proust, p. 23), through which some everyday and innocuous
event of perception, a madeleine dipped in tea, a hawthorne hedge, the steeples of churches, the feel of a
flagstone beneath the narrator's feet, provokes an overwhelming upsurge of images, memory, and feeling,
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that motivates a sudden barrage of insights into life, experience, and most importantly,
writing. The narrator realizes that his own task, what Proust himself so clearly excels at,
is to bring his life to word, to practice the passage between thing and word.4
It could be argued that the final chapter of The Visible and the Invisible is the
crux, hinge, and highest elaboration of Merleau-Ponty's thought.5 I have also made the
suggestion that the chapter turns on Proust, and specifically on what Merleau-Ponty calls
the "sensible idea," with the example of the little musical phrase of the composer Vinteuil
which plays a major role in Swann's Way, and reappears from time to time throughout the
rest of the Recherche. Thus an explicit, if brief and limited, interpretation ofProust lies
at the very center of Merleau-Ponty.6 It will be the task of this chapter to show how
and drive large sections of text and major events in the narrator's life. Part of Proust' s task, as he realizes it
in Le temps retrouve, is the expression in prose of these memories, their effects upon his life, and the
mysterious transition from sensual perception to idea which occurs in these flashes.
4 Gary Madison, in The Phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty, makes much ofthis reflective tum in Proust, or
as he calls it this "book of a book." As Madison puts it, "In addition to being the search for a covered
over, hidden logos, Proust's work is itself the reflective consciousness ofthis search. Its theme is not only
life but its author's reflection on life" (135). In a brief account of Proust (pp. 127-137), part of a larger
section devoted to language in Merleau-Ponty, Madison shows how Proust's book both brings the shining
appearance of the world to language, and at the same time reflects on this very process. It is this
"transcendental" level of reflection in Proust which Madison uses to "bring out what for Merleau-Ponty is
the essence of the expressive act" (128).
5 It will perhaps be said, and probably should be said, that picking out a particular work as the highest point
of someone's career is a questionable and potentially distracting rhetorical practice. This can be true,
perhaps most importantly because it can diminish the importance of reading any other aspect of that
author's work. For example, the commentaries on Merleau-Ponty which have been most important for the
present work have not drawn as much from the final chapter of The Visible and the Invisible as from
various other sources, primarily the College de France course notes. Nevertheless, when it is the case that
the depth of thought and the illumination ofthe obscure matter to be thought shines most brightly in one
place, it behooves us to tum our attention to that place, notwithstanding the possibility that even greater
results could, hypothetically, just as easily come from somewhere else if we had chosen to look there
instead.
6 Proust figures prominently in the 1959-1961 College de France lectures as well, again mostly in
discussions ofthe sensible idea. I do not see his treatment there taking such a prominent place in the course
of the lecture as it does in the argument of The Visible and the Invisible, where it provides a key tum, and
perhaps we cannot expect a series of lecture notes to have the same sense of overall structure and progress
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Proust not only provides an example of, but reflects on and examines, how a passage
through silence, darkness, and forgetting is necessary for writing the silent speech of the
things, for effecting in art the transition from nature to language in a manner which
remembers and re-inscribes the silence of nature in its very presentation. Proust's writing
relies on the carrying of meaning by the silence of the things; this is the experience of the
sensible idea and of involuntary memory. In the context of a novel, Proust gives, in
effect, a phenomenological description of these processes.
Proust shows how language itself is recherche, as Proust's narrator comes to
understand recherche as the task of art of traversing a depth to the silence ofphenomena.
Just as the past brings life and joy to the present in the involuntary memory that moves
the novel, but that can only be shown by the traversal of a certain depth in time, in
memory, and in language, the things come to life in speech as phenomenology. The range
of the French word recherche is thus more apropos than the likely English translations
"remembrance," "research," or "in search of," since it combines the passivity and
obscurity of remembrance with the determination of a quest and the rigor of a scientific
research. The past comes back to Proust, but the things come to word in Proust, and it is
in this manner that Proust stands as an exemplar for the thinking of language and silence
in Merleau-Ponty.
that even an unfmished book might have. The treatment of Proust in the lectures comes in the context of
the course on literature as contemporary philosophy, and it appears in the lectures that the sensible idea is
Proust's main contribution. See NC 49-50,191-198.
80
The last chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, at the center of which lies the
reading of Proust, takes the following structure. The first ten pages or so are a beginning,
a phenomenology of the sensible that will "form our first concepts in such a way as to
avoid the classical impasses" (VI 178/137). As always in Merleau-Ponty, the grounding
and launching of thought returns to the simple question, the demand, ''yes or no: do we
have a body - that is, not a permanent object of thought, but a flesh that suffers when it is
wounded, hands that touch?" (VI 178/137). The description of the life of this flesh is the
starting point for all the philosophy that will follow. The ten introductory pages here
elaborate the character of sensible life, the synaesthesia that characterizes it and that
opens the boundaries of sensibility outside the limits of the body, and finally reach the
suggestion of a "flesh" of things. In this lyrical series of pages, Merleau-Ponty, just like
Proust (only the effort is more obvious in Merleau-Ponty, because he is trying to come
closer in words to the bottom of the depths, to stare more directly, at what Proust evoked
mote casually and perhaps with greater skill, but more obliquely and at leisure, for
thousands of pages), is engaged in an effort of language, an exertion, to let sensibility
become word. One can feel the struggle in Merleau-Ponty's prose, the visceral difficulty
in fmding words for an elusivity gliding below every sensual moment ofour life.
Yet it quickly becomes clear that this is a re-working of thoughts aiready begun at
least as far back as Phenomenology ojPerception,7 a description of the movement
between sensible and sentient in perception, and that the novelty of the chapter will come
with the turn to the invisible, about ten pages in, around the following phrase: "And
7 For example, PhP 246-248/212-214.
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henceforth movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the other and to themselves,
climb back toward their source and, in the patient and silent labor of desire, begin the
paradox of expression" (VI 187/144).
The movement into the thinking of the invisible, and its emergence in and lining
of the visible, is not a clear break in the text, but a slow spiraling closer toward "that
central vision that joins the scattered visions, that unique touch that governs the whole
tactile life of my body as a unit, that I think that must be able to accompany all our
experiences" (VI 189/145). Over the next few pages, it becomes necessary to think the
bond and transition between different moments of experience, between perceptions, the
"clear zones, clearings, about which there pivot opaque zones" (VI 192/148). Husserl's
thought of the exterior and interior horizon of things, "that darkness stuffed with visibility
of which their surface is but the limit" (VI 193/148) is the image that brings us to "a new
type of being, a being by porosity, pregnancy," one that could include the "fold" of the
visible which is seeing.
It is here that we arrive at what Merleau-Ponty calls the most difficult point, "the
bond between the flesh and the idea, between the visible and the interior armature which
it manifests and which it cortceals," indeed the point that gives The Visible and the
Invisible its title. And it is here that Proust comes in.
''No one has gone further than Proust in the fixation of the relations between the
visible and the invisible, in the description of an idea that is not the contrary of the
sensible, that is its lining and its depth" (VI 193/149). The explicit discussion of Proust
which follows concerns primarily the thought, which Proust continually returns to, of the
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sensible idea, that which is communicated in art and literature, and which lives in a
peculiar and necessary relation to the sensible.8 The best example is always the first one
in which it occurs in Proust's novel, that musical phrase of the composer Vinteuil which
Swann hears when he is pursuing Odette in the Verdurins' salon, and which captures
Swann's whole love for her in a manner which he could never put into words, and which
he never evens grasps in any way, since he is continually and thoroughly deluded about
his love for Odette, which is only jealousy for his rivals and turns to nothing when they
are finally together for life. Years later, having heard Swann try to speak of the power of
the little phrase and not finding much of note when he himself has heard it played, the
narrator finally hears it again, and grasps the structure of the sensible idea which had
enabled the little phrase to speak a world for Swann.
Here is Merleau-Ponty's reading, which provides such a key bridge in the
structure of The Visible and the Invisible, quoted at length:
Literature, music, the passions, but also the experience of the visible world are, no less
than is the science ofLavoissier and Ampere, the exploration of an invisible and, also as
much as them, the disclosure of a universe of ideas. Simply, this invisible, these ideas,
unlike theirs, do not let themselves be detached from the sensible appearance and be
erected into a second positivity. The musical idea, the literary idea, the dialectic oflove,
and also the articulations ofthe light, the modes of exhibition of sound and of touch
speak to us, have their logic, their coherence, their points of intersection, their
concordances, and here also the appearances are the disguise of unknown 'forces' and
'laws.' But it is as though the secrecy wherein they lie and whence the literary
expression draws them were their proper mode of existence. For these troths are not only
hidden like the physical reality which we will not have been able to discover, invisible in
fact but which we will one day be able to see face to face, which others, better situated,
8 See Luco Vanzago, "Presenting the Unpresentable: the Metaphor in Merleau-Ponty's Last Writings,"
especially page 10, for a discussion that ties the sensible idea to Merleau-Ponty's practice of metaphor.
Vanzago sees, aside from the traditional, Aristotelian concept ofmetaphor which understands it is re-
presenting something that could be presented non-metaphorically and straightforwardly, a Merleau-Pontian
concept of metaphor which presents the non-presentable in the manner of the sensible idea, as the only way
it can be expressed.
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could already see, provided that the screen that masks it is lifted. Here, on the contrary,
there is no vision without the screen: the ideas we are speaking of would not be better
known to us ifwe had no body and no sensibility, it is then that they would be
inaccessible to us; the 'little phrase,' the notion of the light, are not exhausted by their
manifestations, any more than is 'an idea of the intelligence'; they could not be given to
us as ideas except in a carnal experience. It is not only that we would find in that carnal
experience the occasion to think them; it is that they owe their authority, their fascinating,
indestructible power, precisely to the fact that they are in transparency behind the
sensible, or in its heart (VI 194/150).
This passage introduces what, again, is to be the most difficult point, "the bond
between the flesh and the idea," towards the thought of which no one has gone further
than Proust. In the first ten pages of the chapter, which serve as a beginning, it would
seem as if the sensible and the flesh, so laboriously described, were mute. Merleau-
Ponty's prose here is like watching a silent movie, where the life on the screen is so
obviously filled with speech that its silence can only be experienced as a lack, as an eerie
quiet. But the transition into speech which then occurs is hard to think in a manner that
does it justice. Just how it is that "literature, music, the passions, but also the experience
of the visible world are the exploration of an invisible and the disclosure of a universe of
ideas" remains obscure, and must be thought through and described. The gift ofProust is
that he succeeds in describing this transition, and describes it over and over again, mOst
explicitly in the "little phrase," but also in the taste of the madeleine that reminds him of
Combray, or in the texture of the flagstones and his own movement over them that, at the
resolution of the novel which it will soon be our task to investigate, captures the essence
and meaning of the narrator's life.
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Merleau-Ponty again describes this work in a long passage in The Prose o/the
World, 9 in the chapter dealing with "indirect language": "Given an experience, which
may be banal but for the writer captures a particular savor of life, given, in addition,
words, forms phrasing, syntax, even literary genres, modes of narrative that, through
custom, are already endowed with a common meaning - the writer's task is to choose,
assemble, wield, and torment these instruments in such a way that they induce the same
sentiment of life that dwells in the writer at every moment (PW 67/48)." Proust not only
accomplishes this work, as many writers do, but understands his own work in precisely
this way, structures his masterpiece expressly around it all the way to the title, and,
finally, provides an analysis ofhow and why this work occurs and what it has meant for
the conduct of his life.
If the transition between the flesh and the idea, between the sensible and
language, remains difficult and obscure, the point of the transition is clear. "The musical
idea, the literary idea, the dialectic of love, all have their logic, their coherence," but this
"cannot be detached from the sensible appearances and erected into a second positivity."
The comparison here is to the ideal laws of science, which, once proven and articulated in
speech, do, or so the theory goes, manifest such a second positivity, a solid and clear
structure of thought which fits perfectly, or almost perfectly, to the visible world, but
which can be detached as if it rested in itself. 1O The sensible idea cannot be detached
9 For a thorough summary of The Prose ofthe World, see David Michael Levin's "Language, Thought, and
Truth in the Works of Merleau-Ponty (1949-1953)."
10 This conception is, of course, too simple and full of problems: we would have to look at least as far back
as the many conflicts in Kant's first Critique, or perhaps to Plato, to wonder about the perfect fit of ideal
laws to the empirical world. But the point, for Merleau-Ponty here and for us, is that the sensible idea does
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from its sensible appearance: while Swann can dissect the experience of the little phrase
into the notes that make it up, which are "convenient for the understanding" as Proust
puts it, he then no longer has the little phrase itself; its meaning, its existence as sensible
idea, has disappeared. As Merleau-Ponty says, these ideas "could not be given to us as
ideas except in a carnal experience," and "it is not that we would find in that experience
the occasion to think them; it is that they owe their authority, their fascinating,
indestructible power, precisely to the fact that they are in transparency behind the
sensible, or in its heart" (VI 194/150).
Somewhere in the in-between of flesh and language floats the sensible idea, a
dimension "in terms of which every other experience will henceforth be situated," not
invisible because it is hidden behind something else, or because it has nothing to do with
the visible, but "the invisible a/this world, that which inhabits it, sustains it" (VI
197/151). This thought, of the invisible that inhabits the sensible, makes possible the
transition to a discussion of language, the discussion on which the published text of The
Visible and the Invisible abruptly ends, a discussion which, to be sure, is harely a
suggestion. Once the thought of the invisible at the heart of the visible, the sensible idea
which animates the meaning of sensible life, has been introduced, indeed has come to
thought by a sort of necessity, both in Merleau-Ponty's text and in Proust, it becomes the
task for thinking. "Once we have entered into this strange domain, one does not see how
there could be any question of leaving it" (VI 197/152), and indeed the rest of the chapter
not claim to be detachable from its sensible manifestation, as does the scientific idea, for better or for
worse.
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becomes an interrogation of language, but one that barely begins, and one that leaves
much more to be thought.
Though Proust provides the thought for a key tum in The Visible and the
Invisible, the reading ofProust here is extremely brief, only a page, and focused on the
matter of the sensible idea, or the possibility of a sort of logos carried by the sensible.
Given that the explication of Proust and the sensible idea is so brief and so obviously
experimental, it remains quite open how we are to take it. Is the import of Proust for the
late Merleau-Ponty restricted to the insight of the sensible idea, which is the only matter
that Merleau-Ponty discussed, or is a further reading ofProust possible, a reading which
would carry the interpretation of Merleau-Ponty farther? Is the sensible idea to be taken
as a call to a sort of rigorous science, a sort of organization and categorization of the
ideas, as when Proust's narrator says "To this contemplation of the essence of things I
had decided therefore that in future I must attach myself, so as somehow to immobilize
it" (R 2269/R III 909)?
This is the reading given by Deleuze in Proust and Signs. At first glance it has
much in common with Merleau-Ponty's reading, when the latter follows Proust in saying
that literature and the musical and sensible idea "have their logic, their coherence, their
points of intersection, their concordances, and here also the appearances are the disguise
of unknown 'forces' and 'laws'" (VI 194/149). It would seem to be necessary, and it
would seem that Proust took it upon himself, to "immobilize" these "forces" and "laws"
in order to understand them. It would seem to be insufficient to just grasp them fleetingly
before they slip away. Proust's whole effort is between this insufficiency and this task of
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immobilization: the narrator grasps the sensible ideas as they slip away throughout his
whole life, indeed he says that this is "the only genuine and fecund pleasure I had
known" (R 2269/R III 909), and finally sees that his task as a writer, his task of language,
is to put these sensible ideas to word. This, as Deleuze sees it, is the peculiarity of the
artist, who is the only one able to put the sensible ideas to word, so much so that ''there is
no intersubjectivity except an artistic one"11because the artist founds communication as
it lives from the sensible ideas.
It is probably the case, as Mauro Carbone observes, that Merleau-Ponty tends to
emphasize the continuity between the sensible and art while Deleuze tends to emphasize
the discontinuity,12 which is why Deleuze focuses on the difficult task of immobilizing
the sensible ideas in language - such an immobilization, for Deleuze, is unlikely and rare,
if also absolutely necessary. Yet the manner of their "immobilization" is obscure. We
should take caution from the fact that Merleau-Ponty puts 'forces' and 'laws' in scare
quotes, and even more from the fact that Proust's narrator is never a model of self-clarity
when it comes to the task of his work - if he says that it is his task to "immobilize" the
sensible ideas, it remains to be seen if this is really his task or if this is what he
accomplishes at all, or indeed if what is at stake is a matter for immobilization in the first
place.
Deleuze's effort is worthy of note here as an example of this reading of Proust.
The thesis of Proust and Signs is that Ala recherche du temps perdu may be read as the
11 Deleuze, Gilles, Proust and Signs, 42.
12 Carbone, Mauro. "The Mythical Time ofIdeas: Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze as Readers of Proust."
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explanation of the workings of systems of signs in life, signs which, like the sensible
idea, are never directly explicable, but whose meaning is hidden. In this manner,
De1euze's book might be read as a attempt to fulfill a task which Proust set for himself, in
the manner which we alluded to above of immobilizing the meaning of signs, "to
interpret the sensations as signs of so many laws and ideas, by trying to think - that is to
say, to draw forth from the shadow what I had felt, to try to convert it into its spiritual
equivalent" (R 2271/R III 912). Proust's narrator continually unfolds the meaning of
various signs, and it is this that allows him to gradually succeed in life and happiness, and
to write his novel. He decodes the signs of class and the signs of love, climbing the
social ladder, learning how to use the previously unattainable signs of the Guermantes'
social circle with ease, and, to a lesser but still considerable extent, learning how to
communicate in the signs of love with Albertine, and even further, how to read his own
love as it occurred in the past. This is what the narrator learns in his apprenticeship, and,
as De1euze tells us, "learning is essentially concerned with signs.,,13 In the same vein,
De1euze essays to classi1)r and organize the types ofsigns in Proust's work, and to
provide examples of their workings. For instance, the signs of love:
We cannot interpret the signs of a loved person without proceeding into worlds that have
not waited for us to take form, that formed themselves with other persons, and in which
we are at first only an object among the rest. The lover wants the beloved to devote to
him her preferences, her gestures, her caresses. But the beloved's gestures, at the very
moment they are addressed to us, still express that unknown world that exc1udes us. The
beloved gives us signs of preference, but because these signs are the same as those that
express worlds to which we do not belong, each preference by which we profit draws the
image draws the image ofthe possible world in which others are or might be preferred. 14
13 Deleuze, Gilles, Proust and Signs, 4.
14 Ibid., 8.
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Like sensible ideas, the signs of love communicate not just by their overt
meaning, but by their references to other, unknown signs, references which must be
decoded, and which are never sure. Indeed, Proust's narrator never devotes much
attention to, or puts much confidence in, the simple meaning of what anyone actually
says, but, like a neurotic with an over-active imagination,15 immediately plunges into the
task of interpretation, which becomes guessing, wondering, a search for truth which, as
Deleuze puts it, is a sort of manipulative violence. 16
Deleuze's effort, as a reader and interpreter ofProust, is to unravel the signs, to
show us how they function, and to categorize them for our benefit. To some extent this is
also the effort of Proust's narrator as he makes his way (and tries, usually successfully, to
get his way) in the world. Yet this is not the effort of Proust the writer ofA fa recherche,
nor indeed the fulfillment of the narrator, the true work of his life, as he finally sees in Le
temps retrouve. Indeed, it is more like the narrator's efforts, which always fail and are
rather comical, to find happiness by learning the secret signs of his affective life, and of
his love life, and manipulate them to create the desired result. Indeed, these efforts at
affective self-control and self-manipulation fail precisely because they treat as clear the
play of emotion and sensation that always remains partly in shadow; the narrator behaves
as if it is possible to decode these signs, yet his decoding consistently fails.
15 As Benjamin says, never has there been such a radical attempt as self-absorption, but ofa self like a
crater: "It was a matter of perceiving the silence at the bottom ofthis crater, whose eyes are the quietest and
most absorbing" ("The Image of Proust," Illuminations, 213). This "self-absorption," as an intense work
on the self, is the result ofthe relentless pursuit of an ethos, a quest for happiness. See below for more on
Benjamin's reading ofProust's search for happiness.
16 Deleuze, Gilles, Proust and Signs, 19.
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The Deleuzian effort to categorize the system of signs in Proust, to penetrate
beyond the literary experience to find the organization of ideas hidden therein, seems to
miss the point of this irrepressible darkness, this impossibility of bringing fully to the
light and manipulating the signs ofaffect and sensation. It becomes pedantic, becomes
what Proust, in a diatribe coming in the midst of his revelation in Le temps retrouve, calls
''theory'': "A work in which there are theories is like an object which still has its price-
tag on it" (R 2274/R 111916). It suffers "from the temptation for the writer to write
intellectual works - a gross impropriety" (R 2274/R III 916).17
The point is that a work such as Deleuze's, despite accomplishing an admirable
clarification and organization ofthe jumble of ideas in a long and complicated novel,
loses those ideas by lending to them a purely rational18 signification while missing the
sensible idea, the meaning of the work carried in its "mesh," as Merleau-Ponty puts it.
Proust says it like this: "When an idea - an idea ofany kind - is left in us by life, its
material pattern, the outline of the impression that it made upon us, remains behind as a
token of its necessary truth. The ideas formed by the pure intelligence have no more than
a logical, a possible truth, they are arbitrarily chosen" (R 2272/R 111914). The necessity,
what Merleau-Ponty, in the passage already quoted, called the "authority" and
"fascinating, indestructible power," is given in the impression itself, given in its
recollection, and sometimes given in language. Proust's point seems to be that when
17 To be fair, Proust gives no basis for categorizing who is a "writer" and who is responsible for
"intellectual works"; perhaps Deleuze, as a "philosopher" and not a novelist, should practice theory and
write intellectual works. Yet Merleau-Ponty's insistence that literature is a more active field of philosophy
than "express philosophy" itself seems to belie that straightforward excuse.
18 "Rational" in that the sensible idea or the signs of love would function like the signs in an equation,
which should be able to be decoded and laid out, plain to see, in a perfect ratio.
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these ideas lose their mooring in the sensible, they lose their very claim on life, to
become an "arbitrary" categorization at the disposition of the "intellectual writer."
Writing, thus, in its bringing to word such sensible ideas, must somehow communicate
the sensible origin of these ideas, at the same time as their necessary silence, the distance
between the sensible and language, a distance which is their only true proximity. It is,
again, a writing after the second sailing.
Thus neither should we read Merleau-Ponty's interest in Proust, and thus the
intention to think the invisible and its intertwining in the visible which turns on a reading
ofProust, as an attempt to set down the forces, laws, and structures of the sensible ideas,
although certain of Merleau-Ponty's turns ofphrase lend credence to this reading. But
then the question becomes, again, how the necessity and authority of the impression, of
the sensible which carries its invisible as a lining, is so powerfully held in the impression
itself, and how it is sometimes brought to word, how language lives from this lining like
plants live from the sun. Understanding this relation will show the movement from Step
1 to Step 3 of the second sailing, a movement beginning and ending in the sensible.
An answer to this question lies in Proust's forty-odd page revelation in Le temps
retrouve, in a rambling discussion that runs from the quality of good literature to the
quality of a good life. The meeting of these two, of good literature and a good life, is not
fortuitous or coincidental. "Real books should be the offspring not ofdaylight and casual
talk but of darkness and silence." What is it that makes some books "real," and how
does this require a birth in darkness and silence? What does this show about the passage
92
through silence between nature and language, and the practice of philosophy which
would think this passage?
Immediately after this line, which I take as the directive insight for this chapter,
comes the following: "And as art exactly reconstitutes life, around the truths to which we
have attained inside ourselves there will always float an atmosphere of poetry, the soft
chann of a mystery which is merely a vestige of the shadow which we have had to
traverse, the indication, as precise as the markings ofan altimeter, of the depth of a work"
(R 2286/R III 934). As art reconstitutes life: Proust's art of language is a matter of
bringing to word a life already lived, a recherche. The same quality of depth, which
marks a life as having not merely been passed through, but having been lived, marks art,
or here language. Real books, real art, real language, like real lives which are recalled in
recherche, are marked by "an atmosphere ofpoetry, the soft chann of a mystery which is
merely a vestige of the shadow which we have had to traverse." The soft chann of
mystery, which gives poetry its power, is an effect of time andforgetting, the shadow
which a life traverses, and which language must traverse if it is to bring life to word, as it
does in the work of Proust. This, Proust's narrator realizes, is his task, and ALa
recherche du temps perdu is the result.
Of the truths "which the intellectual faculty gathers in the open," we are tdld in
the next paragraph that, irrespective of their value in full daylight, they "have very
straight contours and are flat; they have no depth because no depths have had to be
traversed in order to reach them, because they have not been re-created" (R 2287/R III
935). This is why, Proust says, there is no necessity in such truths. The truths of art,
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having been re-created according to the truths of life, undergo a certain passivity. Proust
defines "the artistic sense" as "submitting to the reality within oneself' (R 2274/R III
917). Of the truths which he seeks to bring to language in the work of recherche,
"church steeples or wild grass growing on a wall" and the "magical scrawl" of
heterogeneous impressions which they carry, he says that "their foremost character was
that I was not free to choose them, that such as they were they were given to me" (R
2272/R III 913).
Thus the depth that distinguishes art from dry theory is a mark of language that
has confronted the necessity of "traversing a shadow," the obscurity of forgetting and the
passage of time. This obscurity manifested itself for Proust's narrator in part in his
inability, until the end of his life, to begin writing, and in part in his inability to
intentionally re-create the joy that, when he did experience it, was fleeting and out ofhis
control. The narrator is comical in his continual self-deception, trying constantly to
figure out ahead of time what will make him happy, and to create such a situation at all
costs, only to find that when everything goes offjust as he planned, his feelings bear no
relation to the joy and fascination which swept him away on the original impression, or
leave him in a sadness "like that I had had, the day I had been presented to Albertine,
having taken pains, small to be sure, in order to obtain a thing - knowing tliis yOling girl
- which seemed small to me because I had obtained it?" (R 2269/R III 909). The greatest
example is Albertine; by the time he has her as a prisoner in his house, he is no longer in
love with her, and even by the time he manages to be introduced to her, the pleasure of
her acquaintance seems small.
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For the person suffering and seeking happiness, there is little solace here.
Reflecting on his own despair, the narrator remembers consoling himself, hopelessly,
with his ability to catalogue impressions in his memory like a collector, saying to himself
that at least in his life he had seen some beautiful things. But the thrilling joy of
involuntary memory, of the immediate plunge into the depth of time and things that
makes them shine forth in all the power ofappearance, is nothing like this. Rather "these
three memories which I had just had, instead of giving me a more flattering idea of
myself, had almost caused me to doubt the existence of that self' (R 2267/R III 906).
The suffering of life, of the fruitless search for happiness, is hardly alleviated by the
realization that the truest joy is only found in remembrance, in art, and in the bringing to
word of impressions which have already passed, and which, if they held any joy when
they were present, only did so by virtue of their own obscure connection to impressions
still further in the past. It is the distance to the impressions, to the things, to the
happenings ofa life and the elements that fill a memory, that makes the traversal of an
obscure depth necessary.
In the famous involuntary memory, Proust's narrator undergoes the vividness
and power of such a traversal, when the truth of an impression, like Vinteuil's little
phrase, the taste of the madeleine, or the cobblestones, traverses the depth of time and
opens up the richness of a life, in a joy so great that it can be called the only joy (R
2269/R III 908). The task of language becomes the "re-creation" of the power of things
and ofthe richness of life, a bringing to word of that possibility opened up by involuntary
memory. Thus the work ofProust, as recherche, is like involuntary memory itself.
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"The duty and task of a writer is that ofa translator," (R 2218/R III 926), a translator of
things to word. In a word, phenomenology, the logos ofphainomenon.
What else is Proust doing, everywhere and for 3,000 pages, for example and in
the simplest way, in the following:
An image offered to us by life brings with it, in a single moment, sensations
which are multiple and heterogeneous. The sight, for instance, of the binding of a
book once read may weave into the characters of its title the moonlight of a
distant summer night. The taste ofmorning cafe-au-lait brings with it that vague
hope of fme weather which so often long ago, as with the day still intact and full
before us, we were drinking it out of a bowl of white porcelain, creamy and fluted
and itself looking almost like vitrified milk, suddenly smiled upon us in the pale
uncertainty of the dawn. An hour is not merely an hour, it is a vase full of scents
and sounds and projects and climates, and what we call reality is a certain
connection between these immediate sensations and the memories which envelop
us simultaneously with them (R 2280/R III 924).
This is the simplest way because it is simply the bringing to word of sensations
and images, of appearances, and the following through of their connections, of their
heterogeneity. The entire Recherche moves in this tone, flowing like thought itself, or
more specifically, like remembrance itself. In this passage, in a relatively (and unusually,
because it is being used by Proust as an example) confined space, we have only the
fleeting beauty of impressions, but the work of recherche takes up thought, ideas, and the
character and passions ofmany human beings. These, however, could not be brought to
word in a direct and plain manner, in full daylight, as it were. They require the traversal
of a great depth, of the depth ofa very long novel, of many, many extraneous and
wandering reminisces, and of the life of the author. That is why the revelation of the
truth ofProust's narrator's work comes at the end of his life, after he has undergone, and
to his chagrin, failed to grasp, the depth ofwhat he was passing by. It is no mistake that
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the revelation comes after an abrupt passage, in the time of the novel, ofmany years. The
bulk ofA1a recherche details the life of a young man, but we are suddenly thrust forward
decades in the middle of Le temps retrouve, and this sudden thrust is when we feel the
nearness of the end of the novel, of death, and, before the revelation, of the hopelessness
of all that has been traversed so far. The facticity of this passage of time is further
reinforced by the aging of all of the narrator's old friends who he now sees again after a
longtime.
The "immobilization of the essences" that Proust sought, the essences that he only
glimpsed in the random flights of involuntary memory, does not occur in a matter ofa
few sentences, in a concise theory, in a manner that could be grasped quickly by a
sufficiently adept intellect. If that were possible, the narrator would have had success in
his countless attempts as a young man to forcefully create the happiness he had
sometimes glimpsed. Proust's point of the requirement to traverse a great depth is
perhaps made most forcefully by his requiring us to read on for thousands of pages, pages
that, no less, have no plot or clear theme, to finally come to terms with what we have
been doing (probably for years, because who can read all ofProust straight through?) and
learn what he has to share. It is also, perhaps, why his sentences are so long, why he
ranges from volubility to breathlessness: each marathon sentence, by virtue of its
capability to end in a place very remote from where it began, and to have stopped off at
more than one place along the way, is a miniature version of involuntary memory, of the
traversal of a depth. Each sentence, in the resonance of its language, must draw the
reader in just as the narrator is drawn in by the force of involuntary memory, by re-
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creating, bringing to word, the world. Moreover, it is almost the case that this effort of
language here, this work of phenomenology, is the only point of reading Proust. There is
no plot, there is no clear moral or political point aside from the enjoyment ofa brutal
satire that takes no prisoners and makes fun of everyone equally.19
Proust's Recherche, his whole effort of traversal, is unimaginable without the
sensible. To be sure, he also practices a phenomenology of sociality, of "human passions
and character and conduct," (R 2286/R III 935), as well as a deep introspection, an honest
bringing to word ofhis own depths. But the invisible lining of the sensible with meaning,
the sensible idea, the ability to spark the recollection of carnal impressions, lies at the
center of his every effort, and it is this that is most important for the present investigation.
What Merleau-Ponty sought to think, what he came to see that philosophy must find
room for, is what carries Proust's work. The transference and intermingling, the
proximity and distance, between visible and invisible, the things and ourselves, and the
past and the present all partake ofthe same field. That is why, in Proust's work, anyone
of these provokes the memory of another, and the provocation can move in any direction
(making a linear plot entirely inconceivable). For example, in a sentence that began ten
lines earlier at the restoration of the narrator's faith in literature, and did not hesitate to
pass through the career of one of the Prince de Guermantes' butlers as wel1 as a selection
ofpetits fours and a glass of orangeade:
19 An enjoyment entirely worthwhile in its own right. Benjamin's claim that Proust does make a clear
political point through his criticism of snobbery and ofthe class system is not entirely convincing, simplv
because in Ii fa recherche no one, and no class, is clearly spared from such criticism. "The Image of •
Proust," Illuminations, 209-210.
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...a new vision of azure passed before my eyes, but an azure that this time was
pure and saline and swelled into blue and bosomy undulations; so strong was this
impression that the moment to which I was transported seemed to me to be the
present moment: more bemused than on the day when I had wondered whether I
was really going to be received by the Princesse de Guermantes or whether
everything round me would not collapse, I thought that the servant had just
opened the window on to the beach and that all things invited me to go down and
stroll along the promenade while the tide was high, for the napkin which I had
used to wipe my mouth had precisely the same degree of stiffness and
starchedness as the towel with which I had found it so awkward to dry my face as
I stood in front of the window on the fIrst day of my arrival at Balbec, and this
napkin now, in the library of the Prince de Guermantes's house, unfolded for me-
concealed within its smooth surfaces and its folds - the plumage ofan ocean
green and blue like the tail ofa peacock (R 2264/R III 901).
This is a primary effort ofphenomenology, the phainomenon, the shining forth of
appearance, become logos. The words here give the things, the azure plumage ofan
ocean together with the invitation of a beach or a Faubourg family, the fear or joy of a
young human being at that invitation, all from the starchedness of two napkins in two
parts ofFrance, separated by tens ofyears.
Proust is thus an example of Merleau-Ponty's own effort of "the expression of
what is before expression and sustains itfrom behind" (V/219/167). lbis is why it can
be said that "no one has gone farther than Proust," but not only in describing the
possibility ofa sensible idea. Proust's work is exemplary because it is the coming to
word of sensible ideas, a faithful, indeed salvatory, effort of phenomenology in ttaversing
the depth of time and the depth of things, in lingering near "the bond between the flesh
and the idea," in cutting close to the bone. It does this not against, but by virtue ofa
fundamental obscurity and passivity, the obscurity ofdepth, time, and silence, and the
passivity, and necessity, ofcoming after, of remembrance.
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These are the multiple axes of obscurity, which, together, make it necessary that
real books should be the offspring of darkness and silence. Their insistence and their
secret, that which gives the "atmosphere ofpoetry" to memory and to the important
impressions of our lives, is what requires an effort ofphenomenology, Proustian
phenomenology if you will, to be brought to word. This is why Proust is exemplary for
phenomenology, for "the reconversion of silence and speech into one another" (VI
169/129). The words come from this silence, but silence, that which is of the utmost
obscurity to language, is not only language's birthplace, but its very environment, its
home. As Jean-Noel Cuille puts it, "silence is not only the condition ofpossibility of our
linguistic gesticulations, but also their own milieu.',2o
Yet for Proust, it must be said that this is more than a task of truth, of properly
"fixing the relations between the visible and the invisible," as Merleau-Ponty puts it in
one place. It is the task of an ethos, ofa way of living in language, a way that may lead
to happiness. Benjamin sees this clearly. He quotes Jean Cocteau,21 who says that
Proust's voice followed "the intonation of night and honey." This, says Benjamin, was
the only way that Proust was able to conquer what Proust himself once called22
I'imperfection incurable dans I 'essence meme du present, that yearning behind what,
20 "Le silence du sensible: Elements pour une esthesiologie dans la pensee du Merleau-Pohty, " 145. This
excellent and thorough article, starting with a strong skepticism ofthe Romantic undertones and
straightforward contradictions of a philosophy of silence, situates Merleau-Ponty with respect to the
beginnings of the liberation ofsensibility from the rational mind in Kant's Critique ofJudgment, then
moves through Merleau-Ponty's considerations ofexpression in the nature revealed by modern science to
an appreciation of the interweaving of silence and language in literary works through the sensible idea,
especially in Proust.
21 Benjamin gives no reference for the quotation from Cocteau.
22 Again, Benjamin gives no reference.
100
Benjamin says, should be at the center ofany study ofProust, what he "sought so
frenetically" and what was "at the bottom ofthese infinite efforts": his "blind, frenzied
quest for happiness. ,,23 This is why Proust's reflections at the end ofLe temps retrouve
become a matter not only of art, language, and memory, but of life. "We have to
rediscover, to reapprehend, to make ourselves fully aware of that reality, remote from our
daily preoccupations... that reality which it is very easy for us to die without ever having
known and which is, quite simply, our life" (R 2284/R III 931). That enrichment of life
by awareness, which happens in passing, passively, in passion, during the living of life,
can be rediscovered in remembrance, in a work of language, of bringing to the things to
word. Thus Benjamin, again: "A la recherche du temps perdu is the constant attempt to
charge an entire lifetime with the utmost awareness.,,24 The form ofthis awareness, the
only form it can take and the form it must take, is language. The fleeting images of the
past are not sufficient, and even the arresting power of involuntary memory must be
"immobilized," which only means spoken, written down, brought to word. Language, in
Proust, is thus a form of utmost awareness, a practice ofawareness that traverses a depth
to the silence of things, to that place where things become affect, feeling, the idea, and
language. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the sensible ideas that "stream forth along the
contours of the aesthesiological body ... lead their shadowy life in the mind only because
they have been divined at the junctures of the visible world" (VI 197/153). Proust, with
23 "The Image of Proust," Illuminations, 211.
24 ibid, 211.
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the intensity of awareness that becomes ethos, brings words to these junctures of the
visible world, to that point, paradoxically, from which words came.
It must become a question, for the intentionally philosophical reader of Proust,
how anything that would be called "philosophy" can be something other than the dry and
random ideas of the intellect which Proust so vehemently decries, as we have already
seen and as we have, somewhat self-consciously, questioned as well. Indeed this tension
runs high within Proust, for along with his rich evocations of a remembered life, which
supposedly bring the essences of things and people to word, he is also liberal with
theories and explanations, not only of his own task at the end ofLe temps retrouve, but of
anything and everything, throughout the entire novel. And of course, it is substantially
from these more overtly "theoretical" reflections that I have been quoting.
Merleau-Ponty, of course, is in a similar situation, only perhaps more intensely,
because he is explicitly devoted to, and in debt to, the history of philosophy, even if its
manner of language has become inadequate. Yet The Visible and the Invisible especially,
and its last chapter in particular, is an almost Proustian effort of evocative language, of
bringing to word the matter at hand, the flesh and the fluid lines between visible and
invisible, like that intimacy, as close as the sea and the strand, between us ahd the things
which opens the chapter (VI 170/130). As Bernhard Waldenfels remarks, the voir of
Phenomenology ofPerception, the work of philosophy as a straightforward look at the
matter for thought, becomes afaire voir in The Visible and the Invisible, a labor of
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language, a doing as much as a direct seeing. 25 Yet it is also a structured argument,
certainly a matter of the intellect, and no doubt a book with theories, which should make
it, as Proust says, like an object with its price-tag still on it, its presentation so shallow,
flat, in outline only, without the depth ofa real thought.
It should be clear, then, from the foregoing but moreover from any reading ofthe
texts themselves, that both Merleau-Ponty and Proust are working at the verge of
literature and philosophy.26 The late Merleau-Ponty is full of images of verging, veering,
one thing sliding into another and both taking part in the same field, the same flesh. The
visible and invisible become one another, as do the body and the world, carnality and
language, and the "veering I-Other Other-I" referred to in a working note ofNovember
1960 (VI 3111263). It is no doubt appropriate to consider here a verging of philosophy
and literature, in the form ofa verging and veering into one another of ''theoretical''
language and the language of recherche, of the supposedly shallow and one-dimensional
language and the language that traverses a depth and speaks from a silence. Proust the
noveiist makes theories and gives explanations all the time, and Merleau-Ponty the
philosopher conducts his own kind of recherche, a reaching of words across the foam of
the surf into the sea of the things. IfProust, as we have argued, and Merleau-Ponty as
well, are in a fundamental way working toward the enrichment of awareness, the
25 Waldenfels, Bernhard, "Faire voir par les mots: Merleau-Ponty et Ie tournant linguistique," 59.
26 Jason Wirth, drawing on Heidegger's and John Sallis's readings of Kant's reticence on the crucial link
between noumenon and phenomenon made by the transcendental imagination, shows that Schelling
operated on a similar veering plane, that between madness and intellect: "One must have a touch of
madness. Otherwise, reason is tyrannized by the dogmatism of the intellect and the clarity of shallow
understanding, or it collapses into the chaos of sensibility utterly detached from the intellect" (The
Conspiracy ofLife, 89).
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awareness that takes form in language, then both are, in an ancient sense, engaged in
theoria, in witnessing, in the oldest kind oftheory.
Thus Merleau-Ponty's experiments in language are not just a rhetorical technique
or an option chosen to communicate something difficult, something which might have
been better pinned down through the rigidity ofdefined terms, carefully manipulated.
They are the reaction to an ontological state ofaffairs, a reaction that learns much from
Proust. It is a matter of the expression of the sensible idea, or the metaphor, as the
practice ofa different ontology. The sensible origin of language is not a new idea; one
finds it in Hegel, who worked towards the progressive release of the concept from its
origin in the sensible, and one fmds it as a central theme in Nietzsche, in his many
variations on the thought of truth as a fable.27 But this focus on origin in philosophy is
often like the unmasking ofan original sin, whether one seeks to climb out of the sin, as
in Hegel, or to invert it and call it a saving grace, as in Nietzsche. The sensible idea, in
Proust and Merleau-Ponty,perhaps makes a new beginning, a difference from this sort of
unmasking and reversal. It perhaps thinks and speaks in a manner that responds to a
different structure of being, to a different relation between language and the sensible
wherein they are necessarily intertwined and given together?8
27 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power, note 539. The first chapter of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's The
Subject ofPhilosophy is an excellent, concise, and compelling exploration of the consequences of this
thought with respect to the difference between literature and philosophy at stake here, the sense of truth at
work in philosophy, and, just as in Merleau-Ponty, the future of philosophy in this new land where it is not
enough to just say what is.
28 See Vanzago, Luco, "Presenting the Unpresentable: the Metaphor in Merleau-Ponty's Last Writings".
As Vanzago puts it, Merleau-Ponty's "renovated" ontology has to do with this conception of the metaphor
as something that does not simply represent previously given objects in a different way but rather presents
objects, brings them to the fore, uncovers them from a concealment that is not a veil but something that as
such cannot be given, since it is not a thing.
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It is perhaps not necessary, or perhaps futile, to defme the exact space of their
togetherness, of the "awesome birth of vociferation," the "point of insertion of speaking
and thinking in the world of silence" (VI 188/144-145). It would not be quite correct,
then, to say that Merleau-Ponty and Proust witness this birth, that they somehow pinpoint
and immobilize the passage between that remains so obscure. It is enough to say that
they come close. In that closeness, the togetherness of language and nature is at stake,
for the "sensible" which carries the idea, and which language must return to itself in a
new form, is also nature.
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CHAPTER IV
NATURE
Proust is exemplary because he gives word to the silence of things, in a manner
philosophical and true in the ancient sense of truth: he unveils. The lethe that covers the
things, making them mute and estranged from logos, is cleared away, so that the things
shine, at least for a moment. Proust tells us, repeatedly and at great length in the passage
treated in the previous chapter, how literature must show this very silence and hiddenness
of things, of the past, of the sensible, even as it discloses them in a momentary shining.
Thus :Proust's work is among that literature and art with a philosophical character that
seems to have replaced "official" philosophy, which is decadent and inessential, as we
are told in Merleau-Ponty's Notes de cours. l
"Our state of non-philosophy" - this is the title of the first section of the College
de France course of 1958-59, which focused mostly on Husserl's and Heidegger's
struggles to think the contemporary practice of philosophy. The continuation of this
course, in 1960-61, took up "the ontology of today" as it is found in art and literature, in
1 "Of the 1) decadence of express, official philosophy; 2) philosophical character of literature, of art, etc.
My thesis: this decadence of philosophy is inessential; it is that ofa certain manner of philosopher
(according to substance, subject-object, causality). Philosophy will find help in poetry, a:rt, etc., in an even
closer rapport with them, it will thus revive and reinterpret its own past of metaphysics - which is not past"
(NC39).
106
comparison to Cartesian ontology. In between, in 1959-60, Merleau-Ponty taught a
course on nature, leaving the notes collected under that name.
Thus we have, on one hand, an inquiry into philosophical and literary language
and practice and the ontology they express, and on the other hand, the ontology expressed
by nature. What is the meaning of the togetherness of these two approaches - why do
they come one after the other? The proceeding chapters have been engaged with an
investigation of the first, hopefully without forgetting that when language and the
sensible are in question, nature is also at stake, given the force of sensibility in the
conception of nature with which we are working. The present chapter seeks to explore
the second, to begin thinking the togetherness of nature, language, and philosophy, the
togetherness which is demonstrated performative1y by Merleau-Ponty's choice, or
perhaps necessity, of subject matter in his last courses. The intent of this chapter is, quite
simply, to take Merleau-Ponty's interrogation of nature beyond the lectures on nature to
the radicalleve1 of his interrogation of language in The Visible and the Invisible. Thus it
will involve an insistent pushing beyond the letter of some ofMerleau-Ponty' s statements
regarding nature, and also an attempt to take seriously some other passages which seem
to cohere better with the practice ofphilosophy and the understanding of language
explored in the previous chapters. This chapter will include an explication of the sense of
expression found in nature in the 1956-60 lectures, a criticism of the understanding of
nature as a region of being, and a final suggestion, expressed with the deepest
reservations, that Merleau-Ponty is beginning to think being as nature, and thus as
primordially sensible and earthly.
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When one thinks ofMerleau-Ponty's significance in the history of philosophy,
some variation on the theme of nature is likely to come up. On a general level, with
Merleau-Ponty, we learn again to think those elements that have been called "natural"-
the body, sensibility, the perceived world - together with those elements that have been
estranged from what is called nature: thought, language, spirit. This slow, cautious, but
momentous rapprochement had been going on for at least another hundred or so years
before Merleau-Ponty - Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger all come quickly to mind;
many others would do as well - but Merleau-Ponty surely deserves our attention on at
least a centennial scale, for his radical insistence on the sensible basis of human life, and
for his efforts to bring the intertwining of sensibility and thought to word.
If it is fair to think ofMerleau-Ponty's historical significance in terms of nature,
then one surely ought to seek out the places in his works where he takes up this theme
explicitly. This, however, is not the same thing as assuming that these are the same places
that provide the richest of his reflections on this theme, as we will see. It is necessary,
rather, to think through how the matter of nature is to be interrogated along the lines of
the practice of philosophy. While Merleau-Ponty's role in the history of philosophy is
very much to be thought in terms of nature, this is not to be pursued in the manner of a
"philosophy of nature," because the practice of philosophy which I have tried to describe
in Chapter I should preclude such an approach.
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I will take as my guiding thought the following passage from the course notes on
nature:
The theme ofNature is not a numerically distinct theme.-There is a unique theme of
philosophy: the nexus, the vinculum "Nature"-"Man"-"God." Nature as a 'leaf of Being,
and the problems of philosophy, are concentric.
Nature as a leaf or layer of total Being - the ontology ofNature as the way toward
ontology - the way that we prefer because the evolution of the concept ofNature is a
more convincing propaedeutic, [since it] more clearly shows the necessity of the
ontological mutation.
We will show how the concept ofNature is always the expression of an ontology - and
its privileged expression (N 265/204).
Is nature the way toward ontology, or is it the ontological field itself? In the tense
passage quoted above, it is both: a leaf or layer of "total" being, a way toward ontology,
but at the same time, "not a numerically distinct theme." The unique theme of
philosophy is the vinculum. A vinculum, in Latin, is variously a bond, fetter, tie, or chain.
It is the mathematical term for the grouping of elements in some ways distinct but also
bonded, and is represented by a line above the terms to be thought of as a group. It has a
cartographic function as well, as a symbol showing two land parcels owned by the same
person. Likewise, the vinculum in the course notes is a set of terms, including nature,
which are not only tied together, but at the same time that they are three terms, are also to
be treated as one term. The challenge laid out by this cryptic passage is to try to think
this vinculum, to take it seriously, through the thinking suggested in The Visible and the
Invisible.
The whole problem is condensed and suggested in the passage above, in which
nature is understood, entirely ambiguously, as an element of a vinculum, not numerically
distinct, but also as a leaf or layer, as a concept which will lead to a higher concept of
being. Yet the thinking of The Visible and the Invisible, taken radically, doubles back on
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the thinking of nature as a "region of being" to disclose a being that has no regions,
strictly speaking. The flesh manifests itself in certain beings, perhaps, but in a manner in
which the whole field is inscribed in each one: to speak in terms of the vinculum, we
would have to say that the human and nature are all god, god and nature are all human,
and the human and god are all nature. Thinking how this can be, without contradiction
and without the distinctions between these terms being muddled, will require philosophy
to become interrogation - the questioning and evocation ofbeing, rather than the positing
of an ontology, for "every analysis that disentangles renders unintelligible - This bound
to the very meaning of questioning which is not to call for a response in the indicative - "
(VI316/268).
In the lecture summary for the second course on nature, Merleau-Ponty presents
his choice to study the nature described by science as a method of indirect ontology.
"The study of nature is here an introduction to the definition of being, and in this respect
one might just as well have started from man or God." The question of being is "raised
in this instance from the stahdpoint of a certain sector of being, because it is perhaps a
law of ontology always to proceed indirectly, and to lead up to being in general only
through particular beings" (Re 156/156). Nature is here understood as a "sector" Or
region of being which will reveal being in general. Since man or God might just has well
have provided the indirect way to ontology, one might wonder why nature would
"provide its privileged expression." Presumably the structures of being could be grasped
in any of the three regions.
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Renaud Barbaras explains that the concept of nature, as presented by certain
interpretations of modern science, is privileged by a kind of strategic advantage over a
phenomenology that cannot help but struggle to think being without the transcendental
necessity of consciousness. 2 As Barbaras tells the story, Merleau-Ponty's turn to nature
arose from his theory of institution, which is briefly described in Themes (RC 59-65/1 07-
113), and had been evolving since the gestural theory oflanguage and the idea that
speech accomplishes thought, elaborated in Phenomenology ofPerception (PhP 219/178-
179). Merleau-Ponty's theory of expression and truth is intimately bound up with a
philosophy of perception: just as the being of the perceived is the unity of a styIe through
which it presents itself, the being of truth and expression lives in the unity of a style
which is created in an act of instituting consciousness, rather than constituting
consciousness (RC 60/1 08). A creative act of expression consists in the taking up of
already existing instituted styles and shifting them, to create a new meaning, which will
henceforth be understood by others when they grasp its styIe in turn. These constantly
2Barbaras, Renaud. "Merleau-Ponty's Concept ofNature." In "The Ambiguity of the Flesh," Barbaras
goes considerably farther in fmding too much residual consciousness and perception in The Visible and the
Invisible as well. Even the problematic category of the flesh, he points out, includes a moment of
perceiving and a moment of being perceived, and thus re-institutes the very dualism which it is supposed to
avoid, rather than going ahead with the thought of expression throughout nature and being, expression as
not only a strictly human category. There is, no doubt, a duality remaining in The Visible and the Invisible,
and a duality throughout Merleau-Ponty's thought insofar as it is always reliant upon perception as a
primary category, even when expression becomes primary as well. But perhaps the contemporary haste to
see dualism be finally crushed leads one to avoid an honest appraisal or the presentation of experience as
far as we can see it - perhaps there is something unavoidable in the doubling ofthe world between sensible
and sentient. If there were, the task would be to think through nature and language in a manner that would
not insist on avoiding all dualism, but would make their appearance, as doubled, thinkable at all.
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evolving institutions of human expression, however, require some sort offoundation,3
some soil from which to spring.
The foundation is nature, understood as the non-instituted (N 20/4), "what has a
meaning, without this meaning being posited by thought: it is the autoproduction of a
meaning" (N 19/3). Nature is a sort ofphusis of meaning, a self-generating expression.4
The study of the life sciences reveals the being oforganisms as always already perceived
being (N 247/1 89), so that the nature ofbeing, as being-perceived, is not given entirely by
the constituting consciousness of Husserlian phenomenology.s Nature, "our soil. .. that
which carries us" (N 20/4), the foundation of human expression and institution, is
revealed by the philosophical interpretation of modem science as already expressive and
full of sense. As the privileged expression of ontology and its most convincing
propaedeutic, nature has the same ontological structure that will be revealed, in The
Visible and the Invisible, by a phenomenology of perception and a radicalizing of
interrogative philosophy - but without the problematic possibility that this strucMe is
3 Barbaras, Renaud, "Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Nature," 27.
4 The qilestion of the expression of nature and its relation to human expression in art is given direct
attention, although in a different manner, in Dominic Willsdon's essay "Merleau-Ponty on the Expression
ofNature in Art." Willsdon points out the potential romanticist problem ofthinking the expression
accomplished in art as the direct expression, or coincidence, of the artist with the nature that is effectively
expressing itself through him, and provides what he sees as a deconstructionist critique of this from both
art-historical and philosophical perspectives. The philosophical perspective comes in the form ofDerrida's
interrogation ofRousseattian expression in OfGrammatology, where Derrida famously fmds a differance
emerging between nature and artist at the closest moment of their mutual expression. Willsdon points out
similar themes both in Merleau-Ponty's theory of gesture in Phenomenology ofPerception, where gesture,
as the primordial human expression, already asserts and is based on the space between the body and the
expressive act, and in the later work, where this space becomes a main focus of inquiry. See also
Bimbenet, Etienne, "'L'Etre interrogative de la vie' : la historicite de la vie dans Ie cours du College de
France (1957-1958)."
5 Barbaras, Renaud, "Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Nature," 27
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entirely borrowed from human perception. This will help to show that being, as the flesh
ofwhich consciousnesses, meanings, and expressions are hollows or folds, is a being
which we are already in and of(VI 298/248), and not a being constituted, in the end, by
consciousness.
Thinking nature as expression thus marks a step toward resolving the central
difficulty of the present work, the problem ofthe continuity and co-emergence ofhuman
language and nature. If the expressive character of language already exists, in another
form, in nature, then the radical schism between the "rational animal" and nature, so easy
to take for granted, becomes less compelling.
Tristan Moyle makes a similar point in "Re-Enchanting Nature: Human and
Animal Life in the Later Merleau-Ponty.,,6 Moyle points out that the conception of
nature as expression, or more specifically, life as expression, does much more to resolve
these tertsions than Heidegger's conception, which attempted to think both humans and
animals outside of a modem ontology ofbeing-as-presence. As Moyle puts it,
Heidegger's way of thinking removes the ambiguity between a human being which is
obviously natural but also speaks by thinking humans and animals as not at all "natural,"
in the modern sense. However, in Heidegger's reflections, an abyss between humans and
animals is re-inscribed by the impossibility of describing the worldliness ofanimal life,
an ambiguity almost deeper because of its closeness. Moyle makes the case that the
concept of life as expression helps one to think both the difference between humans and
other natural beings as various modalities ofexpression, while also thinking what even
6 See especially page 177, where Moyle puts the argument in precisely this form.
113
Heidegger grudgingly recognized as the shared world between humans and animals.
Moyle's line of argument is certainly a close parallel to what I am attempting here, in that
it consists of an attempt to think the sameness and differences between human and nature
which are both phenomenally obvious in our lived experience, and it requires a radical re-
working at the ontological level to accomplish this.
We should be wary, however, of arguments, and phenomenologies, too closely
concerned with specifically animal experience, or more precisely, with the experience of
other animals. This is a problem with Heidegger's analyses of animal life in The
Fundamental Concept ofMetaphysics, with Merleau-Ponty' s attempts to think animal life
following von Uexkull and others in the Nature lectures, and with many secondary
sources commenting on the Nature lectures. The tendency to focus on animal life,
especially big mammals, is perhaps not surprising, given the phenomenal and
evolutionary closeness of these animals to humans, as opposed to plants, or, say, lichens
or jellyfish. However, there are two problems. First, even an attempt like Moyle's to
describe the differences between humans and animals as differences between forms of
expression has the possibility to re-inscribe the thought of humans as "nature plus
something else," here in the form of the various levels of complexity and spontaneity in
expression that one could attempt to catalogue, ranging from human language and society
to, perhaps, lichen patterns on rocks, or whales making noise underwater, or whatever
one chooses. Second, and tied to the first, a phenomenology of non-human life, or nature,
is impossible. We cannot become a moose, a lichen, or a weather pattern and describe
the appearing of the world from that perspective, and we cannot even share a phenomenal
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world with these beings because we cannot speak to them, nor they to us.7 This is
perhaps closer to the truth ofHeidegger' s insistence on the gulf between humans and
animals. It is a gulf centered on their essential and stubborn silence.
Our own work of language, as we saw in Proust, dances with the silence of nature
and brings our lived experience in it to word - but this is not the same as a
phenomenology of "life" in the manner of, for example, the Phenomenology ofSpirit or
the Phenomenology ofPerception. The titles of those works are good titles because they
describe what the works accomplish: Geist appears as itself in a logos, and the
phenomenon of perception comes to logos. But for such a category as life, the same thing
is not possible, because, even as life too is shot through with logos and logos is
inconceivable without life, a certain impasse separates the two, life being a much larger
category than human Geist or human perception, a category which logos cannot access,
or traverse in its entirety, in the same manner.
The expression in nature, thert, is not just a matter of animals doing things that
seem similar to humans that makes us think of some vague idea of kinship. The soil that
carries us (N20/4), nature as phenomena and as concept, is already expressive in its own
perceiving structures. Nature carries us, and it is structured as flesh, yet
phenomenologically, it remains fundamentally obscure, even opaque. Perhaps this is
7 Moyle suggests, very briefly, that one should be able grasp some sense ofanimal life, especially oflarge
mammals who are more like us, essentially by watching closely and repeating their gestures (pgs 178-179).
This might be true, barely, with a lot of attention. The ontological ramifications ofwhat might be, at best, a
fleeting, very vague sense ofthe bodily movement of, say, a caribou bolting at the smell ofa person would
then remain to be thought.
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why it is easier, for Merleau-Ponty as for almost everyone else, to think nature as always
a region of being, the region of animals and plants and minerals and atoms. As a regional
problem, the opacity and silence of nature is less problematic and less disturbing. Its
stubborn silence can be ignored.
As a supposed region of being, nature is thought as distinct, in some senses at
least, from the regions of the human and the divine, in the passage quoted above.
Whether nature is the non-instituted, as in the analysis of biology explicated by Barbaras,
or the final excess, the Ungrund, the barbaric principle or wild abyss of being prior to
reflection, as in the reading of Schelling in the nature lectures (N 59-71137-45), or the
'''something' at the heart of human existence that does not properly belong to the human
subject: a ground (Grund) of its constituting capacities, that is at the same time a non-
ground or ungrounding (Ungrund), a capacity that evades constituting reason,"s it is
always a region ofbeing which the human, ambiguously, is both rooted in and
transcendent to.
Yet does not the thinking of flesh, the philosophical practice and the ontology of
The Visible and the Invisible, have to tum back from this common, ancient, and
convenient figure of speech, from this sense of nature as a region of being, as a category
or inquiry? Perhaps this sort of nature no longer makes sense, and philosophy must make
8 Bernet, Rudolph. "The Subject in Nature: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of
Perception." Antje KatJUst ("The So-Called 'Barbarian Basis ofNature, and its Secret Aoyo<;") tries to
show that this Schellingian nature as ungrund is also at work in Merleau-Ponty's reading ofscience, which
would consist in an effort to explicate its secret logos. Kapust shows that Merleau-Ponty goes beyond what
Kapust calls Schelling's equivocation between nature as the ungrund that supports thought, and nature as
that whose whole meaning is exhausted by its being thought (N 68/43). Unfortunately, Bernet's analysis,
taken from Phenomenology ofPerception, would also be stuck in this supposed Schellingian circle,
referring nature, even in its abyssal character, to the constituting capacities ofthe human. But perhaps
there is more to Schelling's "equivocation" than Kapust leads one to believe.
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this habitual thinking vibrate until it disjoins (VI 136/102). Merleau-Ponty's study of
scientific nature, taken as the non-human stuff of the world, has disclosed perceiving and
expressive being, a "non-Parminidean being, a form which escapes the dilemma between
being and non-being" (N239/183), hollows and folds which work in being - in a word,
flesh (N 270-271/209, or the same being whose folds allow the sensible idea to interlace
the visible and the invisible. The description ofperception which is taken up again in the
last chapter of The Visible and the Invisible and also in "Eye and Mind," leads to the
same flesh, to the power ofperception in one's own body which lives from the
anonymous field ofvisibility, itself lined and supported by the invisible. As far as nature
goes, this generality of the visible and invisible flesh "exists between different
organisms... Their landscapes interweave, their actions and their passions fit together
exactly: this is possible as soon as one ceases to defme the primordial qualification of
sensibility as the belongingness to one sartle 'consciousness', and as soon as we rather
understand it as the return of the visible upon itself, a carnal adherence of the sentient to
the sensed and ofthe sensed to the sentient" (VI 185/142). It is this field of generativity,
this phusis of expression in things, that, in "Eye and Mind," the painter is able to show
(EM 69/181), and that, as we find in a note inserted in brackets in the text of The Visible
and the Invisible, provides for thinking as the invisible of the il y a (VI 188/145), or the
German es gibt. 9 Expression, thinking, language, all live from the same flesh as the
things: "We will therefore have to recognize an ideality that is not alien to the flesh, that
gives it its axes, its depth, its dimensions" (VI 197/152).
9 Heidegger, Martin, "Letter on Humanism," 238.
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As the same note explains, thought, in a certain sense, already occurs in the
dehiscence of the sensible into sensing/sentience. "The thinking we have introduced was
there is, and not it appears to me that '" (appearing that would make up the whole of
being, self-appearing)" (VI 188/145). This is to think thinking not as the presence of
thought to the thinker, not as intentional consciousness, but as the effort of the there is, of
being, of the flesh, of nature, doubling itself up to create a hollow, a lining of invisibility,
which is the depth or dimension of the visible. "This thinking we have introduced" is an
ideality in the things, in nature, in phusis, what Proust sought and finally learned to
express, the language of the waves and the forests. More precisely, then, this field of
generativity is phusis. Nature, phusis, is precisely what gives there is, what "is" es gibt. lO
Nature, then, that which carries us, also speaks in us. It demands and already
carries language. Nature speaks - that is, the sensible immediately dehisces, the visible is
lined and given its depth by the invisible, while at the same time carrying and opening up
the depth of the invisible. This is what Proust knew, that the sensible, and language in
particular as sensible, catches "a meaning in its own mesh" (VI 198/153). 11
10 See Morris, David, "Animals and Humans, Thinking and Nature," for an attempt, inspired by Merleau-
Ponty and by Renaud Barbaras urging to think nature as phenomenal, rather than phenomena as scientistic
nature, to think the group behavior of certain animals as a sort of thinking, or a sort of sense. This is a
more specific example of what I am claiming here to be a general ontological structure.
II This is what makes possible what Galen Johnson, after Bachelard, called "sensing the material
imaginary." The ocean, through the saltiness of our own tears and blood, and the sensual support ofthe
buoyant salt water, which almost makes us lose ourselves in a manner sometimes blissful, in its warm
rocking, or terrifYing in its cold vastness and depth, communicates the sense of our own origins in what is
not human. The sense ofour origins explained by evolutionary theory, as creatures that crawled out of the
sea, or oforigins in the sense ofthe salty, watery elements that make up our body, are both carried by our
sensual engagement with the carnality ofthe ocean. Galen Johnson, "In the Timber Yard, Under the Sea,"
252-253.
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When expression, language, thought, are all carried by the visible, their hollows
already opened up in its dehiscence; when the so-called natural world, even observed and
objectified scientifically as it is in the studies Merleau-Ponty draws on in the Nature
lectures, shows itself to be already expressive, when its being is being-perceived;12 when,
in painting, so close to the generation of sense in the visible, "it is impossible to say that
nature ends here and that man or expression starts here" (EM 87/188), it no longer makes
any sense to speak of the human or of nature as an entirely distinct ontological field.
Nature is the whole field, and everything that has been meant by the human - ideality,
language, expression, consciousness - is already nature. As Barbaras puts it, perception
and expression are unified,13 both in the human body and in nature, since both are being-
perceived and expressive at the same time, in the same way, through the same flesh. 14
That is why it makes no sense to look for "Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of
nature." As he tells us in the last working note to The Visible and the Invisible, a note
which describes a plan for the completion of that text: "(the 2nd part [Nature] is not
nature in itself, a philosophy ofnature, but a description of the man-animality
intertwining)" (VI 322/274). A note to the Nature lectures includes a long quote from the
anthropologist Evelyn Lot-Falck concerning the shifting identity between humanity and
animality in Inuit masks, from which Merleau-Ponty claims that "mythical thinking
12 If one can take this to be the whole point of the analysis of biology in the Nature lectures.
13 Barbaras, Renaud, "Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Nature," 27
14 See also Barbaras' "Merleau-Ponty aux lirnites de la phenomenologie," which puts the same thought in
terms of a negativity introduced by Merleau-Ponty into Being itself, rather than Being as a fully positive
structure to be confronted with the fundamental negativity of the subject. The latter was the case,
according to Barbaras, throughout the history of philosophy up to Husser!.
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indicates best the humanity-animality relatedness that we have in sight" (N277/214).
This sort of indication does not point to anything that might be called "philosophy of
nature," in the sense of a philosophical elucidation of a particular region of being. What
it points to, the "man-animality intertwining," is itself a function of the back and forth
movement between language and nature made possible by thinking "nature" as already
lined and supported by the invisible, by the field of meaning which eventually becomes
language. In the conceptual terms of the present work, by the nature disclosed after the
second sailing.
There is no philosophy of nature, to be disclosed by scientific data and given in a
set of lectures, aside from the philosophy of expression and perception. To follow
Barbaras again, the problems of the phenomenology of perception, the tendency to
incarcerate expression and ideality in consciousness while maintaining this consciousness
in a natural body which remained, in the bad ambiguity of Cartesianism, foreign to it,15
necessitates a "return to the perceived starting from the knowledge from the study of
exptession,,,16 which will become a tum to nature in order to find the logos and
perception already there. The turn to nature was driven by the previous turn from
perception to expression,17 all in a sort of MerIeau-Pontian second sailing, like that of
Socrates in the Phaedo and the Republic. Just as Socrates, faced with the tautologies of
15 Barbaras, Renaud, The Being ofthe Phenomenon, 44.
16 Barbaras, Renaud, "Merleau-Ponty's Concept ofNature," 27.
17 Barbaras, Renaud, The Being ofthe Phenomenon, 48.
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"inquiry into nature," turned to the logos in order to interrogate its reflection on nature,18
Merleau-Ponty deepens and radicalizes the questions ofnature, expression, and
perception by finding each implicated in the other. The turn to expression itselfbecomes
a further turn back toward nature - but not to the same nature.
If we take the intertwining of the visible and the invisible seriously and radically,
then ontology, while inspired and informed by the study ofnon-human nature through
science, doubles back on our understanding of nature, of ourselves as human, and of the
possibilities of ontology itself. Ifthe flesh is fundamentally lacunary, if its "reality of the
negative" (N2711210) is the non-Parmenidean being of hollows or folds, blind spots of
invisibility which hold open its depth, then ontology will not be the laying out of a
structure with sectors or regions like Nature, Human, and God: "philosophy can no
longer think according to this cleavage: God, man, creatures" (VI 322/274). The meaning
of the vinculum, from the passage that opens the Nature lectures, is that each of these
regions holds all ofbeing, including the other regions, within itself, which is why the
Inuit masks make sense, enabling a human-animality transition which is possible if each
"region" holds the other within itself. That is why it is not going too far to say that being
is nature - or at the same time, that nature and the gods speak, are held up by an invisible
depth that includes ideality, just like the human; or that nature and the human are the
godS. 19 This has to be a thought of non-contradiction: all three are true at once, by a sort
18 Plato. Phaedo 99b-e.
19 It is not at all clear from the text of the Nature lectures why Merleau-Ponty feels the need to throw God
in the vinculum, but it is certainly suggestive. Perhaps it would mean that nature and the human have their
being also, even completely, in the being of the divine. It seems notable that even Heidegger, a champion
ofBeing if ever there was one, at one point makes a similar suggestion in a reading of Holderlin's hymn,
121
of chiasm in the hollows of the flesh: perhaps one could say that the gods and nature exist
in the hollows of the human, and the human and the gods exist in the hollows of nature,
and nature and the human exist in the hollows of the gods.
Thus we could speak of nature rather than of being. I put this forward more as
speculation, as the possible implication of the foregoing analysis, than as a clearly
justified claim. Nature is immediately understood as moss and rain, clouds and rocks;
that is, as fundamentally visible, its invisibility actually carried, not just concealed, by the
visible things. Merleau-Ponty does, at times, move freely between the words nature and
being, as in the Working Note ofMarch 1959, where the "Becoming nature ofman
which is the becoming-man of nature" slides into the question of the hiddenness of being
(he mentions Verborgenheit in Heidegger) and human language as an expression of the
world: "It is not we who perceive, it is the thing that perceives itself yonder - it is not we
who speak, it is truth that speaks itself at the depths of speech" (VI236/184). The
becoming nature of the human and the becoming human of nature is certainly a matter of
language, of the expressiveness ofI1ature as it reveals itself in the depths of human
speech. Yet "being" is also approached as a matter of language and a matter of
perception, indeed as explicitly interchangeable with perception as a term: "The brute or
wild being (= the perceived world)" (VI221/170)."
Nature as b~ihg, if that is the thought that Merleau-Ponty makes possible, reveals
a thinking of being that is not quite like the ontological difference that Heidegger (and
"As when on feast day... ". Heidegger, "On the Essence and Concept ofphysis in Aristotle's Physics B 1,"
184.
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Plato and Socrates) tried to think, the capital-B Being that is fundamentally hidden
behind beings but supports them all.2o It is not like the sun ofthe Republic that grants
visibility and is thus the greatest of the visible things, but is itself invisible, since we
cannot look at it directly:21 as Merleau-Ponty sees in Proust's supposed Platonism,
"These ideas are without an intelligible sun, and appear in the membrane of the visible"
(NC 194). Ontological difference means that being is primordially hidden, primarily
invisible, like Socrates' sun in the Republic, that which gives light but cannot be seen
directly. The hiddenness of nature, the invisible, thought according to Merleau-Ponty, is
the depth that is given right there through visibility itself, an invisibility that literally lives
through the visible.
The separation of being from beings is perhaps too easy to think as an ontological
diplopia, as fully positive and present beings versus, by default, being as absence or as
negativity. To take over the diplopia, to remake the monocular image as Merleau-Ponty
puts it in another lecture summary (RC 159/158), would mean to understand the flesh as
simultaneously presence and absence, identity and difference, to understand nature as
present, as being, through hollows and folds, "that carnal being, as a being of depths, of
20 See, for example, Heidegger, Martin, Parmenides, 95,101; "Letter on Humanism," 234. Throughout
Heidegger's works, Being is essentially hidden, extra-ordinary, though perhaps one could say that through
the trajectory from Being and Time to the later works, Being is thought more and more as near to the
everyday and to beings, or rather, its nearness and farness become no longer strictly opposed. See also
Barbaras, Being ofthe Phenomenon 301-309, in which that book concludes with a discussion of ontological
difference in Merleau-Ponty as simultaneously absolute identity. Barbaras' discussion is close to mine in
that he also sees Merleau-Ponty emphasizing being's givenness in and through the sensible, in a hiddenness
that is simultaneously the most visible. This is one ofthe ways in which Barbaras claims that Merleau-
Ponty carries Heidegger's thought forward, just as he often described himself as carrying Husser!' s thought
forward.
21 Plato, Republic 508a-509b.
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several leaves or several faces, a being in latency, and a presentation of a certain
absence... of which our body, the sensible sentient, is a very remarkable variant, but
whose constitutive paradox already lies in every visible" (VI 177/136). Barbaras again
puts it well: "nothingness must be thought as absence of the thing in relation to pure
determination, as the thing's self-absence. And this absence, this character of
indetermination that is proper to experience, does not conceal a negation of presence but
mingles with presence.,,22 Being beyond beings is such a sort of negation of presence -
being is always hidden. It is not being that is indeterminate and thus leads speech to
silence, while beings would remain determinate in the everyday: it is the things
themselves, nature, whose very presence slips into absence. The flesh is right there as
nature, not hidden behind beings.
In the summary of his lecture course "Philosophy Today," Merleau-Ponty
questions the necessity of the "silence which from time to time breaks into Heidegger's
essays." This necessity of silence, the impossibility to speak being directly, results from
Heidegger's search for Being hidden behind beings, a search that is necessarily
impossible to conclude: "But does not this [silence] come from Heidegger's search for a
direct expression of what is fundamental at the very moment he is showing its
impossibility?" (RC 156/156). Merleau-Ponty would evade this lapse into silence by
practicing ontology indirectly, through beings, or regions of being, "to lead up to being in
general only through particular beings" (RC 156/156). This almost sounds like one
would eventually arrive at being, at a fully elaborated ontology, if one only took an
22 Barbaras, Renaud, The Being ofthe Phenomenon, 100.
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indirect path, which is a strange way of stating things from a philosopher who has
reminded us, again and again, that from our position within being, it will be impossible to
elaborate being-as-a-whole, as if from the outside. This is maintained from
Phenomenology ofPerception, which disclosed the simple fact that the body-subject
never has a view from above from which to grasp the whole field of perception at once,
to the ontology of the flesh, which exhorts us to philosophy as interrogation, as a
question-knowing that does not seek to grasp being, but to open upon it. Indeed, if
language is the reflexivity of nature, the activity of the hollows in the flesh that we are, an
activity which is not entirely ours, if it is "called forth by the voices of silence, and
continues an effort of articulation which is the being of every being," (VI 166/126-127),
then it seems appropriate to seriously question the tendencies of philosophy, including, at
times, of Merleau-Ponty and some who follow him, to take up the expression of nature,
or being, as elaboration and explanation, to seek ontology as a structure of being with one
part called nature, a structure which might almost be diagrammed on the page.
Even further, if the effort of philosophy is to say what is, and if to speak is to
engage and respond in the field of expression which is nature's and not our own, we
might ask ourselves, and ask nature, how it would demand to be spoken. As a nature of
lacuna, of hollows ofdepth which are the home ofthe invisible, including language, this
nature in whose midst we live in might require allusion and evocation rather than
elaboration and explanation, a speaking that could cast itself into the depth of the
invisible, rather than measure nature as if it were entirely visible. "Language in forming
itself expresses, at least laterally, an ontogenesis of which it is a part. But from this it
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follows that the words most charged with philosophy are not necessarily those that
contain what they say, but rather those that most energetically open upon being, because
they more closely convey the life of the whole" (VI 137/102). Language, in what it
means to say and in the activity of its saying, is expression as the phusis of nature.
Language communicates, as Merleau-Ponty learned from Proust, by a sense that is not
always the same as what it means to say, by a gestural meaning: "The meaning is not on
the phrase like the butter on the bread, like a second layer of 'psychic reality' spread over
the sound... and conversely the whole landscape is overrun with words as with an
invasion, it is henceforth but a variant of speech before our eyes... as Valery said,
language is everything, since it is the voice of no one, since it is the very voice of the
things, the waves, and the forests (VI20l/155)."
Philosophy as explanation and elaboration carries an ontological intention that is
in conflict with the thinking of nature that Merleau-Ponty is engaged in, a meaning that
fails to think the flesh of things and the invisible in the visible. The speech of the
landscape overrun with words, language understood as a field we are inside of, as the
lining ofnature, would have to be a speech that evokes an excess: nature itself. As a
speaking out of a hollow ofthe flesh itself, it would have to be a speaking around a
corner of sorts, some kind of echo ofnature - that is, an eminently indirect sort of
ontology, if this could be called ontology at all.
No doubt this entire discussion of nature is at once preliminary and somewhat
forceful: it can only be an introduction, as an outline ofa task, and at the same time is
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only possible through a strong reading and through certain deliberate combinations of
Merleau-Ponty's texts, emphasizing certain passages over others. Merleau-Ponty only
suggests some obscure vinculum ofHuman-Nature-God, and that only in a lecture note
transcribed by a student It remains to think this vinculum, to think the sort of three-way
chiasm that seems to be called for here, and to find a way to bring it to word. Merleau-
Ponty does this only sporadically. For the most part, as the above has argued, he remains
at the level of a concept of nature, at an attempt, the attempt which he always claimed to
practice since The Structure ofBehavior, to find the philosophical lining in the concepts
of a nature given by empirical science. That is why the bulk of the Nature lectures
consist of the explication of selected aspects of past and contemporary science, somewhat
like The Structure ofBehavior and The Phenomenology ofPerception used evidence
from psychiatric studies to motivate and support their philosophical arguments. This
approach is thoroughly and repeatedly argued for and supported through Merleau-Ponty's
conception of phenomenology and its relation to scientific studies. However, its
limitations, and likewise the possibilities of thinking nature which are necessarily
excluded by starting from empirical science, are never thoroughly discussed, although
they are hinted at, gestured toward, in extremely powerful language.
One of these passages is the suggestion of the vinculum. Another is the thought
which opens the Nature lectures, that of nature as our soil, a thought which is phrased
even more provocatively in the first few pages of the Notes de cours from 1959-1960, the
course dealing with language, literature, Husserl, and Heidegger, which was interrupted
by the course on nature. In the introductory section of this course, entitled "Our State of
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Non-Philosophy," at the end of a brief and general discussion ofthe "entirely humanized
and entirely inhuman" (NC 42) nature of the technological and atomic age, comes the
following thought: "rediscovery ofa nature-for-us as soil ofall our culture, in which is
enrooted in particular our creative activity which is nevertheless unconditioned, which
maintains culture in contact with wild being, at the confrontation with it" (NC 44).
Nature-for-us is the root ofcreative activity, in other words of the literature and painting
which carry a profound philosophical character in the midst of the decadence of "official"
philosophy (NC 39). Creative activity maintains culture in contact with wild being, with
the excess that demands and eludes expression. Surely this nature-for-us requires a
thought that would not arise only from the results of scientific methodology, requires a
more phenomenological nature, the nature that we touch, eat, and breathe. Or ifnot that
visceral nature exactly, then a nature-for-us, rediscovered philosophically, that can let the
ground and the air enter the labor of the Concept.
But how? Such a rediscovery ofnature, or of the phusis-logos-History junction
which is the stated goal of the last courses given by Merleau-Ponty (NC 37), would surely
require an ihdirect method. One could say that Merleau-Ponty indeed practices stich a
method with regard to nature, in two ways. First, the readings of science produce a
latenil effect of a new grasp of nature not possible through a direct scientific reading or
through a direct phenomenological description. Second, Merleau-Ponty's rare but
intensely evocative passages on sensible nature, such as "my saturation with this limitless
blue" in Phenomenology ofPerception (248/214), and the intimacy between the sea and
the strand in The Visible and the Invisible (VI 171/130-131), perhaps motivate the
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beginnings of a thought of nature illuminated by the very concepts ofperception and
chiasm that the passages themselves are supposed to illustrate. Nevertheless, these
passages are short, and barely graze the edge of what they seem to want to disclose. It
remains the case that the method is almost too indirect: it risks losing nature out of the
comer of its eye. Perhaps a closer turn would have come if The Visible and the Invisible
had been seen through to completion - the matter of nature certainly finds a prominent
place in the various proposed outlines found in the Working Notes.
Thus it would seem that one is obliged to proceed toward the philosophical turn
back towards nature with somewhat limited resources on the part of Merleau-Ponty.
With such limited resources, how is one to carry forward the interrogation of nature that
Merleau-Ponty promises, but barely begins to carry out? A richer and more properly
Merleau-Pontian thinking of nature must perhaps seek insight outside of Merleau-Ponty's
own work, either by interrogating a similar experience of language and nature in another
thinker that yet takes a different tum, or by looking deeper into time for the threads of
nattire in Merleal1-Ponty's philosophical ptedecessors. So we tum to Schelling.
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CHAPTER V
SCHELLING
Nature is the soul of Schelling's thought, its center and its deepest point - and
unlike in the case of Merleau-Ponty, this is not at all difficult to show. Schelling's effort
is similar to Merleau-Ponty's, and his philosophical path is one that likewise suffered
from a reticence in moving from a concept of nature to a phenomenology of nature, a
genuine bringing to word of the matter at hand. Schelling's proximity to a radical
thought of nature, and the equivocation that his thought suffers at its height (or depth),
not only at the level of what he might have been willing to write, but at the level of what
appears as possible to think, is profoundly similar to and profoundly instructive for the
kind of Merleau-Pontian thought of nature that we are seeking. Succinctly, Schelling's
thought, throughout his career but quite forcefully in the Philosophical Investigations
Into the Essence ofHuman Freedom, undergoes the twin difficulties of thinking the
intertwining oflanguage, nature, and history, or Merleau-Ponty's phusis-Iogos-History
junction, and finding a practice of language that could bring this intertwining to word.
Schelling ends up taking a radically indirect method, demanding of philosophy that it
think as literature, or more precisely, as myth. The present chapter will focus on the
point of God's birth in Schelling's Freedom essay, on its allusion to Plato's Timaeus, and
130
on a few evocative passages in Schelling's dialogue Clara to make the suggestion that the
attempt to "think Nature as living Ground" at the center of Schelling's thought relies, like
Timaeus relies in the dialogue bearing his name, on thinking place, as sensible nature,
which rests, in a very strange way, beneath the ground, to use a Schellingian phrase,
supporting the birth of God that is also the birth of language in Schelling's story.
Hopefully, a brief inquiry into Schelling will serve to push Merleau-Ponty
further. l One will have to be both patient and careful with their differences - Schelling
has an extremely different tone than Merleau-Ponty, a tone that is not just a matter of
preference in writing style, and some different preoccupations as well. He is a German
idealist through and through: dark, tragic, mythical, coming from a Germany that in his
time was still, as Roberto Calasso puts it, "the enchanted forest at the heart ofEurope,,,2
rather than Merleau-Ponty's less arboreal enchantments of post-war Paris. But he is
dealing with exactly the same thing, in terms strikingly similar to Merleau-Ponty: the
fundamentally excessive character of nature and its implication in the human as that
which connects us to wild being. Or as Merleau-Ponty puts it in more general terms in
his lecture on Schelling in Nature, "What inspires this idea of erste Natur in Schelling is
the opposition to reflexive philosophies for which Being is contemporary with reflection,
1 Several articles have laid out various connections between Merleau-Ponty and Schelling, and given a
reading ofMerleau-Ponty's explicit references to Schelling. See Robert Vallier, Etre Sauvage and the
Barbaric Principle: Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Schelling"; Marcio Suzuki, "Le double enigme du monde:
nature et langage chez Schelling et Merleau-Ponty"; and Anlje Kapust, "The So-Called 'Barbarian Basis of
Nature' and its Secret Aoyor,". The present intention is not to provide this sort of inventory ofall plausible
connections, but rather to focus on a few passages in Schelling which relate directly to the problem of the
forgetting of nature as excessive ground.
2 Calasso, Roberto. Literature and the Gods, 9. Calasso quotes Madame de Stael's travelogue De
Allemagne to develop this milieu ofwildness and myth in the Germany of two hundred years ago, and its
difference from the more urban and agricultural France of the time, during a discussion of HOlderlin.
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the feeling that Being is anterior to all reflection on Being and that reflection comes
second" (N 61/38). Put blithely like this, if we are willing for the time being to ignore the
confusions surrounding the form of this priority (for as Chapter I of the present work
explains, it is hardly straightforward, not a matter of the first sailing) Schelling is working
on the same phenomenological problem that Husserl (also taken up in the Nature
lectures) opened, the problem of the pre-reflective world or Lebenswelt. 3
The tone is different, but the matter for thought is the same, and indeed part of
the difference in tone between Schelling and Merleau-Ponty results from their different
reactions to the same matter. Schelling writes and practices philosophy in the tragic
tradition: a reading of Greek tragedy is at the center ofhis thought, and the painful
rending in the experience of the tragic, of being pulled apart by an impossible decision or
forced to continue in impossible circumstances, informs his response to the aporetic
experience of forging words to think what he will call the Ungrund.4 Merleau-Ponty,
confroI1ting the same problem of excess and Ungrund and the same call for a radical
change in both the thought and practice of language, responds with the tone of urgency
that is more and more evident in his later works and lecture notes, but also with the tone
ofwonder that permeates all ofhis oeuvre. Merleau-Ponty's wonder, and the sense of
impasse that he reaches, the sense that he is groping blindly to find his way around
something which it is hardly clear ifhe successfully circumvents, is tied to the impasses
3 See N 102-108170-79 and Suzuki, Marcio, "Le double enigme du monde: nature et langage chez Schelling
et Merleau-Ponty, "236. The first few pages ofthis essay summarize and restate Merleau-Ponty's
comments on Schelling in somewhat clearer terms than the lecture notes themselves.
4 On the importance ofthe tragic for Schelling and others including Hegel, HOlderlin, and Nietzsche, see
David Farrell Krell's The Tragic Absolute and Dennis Schmidt's On Germans and Other Greeks.
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of the tragic, and yet quite different in the comportment of its response. Nevertheless,
Schelling's darkness and Merleau-Ponty's luminosity are not fundamentally opposed in
their essentials.s
In many ways, Schelling went as far 200 years ago as anyone since in practicing
philosophy as literature (or for him, as myth) and in grappling with bringing excess to
word. Thus a focus on Schelling here should be, at the least, illuminating. Perhaps, as in
Plato's Theaetetus,6 the side-story on Schelling will bring out something even bigger on
nature and language than what we had seen before, or clarify the results of the earlier
chapters. Very little that Schelling says, however, is straightforward. Thus a lengthy and
elabotate excursus into Schelling's texts and terms is required, in order to eventually
circle back around to nature, language, and silence.
An explicit intention to think nature is present in Schelling's most succinct
formulation of his task, which means, as for any good German Idealist, the task of all
philosophy atld of all History itself. this task is "to think Nature as living Ground." This
thought was formulated in part as a step in a running, even lifelong, discussion and
competition with Hegel, and Schelling indeed becomes a sort of inversion of Hegel:
while Hegel's thought expands further and further outward until the power of the
Concept subsumes everything, Schelling's thought, when it is most interesting, dives
5 Neither is it necessary to read Schelling exclusively as a thinker of darkness, oftragedy, of a certain kind
of failure. Jason Wirth makes the persistent case that Schelling can be read as a thinker of irrepressible life,
of a kind ofbrightness. See The Conspiracy ofLife, which returns to this throughout.
6 Plato, Theaetetus 172B.
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further and further inward, deeper and deeper, as it experiences the necessity and the
impossibility of thinking origin and ground Schelling seeks, and was always seeking,
not only the tightest kernel of thought and of time, the first movement of God when He
was in the womb, so to speak, but also the expression ofthis kernel. This search ends up
finding nature: literally, "Nature as living Ground."?
Yet Schelling's thought, despite its radicality and its ruthless and rigorous striving
to investigate every turn ofthought, to not only graze past difficult thoughts, but grind
them through the wheels of philosophical expression, does indeed miss one tum, as I
shall try to show. It is this missed tum that is most relevant to the argument above on the
centrality of nature in Merleau-Ponty. This missed tum is like a black vacuum,
wordlessly sucking in everything, waiting to be recognized, supporting the whole thought
quietly, as if taken for granted. In the thought of"Nature as living Ground," Schelling,
much like Merleau-Ponty when he discusses nature, tends to not think much about
"ground" in terms of the ground, ground as sensible, visceral, phenomeIial nature, the
earth, which, as Proust would know, carries its own Concept, or idea, and requires a
strange practice of language to bring that Concept to word. Nevertheless, the sensibility
ofnature plays a powerful and pivotal role in Schelling's deepest attempts at grounding.
The role it plays can be thought most succinctly through the matter ofplace.
7 This search was hardly exclusive to the Freedom essay; in fact it is repeated, with variations, throughout
Schelling's corpus. As Jason Wirth puts it in The Conspiracy ofLife, speaking of Schelling's work as a
whole, "In these texts, Schelling led each discursive project to the incomprehensible origin of its own
discursivity, attempting to demonstrate that that the first principle by which a discourse can be founded
cannot, in its tum, be founded. Hence, each and every one of these principles, themselves the progenitors
of their respective systems, is brought face to face with the ruinous opacity of their own provenance, an
opacity that evades all efforts at constituting it and which remains as the ground ofall that exists" (8).
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In Clara, Schelling's philosophical novel which takes the form of a running
dialogue between a priest, a doctor, and a rather morose but richly imaginative young
woman named Clara, Clara says at one point to the priest:
You spoke so often about places and areas in the invisible realm,
and also about places midway between our visible world and the one that
is truly invisible; but then you also spoke about a place that was the
highest of all, to which only a very few go immediately after death. Now,
at the very least, we would so much like to get some idea about this place,
the true and actual heaven; or where else should the passion come from
that seems to be able to open up to us to some extent and with which
everything, albeit still having so very much the appearance of illusion, is
received? And even your calling that abode a "place" is very puzzling.
Can spirits, too, be in a place?
[The priest replies]: Indeed, I said, this is one of the most puzzling
things of all, for it's based on the mysteriousness of place and space in
general, and now I just can't refrain from really putting down some of the
foundations (C 93/67).
Indeed, we must ask, in response to Schelling and to Clara's priest, how would
one put down the foundations of place itself, how would one ground "the mysteriousness
of place and space in general?" Schelling's thought can at times be considered as a sort
of foundation building, even while the possibility of such a practice, of thinking as a
system that would benefit from a firm foundation, is beginning to crumble at the edges, or
rather to implbde from an emptiness at its center. This can be seen in the fact that
Schelling never produced a satisfactory final version of his philosophy. Unlike Hegel,
who, having finished the Phenomenology ofSpirit, could take its insights for granted, as
the most secure of foundations, and proceed to elaborate everything else under the sun,
Schelling continued to try to think the beginning, forever. He never succeeded, at least
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not in the manner of putting down an unshakable foundation on which to rest, and on
which to continue to build.
The beginning of the problem is that the poeisis of foundation building, if the
image of the building and ofthe foundation can carry us further, must necessarily take
place in a place which precedes it, that the building sits on the ground in a place. So the
still greater difficulty is to think: place as founded by thought. This is what should be
required if thought is to build a system, from the bottom up, and be responsible for it.
Yet the constant undertow of Schelling's texts pulls us towards a glimpse of the birth of
everything, even God, out of a place. Even God undergoes this failure to ground the
place from which he is born. Yet against the strength of this undertow, we have an effort
of thought to think the place of its birth: to think nature, to think: the earth. This
necessary doubling of thought, both of/about/determining place and out of/thanks
to/always lacking place, is what Schelling's God suffers in the story of his birth in the
Freedom essay. This is what I will try to show in the present chapter. In short, it
amounts to showing how place, in its very sensibility as the nature that supports us,
erupts in the Freedom essay, even though it is not taken up as a theme. Schelling's
thought, in effect, points beyond itself, all the way through to Step 3 of the second sailing
schema. Schelling, ofcourse, who described the difficulty of escaping the natural
attitude of Step 1 at least as well as HusserI, was always a thinker of the second sailing,
indeed a phenomenological thinker, of a way to think nature not as the in-itself, but as it
presents itself for human beings, full of language and given to thought. That is at least
Step 3. The goal ofthe present chapter is to show how place, specifically in its
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sensibility, taken quite literally as actual places, motivates a move to Step 3, to thinking
the sensible excess of nature as that which gives birth, essentially, to Merleau-Ponty's
invisible.
Thus perhaps it is possible to read Schelling's entire philosophical effort as a
thinking of place, with the full force of the double genitive. We think into place, and out-
of-place, as place thinking, or even in response to place's thinking - or all of these at
once. Schelling's creation story, the story of God's birth which begins the Freedom
essay in earnest and which is repeated again and again, in various permutations, in so
many of Schelling's works, never tells backwards beyond the beginning of place, the
place out of which God was born. This is not entirely clear; Schelling did not address
"place" as a major concept or theme. But it will require only a slightly forceful reading
to show that, despite God's efforts (with the faltering help of Schelling) to integrate the
place from which he was born into the order of his intentional production, place remains
an excess which refuses straightforward integration, just as nature, in Merleau-Ponty,
refuses to be integrated as a region of ontDlogy.8
In rigorously thinking back-into-place to the limit, in following God's tracks back
down to the groUnd of place, perhaps we can help to answer Clara's question, which
motivates the last few exchanges in the dialogue that bears her name:
Where does that deep devotion to Earth come from, independent of all
enjoyment we call earthly happiness and consisting of a full appreciation
of the invalidity of this life? Why, if our heart is indeed numb to
8 See Marcio Suzuki's .oLe double enigme du monde: Nature et langage chez Schelling et Merleau-Ponty,"
for a reading that draws a parallel between the doubling of nature as both product of a divine builder and as
creative ground, and the doubling of language as active and creative and as passive and sedimented.
Suzuki shows both ofthese doublings throughout the works of both Schelling and Merleau-Ponty.
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everything external, and considers it with pleasure only as a sign and
picture of our inner being, why, even ifwe are firmly convinced that the
other world far exceeds the present one in every way, is there nevertheless
the sense that it's hard to part from this Earth? (C 106/76).
That this question comes at the end of a dialogue which has been constantly
concerned with the spiritual, the otherworldly, the disembodied, the inner, at the end of
what could be read, ungenerously of course, as yet another Christianized, Platonist, life-
hating mistake, only serves to affirm the fundamental earthliness of Clara's wondering.
Clara's priest, as usual, attempts an answer, which ends very quickly in a pointedly non-
dualistic failure: "Yet this seems to lead to such wondering entanglements of the internal
and the external that I do not trust myself to develop this speech any further" (C 110/78).
Just a few lines above, he had said, "And one could even add, I think, that language, as
we know it, is something special to Earth" (C 109/78). I take these passages to indicate
that everything in Clara is grounded in a deep earthliness, which, as is occasionally stated
explicitly, is the same as the spiritual of which the characters speak so falteringly. This
dialogue thus makes a different attempt to think Merleau-Ponty's vinculum.
Our thinking of place, along with Schelling, should follow Clara's example in
returning to and starting out again from place not only in its conceptual necessity, but in
the power and gravitational pull of actual places: of ground as the ground that supports
us, as rocks and hills. The dialogue Clara takes place on walks, mostly outside, its
constant lingering theme of life-and-death always situated by the change of seasons: it
begins in fall and ends in spring. The sadness that hangs over the whole dialogue is not
only the sadness ofClara's impending death, but of the death that every autumn brings,
of the impending darkness of winter in the north, and of the life of spring that will only
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circle back to falling leaves next year. The boundedness of birth and death to place is
strongly figured in the dialogue's attention to this change of seasons and its emotional
weight. Clara's questions about place seem to come directly from her attention to the
sensibility of the place where she is; they do not arise as strictly conversational responses
to her interlocutors, but equally as questions motivated by a sort of sensible idea, which
the texts conveys through its descriptions of the natural places in which the dialogue
takes place.
The action immediately before Clara's question quoted above reads thus: "At that
moment we stepped out from the trees of the church and the whole area lay once more
before us in a mild transfiguration" (C 106/76). Once more transfigured. What is the
repetition here, perhaps the memory, that reminds Clara of a devotion to the Earth which
she speaks of as if it had always been present and operative, even if momentarily ignored,
or forgotten? Perhaps Schelling's effort to think in narrative, mythologically, with a
conceptually rigorous story of creation, could be read as an effort to remember a
groundedness in place that sustains even God: God's and our own irrepressible
rootedness, like plants, in the ground of the earth. Thus Schelling's injunction to
philosophy: to think nature as living ground.
Nature, ground, God; all Schellingian terms par excellence, but place? If
Schelling speaks ofplace, it is not as a clear concept which would playa role in the
System he never finished revising, but almost by accident - as ifhe could not help, in
speaking of nature, ground, or God, to refer them to place. This seems especially clear in
Clara, but it also occurs in the Freedom essay. Schelling constantly moves between
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several words whose force, in his work, lives from their ambiguous status as partly
distinct, but in some senses overlapping at the edges, words with function in a vinculum
of sorts. Such overlappings would shift the sense or meaning at stake, but in a manner in
which the sense of one word draws its force from another, rather than from its clear
distinction from the others, precisely as, in Merleau-Ponty for example, we see a
movement, without explicit deliminations, between "invisible," "thought," "absolute,"
"language," etc. The basic pantheistic thesis is the "God is nature," yet Schelling thinks
both the birth of God from nature and God's own effort at grounding himself in nature,
which of course requires the distinction between the two. Nature is indeed the ground,
but at the same time God is the ground insofar as it is his task to ground himself in nature.
Place, meanwhile, offers a sense of ground as sensible ground, and also as nature.
Perhaps, if Schelling had finished his System and presented it for all to see, it
would have been easier for us to delineate precisely why and where these terms function
as distinct or as ambiguous - but he didn't. The words nature, God, longing, and ground
circle one another endlessly in Schelling's work, sometimes rigorously distinguished
from one another, sometimes becoming one another, and sometimes shifting back and
forth despite the attempt at rigorous distinction: Nature as living ground, or,
pantheistically, nature as God, or, the longing/elt by the eternal one (God? Nature?) to
give birth to itself(Nature as phusis, becoming out of itself?). Through Schelling's early
work and his occasional reference to Plato's Timaeus, and from the unmistakable
parallels between Timaeus's story ofcreation in that dialogue and Schelling's own, such
that Schelling's work could almost be called a repetition of the Timaeus, it almost
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unavoidable to read the word chora when Schelling speaks, unspeakably, of God's birth-
place. 9
Place would be such a word which is barely spoken at all - Schelling uses it
relatively rarely, perhaps most often through the voice of Clara in the passages already
quoted. Yet if all the above words must be thought from place, in some sense from
earthly places, then Schelling's reticence in using this word, even if unintentional, speaks
to the difficulty of thinking place as ground, as God, as chora, and to the limit-character
of this movement of language toward its origin from the earth. Since what is to be said,
what even longs to be said (F 456-457/239), only flees from the sayability that marks the
first movement of God as the possibility of predication,10 whatever is said least, or with
the most difficulty, perhaps lies closest to the matter at hand.
Whatever is trying to be said, whether it is place, chora, nature, ground, God or
whomever, is repeated, again and again, throughout Schelling's work, as that work as a
whole is a repetition of Timaeus's necessity to retreat, anachorein, to the chora, the place
"which always is, admitting not ofdestruction and providing a seat for all that has birth,
9 Very briefly, most of the Timaeus consists of Timaeus trying to provide a complete story of creation. He
gets stuck, essentially around the problem of origin, of how there is to be something that originatesfrom
itself, without having been born of something else which must then be explained in turn. Amusingly,
Timaeus tries various different stories as a solution, and none of them really work. Generally they involve
some form ofproduction, where a "demiurgos" makes the world, and thus are similar to Aristotelian and
monotheistic cosmology. The problem, however, is the demiurgos' origin, or in the monotheistic
inheritance of this tradition, God's origin. To explain this, the story that ends up working best in the
Timaeus is the one in which everything was born out of something called chora, a word which can mean
womb or place. Timaeus' story is thus a forced transition, forced by the failure of its preliminary attempts,
from thinking of the creation of the world as a matter ofproduction, poeisis, to a matter of birth, more like
phusis. See John Sallis, Chorology, and Jacques Derrida, Khora. For a brief inventory of Schelling's
apparent references to Timaeus' chora ("The figure ofthe chora operates tacitly throughout Schelling's
entire corpus, taking on many different names"), see Jason Wirth, The Conspiracy ofLife, 86-88.
10 Schelling, Stuttgart Seminars, 199; Identity Philosophy, 143.
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itself graspable by some bastard reasoning with the aid of insensibility, hardly to be
trusted, the very thing we look to when we dream and affirm that it's necessary somehow
for everything that is to be in some region or occupy some space, and that what is neither
on earth nor somewhere in heaven is nothing."ll Timaeus retreats (in the argument) to
the chora, which is not graspable directly but only by some bastard logos, to find a sort of
resting place for his story in the very idea ofplace itself, in the necessary placedness of
all being. In a sense then, the argument rests on the earth.
The way to place in Schelling is slightly more involved, although Timaeus'
speech up to this point in the dialogue is certainly very long and convoluted itself.
Schelling's speech, and our own, is on Timaeus' terms also a bastard logos, the logos of
God's birth taken over by human beings - but it is very questionable if God himself is the
proper father of this thought, the thought of that from which he is born. The repetition of
this thought in the Freedom essay requires a sort of bastard reasoning to say the ground
of God, a turn to terms more accessible, but presumably less proper: "If we wish to bring
this being closer to the human, then we can say: it is the longing [Sehnsucht] felt by the
eternal one to give birth to itself' (F 455/238).
It is in the space of this longing, articulated in the Freedom essay, that Schelling's
unthought-thought of place can be followed. 12 Strictly speaking, at least in one direction,
Schelling has no thought of place, because place lies underneath thought, as its own
chora, as birthplace, ifyou will. Perhaps this is why Schelling uses the word rarely.
II Plato, Timaeus 52a-b.
12 On this moment in the Freedom essay, see Robert Vallier's "Etre Sauvage and the Barbaric Principle:
Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Schelling," 97-100, and Slavoj Zizek's The Indivisible Remainder, throughout
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Perhaps we shall see that thinking place, as thought ofplace in the sense of thinking what
already is, is more properly place thinking13 - or that the failure to think place, even as it
is enacted unintentionally in Schelling's failure to use the word very often or in our own
necessity to think it through a 2,500 year old Greek text, is the more appropriate way to
attempt this thought.
The birth of God and the creation of the world as Schelling tells it cannot be
thought without thinking at least spatially, even if not yet as place. Schelling begins his
story14 in the Freedom essay with the following thought, which contains, in germ, the
entire problematic of the excessive character of place: "Since nothing is prior to or
outside of God, he must have the ground of his existence within himself' (F 454/237).
This ground, that which grounds God but is already within him, is nature, as we find in
the next sentence. But first, let us note that "within" is a word of spatiality. This
wonderful entanglement of the interior and the exterior, as Clara's priest would say, is
precisely the spatial headache of thinking nature as living ground of God. Nature is
within God, but God, in his birth out of the ground, must grow out of nature - out of what
is within him. It defies everyday geometry.
13 Precisely as Merleau-Ponty wrote, time and again in his later work, that Being or Language speaks more
than we speak of Being or Language. See, for example, VI 188/145, 228/176, 236/185, 241/190.
14 After the long introduction establishing the character of pantheism.
----_. -_._.
143
God15 exists, he is actually, and everything that exists needs a ground, a place to
rest. But the peculiarity of God, or the all, is that he/she/it must have his ground within
himself. Thus, "since nothing can have being outside of God, this contradiction can be
resolved only by things having their ground in that which is in God, but is not God
himself' (F 456/238). This hardly makes things simpler or more palatable: God's
ground, which is inside him, is not him. God's existence is grounded on something
inside him which is not himself. God, from day one, is internally divided, or exists only
by virtue ofan otherness inside himself - nature. Nature occupies an odd place inside
God, while God is placed "on" nature, on the ground.
Here we require, Schelling says, terms more accessible to human beings. It will
be necessary return to this so-called accessibility, which, apparently, allows us to speak
ofGod's ground without saying it properly, in a sort of bastard logos. This being, nature,
the ground of God, is understood by us human beings as "the longing of the eternal one to
give birth to itself' (F 456/238). Sehnsucht, longing, languishing, desire - a longing at
once erotic and sick, destitute, necessitous, and at the same time the source of love. This
longing is the first - Schelling, before describing this longing, has given us nothing, has
told no story. He has, so far, only set the stage: pantheism, God as the all, which must
exist and have a ground, yet must hold this ground within itself. But nothing has
15 This could simply be read: God is all. Schelling thinks God pantheistically, which is in large part why
the importance which he attaches to God is important for us as well - "God" is not the monotheistic
personality in the sky with a beard, but the very fact ofexistence, of all-ness. In this sense, we could
almost dispense with the word "God," and thus rid ourselves of 4,OOO-odd years of monotheistic distraction
which serves mostly to muddy the waters. We could just think "the all." But this might be too hasty, and
would certainly disrespect Schelling's terminology, so we will have to be satisfied with the reminder that
God is not only the Good Father who creates and commands, but the all, everything, pantheistically.
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happened: the first to step onto the stage of creation is longing. That is, n~ture,
understood more accessibly by human beings as longing.
We see in the next few lines that this longing is willing, and thus the first instance
and the deepest root for an essential concept in this essay on human freedom. But it is
willing without understanding. Understanding comes on the scene presently, with God's
gift of predication - God says what is, predicates, "A is A," and thus the order ofthe all is
established and secured. But not yet. First there is only longing.
But the ruleless still lies in the ground as if it could break through once ..
again, and nowhere does it appear as though order and form were original,
but rather as if something initially ruleless had been brought to order. This
is the incomprehensible basis of reality in things, the indivisible
remainder, that which with the greatest exertion cannot be resolved in the
understanding, but rather remains eternally in the ground. From this non-
understanding is born understanding in the true sense. Without this
preceding darkness there is no reality of the creature; the gloom is its
necessary inheritance (F 456-457/239).
Remains eternally in the ground, buried, in the earth. This gloom, the impassable
darkness of the ground which we walk on, which supports us eternally, is out necessary
inheritance. God, in Schelling's story, will soon take on his proper role as the stage
director of Genesis, or the demiurgos of Timaeus (who himself needs chora to get started,
even ifTimaeus forgets it for awhile), the producer/craftsman who knows what he is
doing as he shapes reality. But the longing in the ground beneath/inside God is ruleless,
knowing no plan, and can always break through again. Indeed it breaks through all the
time, in our own experience of longing, perhaps our own pantheistic participation'in
God's ground, which makes this story so accessible to us. We may not know God, or
know the all, but we all know longing.
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We should pause a moment and try to think the sense of the eternal, and the sense
of narrative in Schelling's story, which is at work here. Schelling cautioned us a page
beforehand, while introducing God's need for a ground for his existence, to avoid
thinking either God or his ground as prior to the other: "As far as this precedence is
concerned, it is to be thought ofneither as precedence in time, nor as priority of being. In
the circle out of which all things become, it is not a contradiction that what engenders one
thing is itself generated by it. Here there is no first and last, because all things mutually
presuppose each other; nothing is the other, and yet nothing is without the other" (F
455/237). In a sense, this is the thought of God's dependence on a ground which is inside
him, as the all - he depends on it, but it depends on him, since it is inside him. We need
to take seriously Schelling's insistence on the simultaneity, or the interdependent co-
arising, ofall things which might assert themselves as in some sense prior. In the
preceding paragraphs, Schelling hasn't just cleverly pointed out that God isn't such hot
stuff after all, he isn't really the producer, the master and commander of everything, but
instead has always depended on a dark ground which he can never control. That would
be too easy, and would simply deify, or reify, the dark ground which is supposed to be
always a remainder, an excess - instead of God being God, the dark ground would really
(real~y!) be Ood. But this is nothing more than taking the figure of God as simple origin
and pushing it one step back, then proclaiming this new point, the dark ground, as the
new origin. Nothing would really have changed.
The deeper point is that God, the all, that which suffers nothing to be outside of
itself, never has an adequate grasp of itself such that it could claim its own priority. In
---~------
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the essay on identity philosophy, Schelling had claimed that duration, or time, does not
apply to GOd. 16 God is outside of time, and thus his birth is also outside of time. Yet as
outside of time (if that thought is possible at all), the saga of God's birth is an eternal
event, always happening, coterminous with all other events in time. In this way, then, the
entire creation "story" must be thought as an eternal return, as reenacted in every moment
of time, forever. Perhaps only God can suffer to undergo the longing that lies below his
own birth in every moment, forever. That sounds very hard. At some moments in the
Freedom essay, God is the unity of the "dark principle" which is in the ground and the
"light principle" which is in the understanding (F 459/241), and the human is the possible
difference between these two principles, or the actuality of evil. God, or the
understanding, after being born, "raises up the unity hidden in the divided ground" (F
458/240) - sometimes Schelling seems to say that God understands, retroactively as it
were, the longing in his own heart, the longing in nature.
As we speak in terms of time in Schelling's creation story, in a narration of
events, we should therefore think the eternal character ofwhat is said. In Timaeus's
words, it is "the third kind - that of chora - which always is, admitting not of destruction"
(Timaeus 52A-B) that we are seeking. Schelling's casual, off-handed mention of "Plato's
matter" helps to explain the already "more accessible" thought that we are trying to think,
the longing of nature on which God rests, or which rests (restlessly) inside God. It
follows a serious of images which remind us that light always comes from darkness: "All
birth is a birth from darkness into light; the seed must be buried in the earth and die in
16 Schelling, Identity Philosophy, 155
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darkness" (F 456/239). One has to envision darkness as the permanent basis, the
unformed matter, in a sense, of the all, and light primarily as a privation of darkness - but
of course one could not envision such darkness if vision only occurs through the light.
The longing, the earthliness of nature as the ground, which is in some sense "accessible,"
as darkness precisely cannot be envisioned by us at all. But chora, we should remember,
is only "itself graspable by some bastard reasoning with the aid of insensibility" (Timaeus
52B). So the difficulty of thinking this longing is not surprising. Schelling continues,
introducing "Plato's matter": "Thus we must represent original longing to ourselves in
this manner: it directs itself towards the understanding, which it does not yet know, as we
in our longing desire an unknown, nameless good, and it moves pre-sentiently like an
undulating, surging sea, similar to Plato's matter, following a dark, uncertain law,
incapable of forming something lasting by itself' (F 456/239).
It requires a bit ofgenerosity and a certain hermeneutic fearlessness to make
much at all out of "Plato's matter," for which Schelling gives no citation from the
Platonic texts. It seems possible that he intended the Timaeus, since there are two
obvious candidates for interpretation as "matter" at the center ofthis dialogue: chora and
hyle. The latter comes in the following passage of the Timaeus, after Timaeus has
introduced chora, the wandering cause: "So then, now that the kinds ofcauses have been
sifted out and lie ready to hand for us, like wood for builders, out of which we must
weave together the account that remains ..." (Timaeus 69A). Hyte is wood in the sense of
trees in the forest, which will become for Aristotle, but already is here in Plato~matter in
the sense of what is to be formed through poeisis. Schelling's frequent thought of God as
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the understanding that gives form to nature, a basically Platonist thought, seems to fall in
line with Timaeus's thought ofthe demiurgos, who fOffiIS the all in accordance with his
divine plan, like a craftsman. In a sense this is all it takes to understand the whole history
ofnatnre in the Ari~totelian and monothei~tic tradition: matter i~ lumher.
Yet perhaps one could take the liberty of reading hyle more as "the woods" than
as "wood for building," although it is clearly the latter sense that Timaeus has in mind.
After all, lumber comes from trees, and trees grow out of the ground, as nature in the
sense ofphusis. Any and all building, to push Timaeus's image farther, uses materials
that grew in a place or foml the ground of a place; in this image the place is the forest.
Anyone who has stepped into a great forest with eyes and ears open should know,
without knowing, the wild excess, the indivisible remainder, the matter and the ground
beyond and undemeath any practice of building which would, of necessity, receive its
hyle, even as lumber, as a gift from that place. In this sense, hyle is not so far from
chora, and it may be possible to read these two at the same time, as place of the earth, as
material place. Since Schelling gives no citations, he can't blame us for taking advantage
of his ambiguity. This would, at least, be a provocative reading, whatever Schelling's
and Timaeus's intentions actually were; both texts are open enough to invite such
provocative readings.
The dark, uncertain law of the undulating sea of "Plato's matter," or longing,
"which as the still dark ground is the first rousing of divine existence, has as its
counterpart a reflexive representation engendered in God... God beholds himself in his
own image" (F 456-457/239). A reflexive representation, a re-presenting of self, not
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produced by, but engendered in, God. In the difficult tenns of identity philosophy and
the Stuttgart seminars, God, initially, is only "A" by itself. "A=A", the statement of
identity, the first act of predication, of the joining through the copula, is the possibility of
time and of the revelation of God. The reflexive character of the first predication,
"A=A," the "is" as a saying of the same that repeats itself in every predication, in all
speech, is engendered in God as a coUnfel1Jarf to the longing of nature/chorfl, the dark
force in the ground. Language is a response to the longing. In the words of Clara's
priest, "language, as we know it, is something special to Earth" (C 109/78). Or, a few
lines later in the Freedom essay, "This representation is at the same time the
understanding - the word of this longing" (F 457/239). A footnote supplies the clue to
thinking "the word of this longing": "In the sense that one says: the word offthe solution
tol a riddle" (F457n/239n). God's Word, the original predication, language per se, is the
word of longing not in the direct sense of the word as the possession of longing, such as
human beings are said to possess speech and we can say "Schelling's word," for example.
It is the word of longing (of nature) as a riddle calls for, demands, a word in response. It
is the word of silence, but a \\ford engendered in and demanded by what is silent - nature.
Or as Merleau-Ponty put it apropos of Proust, "The call to write thrO\\'l1 out by the
things" (NC 49). As we have seen, in Proust especially but also in Merleau-Ponty, this
call of the things could easily be called a longing, Sehnsuchf, or in the translation put
forward by David Farrell Krell, languor. 17
17 Kreil, David FarrelJ, The Tragic Absolute.
- ------
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One would have to point out that if the word is a response to wordless longing,
and that longing is the ground that is inside God and us, then perhaps we are not precisely
in possession of that word either - for how could one be in possession of something that
arises, is engendered, as a response to a ruleless longing from the depths ofwhat is silent?
Again, we are in the same realm ofthe dispossession of speech by the human and its
ambiguous, lacunary place in nature which Merleau-Ponty attempts to think.
Despite Schelling's and Timaeus's obsession with the God ofpoeisis, neither of
them can escape the thought, in their own speeches, that God cannot produce nature, he
cannot produce his own place, because he is born out-of-place (and thus, oddly enough, is
rooted in place while being necessarily out of place, at least a little bit). Timaeus's
demiurgos requires a chora, a place/space/receptacle/womb/matter to be in or, at the very
least, to work with. Schelling's God is born as a response to a wordless longing of
nature, a wordless longing that is inside God himself. God may go on to produce rule
and order, to speak the Word in a way perfectly adequate to this order as human beings
perhaps can never do, committed as we are to the finitude oflanguage and nature that are
not identical, that do not achieve perfect adequation. God may even try to grandfather
the wordless longing into his order by claiming to have thought and produced his own
birth, as Schelling attempts to claim on his behalf. But if production requires a plan, and
a plan requires language, and language was engendered only in response to a longing,
then no one could have produced the longing itself, without the language which requires
that same longing. When the cards are down, Schelling's God can never erase the
i)i
longing which \vill always support him as his ground, aild always open up as an
ernptiness illSide. Qfl1irn~
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have to keep up the inquilY into longing, to try to think it through, for it is here that we
will find the most illuminating lessons for the study ofMerleau-Ponty. In a sense,
Schelling's efforts to think God's re-appropriation of that longing is itself an effort to
think the longing itself God's failure is precisely an experience of the obscurity of this
longing to language. But perhaps, with Timaeus, we can here retreat again to the
beginning. "If anyone is to declare how the all was genuinely born, he must also mix in
the form of the wandering cause - how it is its nature to mix things around.,,18 Timaeus'
retreat is an effort to think cham. Our retreat is an effort to think longing as place, in
place.
The effort to think "nature as living ground" reveals the longing at the heart of
nature. Perhaps another effort to think this longing can reveal a thought of place. A part
of place is certainly space. There is the space of nature inside of God, and the birth of
- -
God out ofnature. God's Word, the birth oflanguage, opens up the space of predication,
the space of the copula between "A" and the repetition of"A." The copula requires a
certain sort of space. Space, by itself: if that can be thought at all, is simply openness, or
emptiness. The longing is what opens God, and to the extent that the longing cmmot be
recuperated by God as an instance of the fullness of his productive will, it is an emptiness
18 Plato, Timaeus 48a.
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inside of him. The saying ofpantheism, the thought of God/human/nature/all as the
same, the temporal thought of the simultaneity of each "moment" in Schelling's creation
story, both require, for their identity, an odd spacing between them, as repetitions of the
- .
same. Chora is required by Timaeus and his demiurgos in one sense simply as the space,
the emptiness, that all beings need in order to be: "the very thing we look to when we
dream and affirm that it's necessary somehow for everything that is to be in some region
and occupy some space, and that what is neither on earth nor somewhere in heaven is
nothing.,,19
Space, moreover, easily slides into place. Clara, in the passage which opened this
essay, noted the strange necessity of thinking "the higher" and "the other realm" as a
place, when earthly places would seem to be the opposite of whatever is "the higher," as
the visible is, in a simple way, the opposite of the invisible. The movement of Chapter V
in Clara goes, in a sort of inversion, from this observation of the necessity of thinking
place in order to think what might have been supposed to be most distant from earthly
places, to the even stranger necessity of thinking the spiritual power of grounded,
sensible earthly places: the doctor says, "Weren't even the ancients' oracles tied to
certain areas, even to particular places, and shouldn't we draw the general conclusion
from this that locality isn't as irrelevant to the higher as generally supposed? Indeed,
don't we feel a certain spiritual presence in every place?" (C 105/75). This leads to
Clara's thought of our deep devotion to the Earth, and the priest's hesitation, which ends
the unfinished dialogue, in the face of "such wonderfill confusions of the inner and the
19 Plato. Timaeus 52b.
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outer." "Plato's matter" in the Freedom essay, as either hyle or chora, refers to place,
and this reference is the closest Schelling comes to thinking the longing in the ground of
God.
Most compellingly, and following Clara's example in returning again and again to
real earthly place, how can we think "ground" at all, Grund as the grounding reason for
the being of a being, without thinking the ground we all rest, stand, and walk on? Quite
literally, the ground of God and anything else, as a concept, takes its life as a conceptual
- -
image from the sensible supporting ground underfoot: sticks and leaves, rocks and hills.
Finally, that ground, if it speaks, does not speak in words. The ground of all,
Schelling says, that on which all rests, longs for the Word. Doesn't our speech,
conversely, our thought, suffer an identical longing for the sayability of the ground - of
nature, ofplaces? And is not that sayability, when it can be found, always at a remove, in
a relationship of discontinuity, like Proust who could only begin to write later, or who
only felt the death of his grandmother months after the event, upon the demand of the
things?
Schelling tries to think how God, while holding the dark ground, or the longing of
nature, within himself, already has the Word of that longing. God would possess the
speech ofnature, and only we humans would remain in longing. Whether one can think
this, or whether one finds only aporias which just reinforce the obscurity of that longing,
makes at least a slight difference in how one reads what Schelling calls "the highest point
of the entire investigation," (F 502/278), the unground, or indifference. Schelling's text
started with the distinction between the existence of a being (God) and its ground
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(nature). Throughout the investigation, these two took turns being the same and being
different from one another. Either they are different, and one thinks dualism, or they are
the same, but still surreptitiously different, so they fight for precedence (F 502/276). The
- -
way to resolve this vacillation, says Schelling, is to think a being before the difference
between ground and existence. This is the unground, or the indifference, the ground
under erasure under the ground, or the difference before difference, which "has no
predicate except predicatelessness" (F 502/276). Lacking predication, lacking the Word
with which God was born out of the dark ground, unground or indifference is unsayable
except as the negation of sayability. This is nothing but the repetition of ground with the
addition of an explicit denial of its sayability: ground as silent. Yet we long to say it, or,
it longs for us to say it.
If the original ground was also unsayable the whole time, if it was not accessible
to speech at all, but already abyssal, then "unground" is precisely the ground of which we
have already (failed to have) spoken. Or, if God could say the ground but can't say the
unground, then the same condition holds now. With the thinking ofunground at the end
of the Freedom essay, it no longer makes any difference whether God could say the
longing or not. Ifhe could, he can't now, and ifhe couldn't, then "ground" was
"unground" from the very beginning.
"Un"ground, then, is not the opposite of the sense of ground as nature, longing, or
silent place. Its "un" is the indeterminacy of chora as "receptacle" of all,2o but
determined, as itself, by nothing: "it's shapeless with respect to all those looks that it's
20 Plato. Timeaus 49b.
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going to receive from elsewhere,,,21 thus a sort of everythinJ? that is nathinJ?, or at least
- -
nothing that can be determined by speech. Thus the meaninglessness that one slips into
in trying to Slry it, the meaninglessness and inadequacy that dogs Timaeus.22 Cham, like
the longing of place, is elusively resistant to being caught in the net of determinative
language, yet it calls for language nonetheless. It must, then call for another language -
perhaps Schelling's necessity ofusing a "more accessible" thought, or perhaps
Schelling's entire effort of thinking the birth of the all as a creation story, as a sort of
mythas, could be read as an attempt at such an other-saying. Place, nature, the earth,
perhaps doesn't like to be integrated into produced speeches, just as God cannot be the
producer, through predication, ofthe (un?)ground from which he is born. Yet the earth
longs for and even bears and supports speech, even while turning away our speeches, in
perhaps a different sort of indifference.
This is what painting shows, according to Merleau-Ponty: "Painting gives what
nature wants to say and does not say: the 'generative principle' that makes the things and
the world be, 'first cause,' 'mind or heart of creation', 'absolute knowing' the principle
older than God himself (Schelling), wild being" (NC 56-57). Painting, as a form of
expression if not literally as the language of words, is also, potentially, at Step 3 of the
second sailing, at the presentation of the peculiar excess in nature, like the language of
Merleau-Ponty and Proust. Schelling, in a different way, is also at Step 3. He reaches it
by confronting the necessity of what he calls the indivisible remainder, which, as I hope
21 ibid :50d.
22 See John Sallis's Chorology, Ill.
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to have at least suggested, lives in multiple ways in Clara and the Freedom essay from
the sensibility of nature, from the sensibility of ground, matter, chora, as place, and from
the longing of this place for language. But he reaches it in a different way than Proust
and Merleau-Ponty: they attempt a practice of language that can itself present the silence,
the obscurity, the hiddenness of nature, while Schelling attempts a conceptual rigor that
reaches its end by breaking down, by revealing its truth in the impact with aporia.
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CHAPTER VI
SILENCE
Near the end of the Freedom essay, Schelling speaks of the human
inability to grasp its own condition, to think or say its own necessity - perhaps, in a word,
to speak for nature, to announce its own place in nature. "This is the sadness clinging to
all finite life, and if in God, too, there is a condition which is at least relatively
independent, then within him there is a well of sadness, which, however, never comes to
actuality, but serves only for the eternal joy of overcoming. Hence the veil of
despondency spread over all ofnature, the deep, indestructible melancholy of all life" (F
495/271). The condition of irrevocable commitment to the unsayable seems, indeed, sad,
like the necessity to row with oars instead of sailing by the wind is disappointing.
Silence seems to bar speech from saying the nature that is its deepest ground.
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The attempt of the last four chapters has been to think the intersection of nature
and language in Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, and to come as close as possible
in this thought to the passage between nature and language. The singular goal of this
attempt has been to think the togetherness of human life and nature, a togetherness that,
as we have seen in Proust's emphasis on the darkness and obscurity necessary to the
writer's task of remembrance, and in Schelling's mythic plunge into the dark ground at
the heart of language, is nevertheless a kind of strangeness. The essential problem is to
think the place of human life in nature in a manner that can think both the depth oftheir
bond, as deep as it may be, and the genuine opening between them, in the event of
language. In each case, thinking language has turned back on the thinking of nature to
disclose it, in a circular fashion, as that which, while it provides the place for language to
begin, does not "precede" language in a linear sense. Rather, nature, whether Proust's
sensible, Schelling's hidden place, or Merleau-Ponty's nature as being, is already
expressive, already calling for a language which, in disclosing it, will not hide, but will in
fact show, its very silence.
This is not a new thought. The intermingling of language and nature, the density
and obscurity by which nature eludes language and the longing with which it calls for
words, the unique disclosure of nature in language, is not a matter for thinking unique to
Proust, Schelling and Merleau-Ponty. It is a problem no doubt as old as language itself,
as old as the experience of the failure to find the right words, those that fulfill the call of
the sensible, or conversely, as old as the fulfillment when the sensible idea, as Proust
says, is carried on in words, in successful creative language.
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To grasp the history of such a problem, or to grasp such a problem as history, one
can take recourse to philosophy, and to that which precedes philosophy in Western
history: myth. Many myths tell stories of the origins of language, and account for some
kind of transition between the silence of the things and the language of human beings.
Many philosophies have tried to think the togetherness of language and nature, or to
come up with an excuse for their seemingly inexcusable opposition. In the end, many of
the philosophies tell tales, and many of the myths are philosophically rich; they are
hardly opposites, despite the long history of a logos/mythos opposition in philosophical
thought.
It is one ofthe philosophically rich myths that I wish to attend to now, in order to
think the historical depths of the passages between nature and language on which
Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling focus some of their reflections. To think the
problem historically, indeed, to think it as history, and not as some kind of topical
question incidentally raised by a few authors, requires an appreciation of the changing
form of the problem over the course of the history ofphilosophy, from its beginning to
the present. A rough outline of this for the past several hundred years has been givein in
Chapter I, but the historical beginning, of course, is in myth, in that form of telling from
which history emerges. By suggesting how this problem might have taken fortn long
ago, I hope to at least to suggest the greater historical consistency of the relationship
between nature and language as it has been explored here in Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and
Schelling.
~-- ~-------
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Roberto Calasso tells of a Greek myth which, at the time of its currency, spoke of
those predecessors of the Athenians who were even then mythical, who were to the
Athenians like the Greeks are to us, ancient forebears about whom one knew only vague
stories. As such, it is a story, for us today, of a kind of Ur-origin, of the mythical before
of those very people, the Greeks of Athens, who so often play the mythic role of the
beginning of Western civilization, and especially of philosophy. These pre-Athenians
were called the Pelasgians. The Pelasgians, apparently, were the ancestors of the
Athenian Greeks, but were utterly different from them. The difference came down to
their language - Greeks couldn't understand Pelasgian at all. Calasso describes these
strange people thus:
Pelasgian man is elusive. You can never pin anything on him: he is always the
mute "neighbor" (pilas), the thing language and history have split away from.
Without dwelling on the point, Herodotus remarks that, "being Pelasgian, the
Athenians changed their language when they were absorbed into the Greek
family." Thus the Athenians made two claims about themselves: that they were
autochthonous, born from the soil, because they were Pelasgian; and at the same
time that they had rejected the language of the soil, the lost Pelasgian language. 1
The Pelasgian language is the language ofthe soil, directly, or so it seems.
Perhaps it would be the language of the earth itself, "of the things, the waves, and the
forests," (VI201ll55) which Merleau-Ponty calls for but does not produce, which
Schelling goes beyond and beneath God to find, and which Proust perhaps understands
better than either one, because he takes for granted the necessity of distance, obscurity,
and remembrance in his bringing of the things to language. Like in Schelling's myth of
the birth of God, the language of the soil, of the ground, or of nature, is something that
I The MarriaRe ofCadmus and Harmony, 317.
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cannot be remembered, at least not directly, in the sense of straightforward recall. The
explicit rejection, or impossibility, of this remembrance (for the Athenians could not
remember how to speak Pe1asgian) yet remembering precisely the impossibility of this
remembrance, combined with the paradoxical claim of being authochthonous, being of
the land, is, as Calasso goes on to show, a founding myth ofAthenian civilization. I use
the present tense because it is still a paradoxical foundation of our own civilization; we
are in the same situation today. It is the same problem as the phenomenological
disjunction between our bodily rootedness in nature, and the apparent foreignness of
language to a nature that is always silent, a foreignness that is only mitigated, brought
into some form of thinkable proximity, when we think the necessity of this passage
through silence in language's return to nature, in Step 3 of the schema proposed at the
beginning of the present work. We are of the land, but cannot remember its language.
Only rarely do we remember this forgetting.
But the Pelasgians themselves were silent, in a way. This, at least, is what
Herodotus learns from the three priestesses at the temple of Dodona, where the oracle of
the oak tree speaks the mind of Zeus, about one fateful occasion when the Pelasgians had
consulted the oracle regarding the arrival from Egypt of Cadmus, who, so the myths tell,
brought the names of the gods and the letters of the alphabet to Greece.
Hitherto, the Pelasgians had 'offered sacrifices of every kind to the gods and
prayed to them, but without distinguishing between them with names and titles,
because they didn't know that such things existed.' Now some sailor or other had
come back from Egypt bringing the names of the gods with him... The story the
three priestesses ofDodona told Herodotus is also the fable that ushers in the
opposition and superimposition of nomos and physis, law (or convention) rand,
eventually, name] and nature, and hence the underlying structure of all thought
from then on. Only that day, in Dodona, did the Greeks become Greek: ifby
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Greek we mean nothing more than the coexistence of a dark, obscure background,
like the rustling of a tree, dedicated to any and every power, with a sound that
comes from a foreign land and forever superimposes on that background the
sovereign caprice of a name.2
"The rustling of a dark, obscure background, like the rustling ofa tree," and "a
sound that comes from a foreign land." Calasso's retelling of the myth speaks of the
strangeness of language, the foreignness of language to nature and to the original
"natural" Pelasgians who did not use names, and were thus silent in a certain way. The
determination of names for the gods is an apparent caprice of the linkage between
language and nature, which occurs after the obscurity ofa barely remembered past when
the language of the soil was supposedly spoken. It is the same story told here to
Herodotus by the priestesses of Dodona, the same story told by Proust, Merleau-Ponty,
and Schelling. The rustling of the tree in the story is the rustling of the leaves of the oak
tree at Dodona, through which the oracle of Zeus was interpreted. It is a sound that is
almost silent: "His voice, the rustling of the oak, is the closest thing imaginable to an
undifferentiated sound, a voice that more than any other on earth recalls the sea.,,3 An
undifferentiated sound is a sound as far as possible from the infinite play of differences in
language. A sound that is mute, that is silent. A sound that was once turned into words
2 Ibid, 317. Calasso's passage continues: "The Pelasgians went from a mute homage to the gods to an
homage in which they evoked those gods with foreign names they knew nothing about. Thus did the
Greeks tense their metaphysical bow; such was their style as they raised it to their shoulders." And thus
does Calasso see the metaphysical problem of language, or of the name, and the dark obscurity of nature, a
problem which begins as least as early as the myth of the Pelasgians and continues to this day. Calasso also
points out that the figure of the oak tree and the oracle at Dodona, the oak tree which was the voice of Zeus,
shows the odd requirement of an absolutely sovereign power, the greatest of the gods, in establishing the
authority of the name, oflinking language to nature through the figures ofthe gods: "The oak tree told
them that the names were right and that it was right to use them. Zeus is the god who allows the other gods
to be named. Zeus is the god who allows things to appear" (317).
3 Ibid. 317.
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by an oracle, based on a principle of turning the undifferentiated sound, or the silence, of
nature into language by thinking nature as gods.
Calasso makes much of the physical location of Dodona, on a flat, apparently
rather boring and useless plain, neither prominent and strategically important like Delphi,
or blissfully alpine like Olympia. The generality ofthe place is like the undifferentiated
sound, which supports all the rest: "All the other gods have their shapes, their signs, their
profiles. Zeus has the background, and the background noise. Zeus is the commonplace
supporting the unique. The unique cannot exist alone without that support. But the
support can exist alone. The unique tends to be jealous, because there are things that
don't belong to it. The support tends to be indifferent, because everything rests upon it.,,4
The figures of the unique and the indifferent stand in for many here: the other
gods and Zeus, the human and nature, Schelling's God and nature, or the infinite
articulations of language and the silence of nature that underlies it. The jealousy of the
unique, and its dependence, characterize all these relations, as does the indifference of the
support. This indifference could be the mute refusal of nature to speak, the endless
rustling of the oak tree, or Schelling's indifferentiation at the origin of God, the
indifference before the difference invoked by language, by the very speaking of the
Name.
Thus at the origin of logos and History, at the moment where the Greeks become
Greek, there is nature and logos, or rather only a myth ofa myth of nature's logos, ofthe
4 Ibid. 318.
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"coexistence of a dark, obscure background with the sovereign existence of a name,"s the
undecipherable Pelasgian language of the soil. For the Greeks who told the myths, such a
coexistence was itself a myth, a dream, the dream of their own origins. This is an
indication that language and nature for them suffered much the same estrangement and
longing as they do for us today, and that the pure and perfect coexistence of the obscure
with the named can only be thought, at least in the Western tradition, as a myth of
irretrievable origin.
But as Schelling knew, the Greeks had one thing that we don't have, one thing
that could help to bridge the aporia between language and nature, to satisfY the longing
of nature for words and likewise to plumb the depth of nature with words: they had gods.
They had a manner of conversion between the rustling of the oak tree and their own
language, between the indifference of nature and their own yearnings, strivings, and
meanings. Although who knows how effective a conversion it was, or how much it really
helped.
Gods are dangerous things, especially when they are introduced into philosophical
work. It is tempting to offer a sort of apologia for "turning to the gods," perhaps by
saying that one absolutely affirms that the path of myth is now closed, and that one
introduces myth only as a historical example, or as a form of philosophy. But this is at
once too cowardly and too arrogant, both for the same reason: that when we speak of
myths, and gods, and the divine, we bare(y know what we are talking about. It is too rash
and too difficult, unnecessarily so, to say whether the "time of myth" was past and can
5 Ibid.. 317.
--- ~ -- -------
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never come again, or if it ever existed as we describe it now, or exactly what would have
fundamentally and permanently changed, passed into the past, and what on the other
hand has not changed, or still persists despite its own changing. These are the difficulties
that drove and plagued Holderlin and Heidegger, two of those thinkers who chattered on
the most about "the gods," probably doing more harm than good to their reputations in
the process.
Yet the philosophical problems which are articulated, if not as "philosophy," in
Greek myths, like the problem oflanguage and nature that we have just seen broached by
the myth of the Pelasgians, vibrate, shudder, and echo throughout the history of Western
thought, and throughout the history that walks on its feet, if one believes that the
problems of philosophy walk the streets in how we live each day. That is one reason for
taking up a philosophical discussion with Greek myth, or any other myth that has a place
in history.
The other reason, the reason that will be outlined in the paragraphs that follow, is
based on the assumption6 that myth has always been a vehicle for self-understanding.
Thus, at this level, the mythos is always a logos, and belongs to the history of philosophy,
as well as, more obviously, to literature. As a vehicle for self-understanding, we see
ourselves in the stories of myth, and see our problems in the stories, even, possibly, to the
extent ofmaking our concerns their concerns, of, most likely, reading the philosophical
problems raised in myths differently from how they have been read before. The
6 And necessarily an assumption, never a certainty, simply by virtue of the vast historical distance that
separates us today from mythical time. This historical distance, however, is strangely mitigated by a
phenomenological proximity, as the present chapter tries to show.
~-~- --~----~-------
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problems are more or less perennial, or at least very old. This means that the identity of
the problems themselves is a problem - one can say that we undergo the same difficulties
in a very different way in the 21 st century than they were undergone in the 5th century
BC, or in the time before counting centuries became the thing to do.? This phenomenon,
which is no less than temporality, is what makes the retelling of a myth current. This is
why a book like Roberto Calasso's, which speaks of what people supposedly believed
and told each other 2,500 years ago, can be a comparable literary event to those people
telling each other those stories themselves. Stories that were never really theirs either,
because they were always stories, retellings of events that mayor may not have occurred
in such away, depending on who is doing the telling.
Thus: nature, language, silence, excess, Proust, Schelling, Merleau-Ponty, and the
gods. The goal ofwhat follows is to understand and conclude what we have seen in
Proust, Schelling, and Merleau-Ponty by thinking through how it has all happened before.
We see in all of these thinkers an attempt to bring the excess of nature to word, in a way
that maintains the strange hiddenness ofthis excess in the work of language itself, rather
than covering it over or forgetting its necessity. This togetherness and strangeness, of
nature and language, ofhiddenness and showing, has always been a theme and problem
of philosophy. The question, then, is how did this happen in the time before philosophy
as such, in the time of the gods?
7 See The Visible and the Invisible, 250/199, on the continuity ofphilosophical problems through history,
and the requirement it makes for thinking philosophy as history of philosophy, rather than as a series of
problems to be resolved.
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One can approach an answer to this with another question: what is it that gods
- --
fundamentally do? What is their role in human life, aside from providing entertainment
via endless family feuds, sensational violence, and illicit sex?
One answer is that the gods bring the excess of nature to word, essentially in the
same Step 3 manner which it has been the goal of the present work to describe. They are
- -
the meeting of nature's radical excess, indifference, and underpinning of human life and
language, and of language itself. This is the case superficially, in that the gods embody
powers of nature, and take the forms ofnature, but also take human form and speak in
human language. But it is also true phenomenologically, true at the level of nature as
phainomenon, as the shining-forth-appearing of the world. The point here is not to show
that stories of the gods are nothing more than figures which represent something ineffable
in nature, any more than it is to say that nature is, in fact, not nature but gods. The point
is to think them as the same, to think the gods and nature interchangeably. The oak tree
at Dodona is Zeus, in the manner of appearing not as a barrel-chested, grey-bearded,
thunderbolt-wielding philanderer, but as an oak tree which rustles in the wirid, as the
undifferentiated sound that is silence. Light is Apollo; chaos, hallucination, and sex are
Dionysus. Beauty, brightness, is divinity. In the time of Horner, dios, the adjective
translated as "divine" which modifies gods and heroes alike throughout the Iliad, meant
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"clear," "brilliant," "glorious."s It is the brilliance of vision, of the sensible. "To appear
in Zeus is to glow with light against the background of the sky.,,9
The manner of the presencing in language of nature through the figures of the
gods is such as to maintain and reinforce, to remember, the silence of nature, its refusal of
a direct language, that refusal which is the fundamental problem which motivates
godliness, theos, a word that has a predicative function, designating something that
happens, an event. IO The character of this event, in its coming to language, is to re-
- -
inscribe an obscurity of origin, a mythical time, in the very necessity of a myth's
retelling, through different voices, none of them authoritative. "A god is never a constant
presence," and the mode ofpresentation of the gods, both in their sudden appearance and
disappearance onto the scene within myths, in the narratives themselves, but more so in
the necessary non-presentation of story and image, reinforces this. Myths tell of events
whose "happening" is obscure, events in the deep past, stories of the divine, but in whose
happening the present world is at stake. Events, thus, that cannot be simply passed over
as false, as purely fictional, just as Socrates understands myth in the Phaedrus, 11 as tales
not to be refuted as false, but to be told and interrogated. But how were they told? We
are told that it was thus:
8 Ca1asso, The Marriage ofCadmus and Harmony, 102. Ca1asso further characterizes this sense of
brilliance as the bright light of high noon over a Mediterranean sea and the clarity of line of an island
against the horizon.
9 Ibid., 102
10 Calasso, Literature and the Gods, 5. Calasso attributes this observation to the linguist Jakob
Wackernagel.
II Plato, Phaedrus 22ge-230a.
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No sooner have you grabbed hold of it than myth opens out into a fan of a
thousand segments. Here the variant is the origin. Everything that
happens, happens this way, or that way, or this other way. And in each of
these diverging stories all the others are reflected, all brush by us like folds
of the same cloth. If, out of some perversity of tradition, only one version
of some mythical event has come down to us, it is like a body without a
shadow, and we must do our best to trace out that invisible shadow in our
minds. 12
A "myth" is not a myth but "a fan of a thousand segments," stories different with
each telling, stories whose fundamental unknowability, their necessity of variance, is the
shadow that makes the body real. "The repetition of a mythical event, with its play of
variations, tells us that something remote is beckoning to us.,,13 That remoteness is
preserved, and given, in the repetition-with-variance of myth, that manner in which the
stories of myth are different than the claim to definitiveness, the one-chance-is-all-you-
get, misleading as it may be, of a novel, a sacred text, or a philosophical tome.
So the telling of myth tells silence as well, tells the obscurity beneath and behind
human life and nature.
The obscure non-presentation of theos in myth is like the mythic time which
Merleau-Ponty sees in Proust, the obscurity of a past whose remembrance makes the
present vivid. The past which Proust remembers and evokes "belongs to a mythical time,
to the time before time, to a prior life, 'farther than India and China' [proust's phrasel (VI
296/243). Mauro Carbone puts it this way:
a time that flashes in the simultaneity to Which the ontology implicit in
contemporary thought (and Proust's work itself) attempts to give
expressIon. That is to say, we are dealing with a time flashing in the "relief
12 Calasso, Roberto, The Marriage o[Cadmus and Harmony, 147-148.
13 Ibid., 136.
----- -------
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of the simultaneous and of the successive" [VI 153/114], which founds, in
our experience, the chiasm between anticipation and retrieval, as in a
melody, the chiasm between the first and the last note. A time flashing
precisely in those chiasms. It is precisely in a time thus characterized,
rather than in a Platonistic eternity, that Merleau-Ponty sees the life of the
sensible ideas described by Proust, ideas which he in fact qualifies as "the
eternal in the ephemeral" and immediately after defines as the "ciphers of
the singular." Even if ephemeral, our first encounter with these ideas is
such that - Proust explains - "so long as we are alive, we can no more
bring ourselves to a state in which we shall not have known" those ideas,
since for their part they have "espoused our mortal state." In Merleau-
Ponty's terms, the singularity of that encounter anticipates itself as a
generality - a "cipher" - and as such it is sedimented in the memory of our
body. The dimension which has opened up is thus "b~ now inalienable,
the initiation irreversible" [Merleau-Ponty's phraseV
The sensible ideas are "the eternal in the ephemeral," which do not present
themselves directly, but, as we have already discussed, are barely retrievable through a
work that traverses the obscurity of time. Yet as Proust himself finds, "so long as we are
alive, we can no more bring ourselves to a state in which we shall not have known those
ideas," they have "espoused our mortal state," and the dimension of the sensible ideas, of
the vivid invisible in sensual life, or, as we have argued, simply in nature, is inalienable.
The initiation to this realm i8 irreversible.
The sensible ideas are like the gods, "never a constant presence," but also refusing
to just disappear, just like the life, the vividness of expression, that bubbles beneath the
surface of a nature otherwise domesticated, quantified, and theorized. Now there are
perhaps no gods, or if there are, their presence is weak, occasional, vague, undefined,
fugitive. Yet the initiation to theos is irreversible, if we can understand the Proustian
sensible idea, the Schelling.ian UnJ?rund, and what I have tried to express as Merleau-
- -
14 Carbone, Mauro, "The Mythical Time ofIdeas: Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze as Readers of Proust," 26.
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Pontian nature partake of the same event which long ago was called "the gods." We do
not, perhaps, need to call it by that name, but that does not mean that it has disappeared.
Thus the epileptic shudder of the word, the unbalanced, groundless character of
contemporary thought, a thought which has taken up the challenge of thinking and
bringing to work the event of theos without the help of gods and myths. Once again we
shall tum to Calasso:
There is a very strong and very ancient emotion that is rarely mentioned or
recognized: it is the anguish we feel for the absence of idols. If the eye
has no image on which to rest, if there is nothing to mediate between the
mental phantasm and that which simply is, then a subtle despondency
creeps in. This is the atmosphere that reigns in the first dream of which
we have a record, a dream told by a woman, Addudfui, overseer of the
palace of Mari in Mesopotamia, in a letter etched on clay tablets more than
three thousand years old. "In my dream I had gone into the temple of the
goddess Bellit-ekallim; but the statue of Bellit-ekalim wasn't there! Nor
were the statues of the other divinities that normally stand beside Her.
Faced with this sight I wept and wept." The first of all dreams speaks of
an empty temple... the statues have been carried off, deported perhaps,
along with the people who worshipped them. That kind of thing happened
then. Loss precedes presence: every image must abide by this rule. And
this helps us to understand why literature, guardian of these phantoms, has
so adroitly searched out those fugitive idols and restored them to their
pedestals. 15
The image, the myth, makes the passage between the theos of nature and human
life and language not only the idiosyncratic pursuit of wild-haired mystics or Romantic
philosophers, but a regular, founded, communal practice. The anguish for tlie loss of
idols, images, myths, is the anguish of having no way to mediate between the
togetherness and strangeness ofhumanity and nature. Even the image, of course,
15 Calasso, Roberto, Literature and the Gods, 120. Quoted passage from J.-M. Durrand translation, in
Archives epistolaires de Mari, Recherche sur les civilizations, Paris: 1998, vol. Ill, 478.
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preserves the strangeness through its necessary distancing, by embodying a sensible idea:
"Loss precedes presence: every image must abide by this rule."
- -
The gods provided a portal between the human and what exceeds it. They
negotiated between silence and language, letting in rapture and wonder. No doubt this is
an essential negotiation in being human. The note of anguish which Calasso emphasizes
has been a common response to the problem of how to relate to excess without the figures
of the gods, or more precisely, without a space made sacred by ritual and community, in a
world governed by modem ontology. This was the problem of Holderlin,16 and partly
through him, one ofHeidegger's problems. It was also Nietzsche's. The excess, nature,
maybe the gods, are still with us. But the manner of their presentation is not clear.
Calasso's claim is that literature is now the home ofthe gods, a principal conduit
between humanity and its excess. "This has become the natural condition of the gods:
they.appear in books."l? The excess in contemporary literature takes the form not
necessarily of gods and myths, but of "a certain vibration or luminescence of the
sentence,,,18 as well as a sovereign and fearless flouting of convention, a willingness to
16 The second chapter of Calasso's Literature and the Gods is mostly devoted to conceptualizing
Holderlin's work in this way. Calasso takes pains to emphasize thatthis effort is an effort to think a
relationship between humanity and the gods which has never ended or disappeared, but ebbs and flows:
"Holderlin knows the gods can't reappear in a circle of statues over which the heavy curtains of history will
suddenly rise. That was the neoclassical vision, which HOlderlin was the first to distance himself from.
No, like figures on a carousel gods and human follow the back-and-forth of a secret movement that takes
them now closer together, now farther apart. Everything lies in grasping the law that governs that
movement" (44-45).
17 Ibid., 22.
18 Ibid., 175.
173
widen the cracks that exist in the conventional style that makes the world go round. 19 It
is not so different from Merleau-Ponty's theory of creative expression. As in Merleau-
Ponty, these cracks are gaps where excess seeps into daily life, like the appearance of the
gods, or the simple existence of oracles, or of caves leading to the underworld.
Describing the intertwined action of gods and heroes in the Homeric poems, Calasso
writes, "Every sudden heightening of intensity brought you into a god's sphere of
influence... every encounter occurred in parallel, in two places. To tell a story meant to
weave those two series of parallel events together, to make both worlds visible."zo The
same excess still finds its way into human life today.
There is no need to confine the event of excess to literature; although we have
been following Calasso and this happens to be his focus, he makes no such claim of
exclusivity. No doubt Merleau-Ponty would insist the same is true of painting, in the
manner that the painter paints the becoming of appearance itself, the becoming which we
take from granted in daily vision. Heidegger makes a similar claim for poetry. Others
would probably claim the same thing for music, as the young Nietzsche did for Wagner
when he claimed, in The Birth afTragedy, that Wagnerian music evoked the same sense
of tragic excess as the ancient experience of tragic theater.
But what about philosophy? How is philosophy to engage with silence, with
nature, bringing them to word, as myth did and as literature still does?
19 Ibid., 177. Calasso also makes the point here that what he calls "absolute literature" is also a sort of
natural metaphysics, and that the very fact that there can be cracks in convension is a metaphysical
proposition. Here he also is in agreement with Merleau-Ponty's theory of expression as creative language.
20 Calasso, Roberto, The Marriage a/Cadmus and Harmony, 95.
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The necessity ofphilosophy coming to some fonn of self-understanding is
balanced by a certain ludicrousness in our insistence upon this requirement, a certain very
genuine sense that this requirement has been at least partially met if we are practicing
philosophy at all. This is as much to say that the meaning and purpose of philosophy is
never more than a step in a henneneutic circle, that its meaning is always already
partially known through its practice, through that feeling of the fire of thought which one
must know if one is to love thinking, and ifone is to move forward in thought. On the
other hand, the articulation and explicitation of that meaning, ifdone well, can also move
the practice forward. Husserl said as much, on the last page of the last appendix to the
Crisis:
I know, of course, what I am striving for under the title ofphilosophy, as
the goal and field of my work. And yet I do not know. What autonomous
thinker has ever been satisfied with this, his 'knowledge'? For what
autonomous thinker, in his philosophizing life, has 'philosophy' ever
ceased to be an enigma? Everyone has the sense of philosophy's end, to
whose realization his life is devoted; everyone has certain fonnulae,
expressed in definitions; but only secondary thinkers, who in truth should
not be called philosophers, are consoled by their definitions, beating to
death with th~ir word-concepts the problematic fe/os ofphilosophizing.21
I have tried to make some steps in identifying one aspect of the "problematic felos
of philosophy," of its enigma, as the bringing together of nature and language through the
thinking of silence as their point of transition. Thinking philosophy as Sf({iung, as
institution, in the Husserlian manner taken up by Merleau-Ponty, perhaps helps one to
avoid beating it to death with word-concepts. In this manner, the meaning of philosophy
is not what it is, or what it should be, or what it must become if it is to fulfill itself,
21 Husseri, Edmund, The Crisis in the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 394.
175
someday or as soon as possible. Rather, one must ask, what does philosophy do, what is
its practice, and how, as St({tung, has it been handed down through history? What is
needed from it, and for what is it called upon? Finally, one must admit and remember
that, in Merleau-Ponty and in the whole tradition, at least since Nietzsche, perhaps even
since Kant, probably even since Plato, there has been a tendency to worry that philosophy
is somehow less sure of itself, and thus more prone to suspicion, than the practice of
myth, or literature or art, as if the grass is greener on the other side, as ifphilosophy is
more obscure to itself, and requires repeated attempts at clarification. But one should no
doubt remember that none of these practices is ever perfectly clear to itself. One should
most of all remember that even in the age ofmyth, which was so long ago that one can
conveniently put into it whatever one wishes one had in the present, we have no reason to
believe that any of these problems were any easier to endure.
The name "philosophy" is already misleading, to the extent that it designates a
tradition strictly distinct from literature and from myth. If it did designate such a
tradition, we would suffer from a confusion of "philosophy" with a history of thinking
- -
that has lost a relationship to silence, Merleau-Ponty's "decadence of express
philosophy." The history ofphilosophy that is relevant here is the history of a thinking
that reaches to excess, that attempts to think it, or think the possibility of thinking it. If
the history of philosophy is interpreted generously and creatively, it can be an inclusive
- -
history. Heidegger perhaps had the greatest level of intellectual courage, sing1e-
mindedness, and impudence, to make a consistent and compelling case for
conceptualizing all of the history of philosophy as the pursuit, if often obscure to itself, of
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the question of being, a question which he found combined, throughout history, as the
progressive forgetting of being. This single-minded orientation in Heidegger's reading
was accomplished, as Heidegger was the fIrst to point out, only by a vigorous, creative,
and indeed violent re-reading of that history, of a reading that made clear its intentions of
taking its own terms to each work, even as it claimed a genuine openness to thinking. I
have tried to suggest here that the problem ofthe togetherness and strangeness of nature
and humanity, a togetherness and strangeness centered on the intertwining of language
and silence, is also a reading of the history of philosophy.
Heidegger was great on the history of the forgetting of being, but less clear on the
future, on the practice of thinking as the thinking of being itself. One would like to have
a little more meat on the bones of philosophy, a clearer vision of how silence is to be
thought, for example. But taking Husserl's advice, perhaps that is too much - perhaps a
manifesto is not what philosophy requires. For Heidegger, just articulating the problem
- - - --
of philosophy as the problem of being was a step, perhaps the step, in the practice that he
followed.
Perhaps it is enough, both programmatic enough and provocative enough, to say
that phenomenology, broadly, simply, but also traditionally considered, is already a
practice of negotiating between the silence of nature and the language of philosophy. By
phenomenology broadly, simply, and traditionally considered, I mean the practice of a
logos ofphainomenon, of speaking, through description, distinction, or argumertt, of the
appearing, of the brightness shining-forth that is the world.
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I have already made the case that Merleau-Ponty thought phenomenology in
precisely this way from Phenomenology ofPerception through The Visible and the
Invisible. One has only to read again the passage from the preface to the first book:
"phenomenology... is also a philosophy for which the world is always 'already there'
before reflection begins - as an inalienable presence; and all its efforts are concentrated
upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that
contact with a philosophical status" (PhP i/vii). The same impulse goes straight through
to the first chapter of The Visible and the Invisible: "It is the things themselves, from the
depths of their silence, that it wishes to bring to expression" (VI 18/4). Much changes,
but also nothing. The inalienable presence of nature, the initiation to its silence which
has always already occurred, and the thinking of that direct and primitive contact through
the conceptual rigor of philosophical work, has been the intent of the present piece of
writing.
It is a matter ofthe same epileptic trembling of the word that Calasso observed in
literature, combined with the peculiar form of rigor that is the rigor of the concept. It
does not mean that all being passes through the trembling of the word and becomes the
concept, in the manner that Heidegger said Hegel accomplished the completion of
metaphysics.22 Rather, it is the sur-r~flectionof the silence beneath the trembling ofthe
word, that trembling itself, and the concept that it may become. That means that the
concepts of philosophy dive back in to the silence beneath them. This is how Merleau-
Ponty practices philosophy as phenomenology, as conceptual work, logos as argument,
22 Hegel's Phenomenology o.fSpirit 17/12.
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which continually returns, through logos as the trembling of the word, or even as
literature, to the silence of nature, the shining-forth appearance. Nature finds, not its
fulfillment, but a current made explicit in the peculiar language of philosophy.
Myth, as we have seen, was once a way to conjoin human language and the
silence of nature in a manner that, through the variation and obscurity of mythical telling,
kept the fundamental silence and obscurity of nature in mind - or at least, for this is all
that we, not being mythical people, can say, it held that conceptual possibility. A
phenomenology that continually dives back into the things themselves, that remembers
them as Proust did, that struggles with the very placing of speech as Schelling did, should
be able to keep in mind what is at stake in the becoming of language and of the concept,
what underlies them, grounds them, and what gives to speak while refusing to speak
itself. This is nature, the silence of rocks and hills, the rustling of the oak tree.
This remembrance has always been active in Merleau-Ponty through the
continually maintained thesis of the primacy of perception. This primacy continues right
through to the last chapter of The Visible and the Invisible where Merleau-Pontian
phenomenology and ontology reach their highest point, both in a lyrical description and
in a conceptual ontology of the flesh and the chiasm that arises from it. This chapter
begins in and relies on a description of the nature of perception. It is based on the same
principle as all ofPhenomenology ofPerception. Language partakes of the same excess
which vision knows, through which the senses function, through "this talisman of color,
this singular virtue of the visible that makes it, held at the end of the gaze, nonetheless
much more than a correlative of my vision, such that it imposes my vision upon me as a
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continuation of its own sovereign existence" (VI 171/131). The excess that imposes itself
on vision, that guides the palpation of the look, is the excess of sensual life, which is
nature. Language comes from this, which the movement of the chapter makes clear.
After the description of the sensible comes "this new reversibility and the emergence of
the flesh as expression are the point of insertion of speaking and thinking in the world of
silence" (VI 188/144-145).
A working note of June 1, 1960 calls, probably for the first time in the history of
philosophy, for a "transcendental geology" to replace, or merge with, "transcendental
history:
For history is too immediately bound to the individual praxis, to interiority, it
hides too much its thickness and its flesh for it not to be easy to reintroduce into it
the whole philosophy ofthe person. Whereas geography - or rather: the Earth as
Ur-Arche brings to light the carnal Urhistorie (Husserl - Umstruz .. .) - in fact it is
a question of grasping the nexus - neither historical nor geographic, of history and
transcendental geology, this very time that is space, this very space that is time,
which I will have rediscovered by my analysis of the visible and the flesh... (VI
3071259).
History, including, no doubt, the history ofphilosophy, is still too much the
philosophy of consciousness, or too much the work of language that knows nothing of its
Ur-Arche, Urhistorie, Urst(frung. The nexus of "transcendental geology" and the history
of philosophy would be the meeting place of the person and anonymity, of language and
silence - the thou~ht of the rustling of the oak tree.
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APPENDIX
ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR PRINCIPAL WORKS CITED
For works translated into English, the French or German page numbers are given first.
Quoted passages are based on the published translations, with minor changes where
necessary. All citations of authors other than Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, are
given with the author, title, and page number in footnotes, and the full reference in the
bibliography.
Merleau-Ponty
VI Le visible et I 'invisible. English translation The Visible and the Invisible.
PhP Phenomenologie de la perception. English translation The Phenomenology of
Perception.
NC Notes de Cours au College de France 1958-1959 et 1960-1961.
N Nature. English translation Nature.
EM L 'oei! et I 'esprit. English translation "Eye and Mind."
S Signes. English translation Signs.
PM Prose du monde. English translation Prose ofthe World.
RC Resumes du Cours, College de France, 1952-1960. English translation "Themes
from the Lectures at the College de France 1952-1960."
Proust
R Ala recherche du temps perdu. English translation Remembrance ofThings Past.
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Schelling
F Philosophische Untersuchungen aber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und
die damit zusammenhiingenden Gegenstiinde. English translation Philosophical
Investigations into the Essence ofHuman Freedom and Related Matters.
C Clara. English translation Clara.
182
BTBTJOGRAPHY
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Joe Sachs, trans. Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 1999.
---------. Nicomachean Ethics. Joe Sachs, trans. Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2002.
Artaud, Antonin. "Lettre sur Lautreamont." Supp6ts et supplications, in Oeuvres
complets, Paris: Gallimard, 1978, vol. XIV /7, p. 32.
Barbaras, Renaud. "Merleau-Ponty aux limites de la phenomenologie. " Chiasmi
International 1 (1999).
---------. "Merleau-Ponty's Concept ofNature." Research in Phenomenology 31 (2001).
--------- "The Ambiguity of the Flesh." Chiasmi International 4 (2003): 19-26.
--------- The Being ofthe Phenomenon. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor, trans.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Benjamin, Walter. "The Image of Proust." In Illuminations, Harry Zohn, trans. New
York: Schocken Books~ 1968.
Bernet, Rudolph. "The Subject in Nature: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's
Phenomenology ofPerception." In Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective,
Jan Van Der Veken and Patrick Burke, eds. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer,
1993.
Bimbenet, Etienne. "'L'Etre interrogative de la vie': la historicite de la vie dans Ie cours
du College de France (1957-1958)." Chiasmi International 2 (2000): 143-165.
Calasso, Robert. The Marriage ofCadmus and Harmony. Tim Parks, trans. New York:
Vintage, 1993.
---------. Literature and the Gods. Tim Parks, trans. New York: Knopf, 2001.
Carbone, Mauro. La Visibilite de l'Invisible: Merleau-Ponty entre Cezanne et Proust.
Hildesheim, Germany: George Olms, 2001.
---------. The Thinking ofthe Sensible. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
2004.
183
---------. "The Mythical Time of Ideas: Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze as Readers of
Proust." The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 39 (2008): 12-26.
Cueille, Jean-Noel. "The Silence of the Sensible: Elements of an Aesthesiology in the
Thought of Merleau-Ponty." Chiasmi International 3 (2001): 119-158.
Dastur, Franyois. "La lecture Merleau-Pontienne de Heidegger dans les notes du Visible
et l'invisible et les cours du College de France (1957-1958)." Chiasmi
International 2 (2000).
Dastur, Franyois. "World, Flesh, Vision," Ted Toadvine, trans. In Chiasms, Fred Evans
and Leonard Lawlor, eds. Albany: SUNY Press, 2000.
Davidson, Donald. "Truth and Meaning." In The Philosophy ofLanguage, A.P.
Martinich, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
De Bestegui, Miguel. Truth and Genesis. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
2004.
Deleuze, Gilles. Proust and Signs. Richard Howar, trans. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000.
Derrida, Jacques. OfGrammatology. Gayatri Spivak, trans. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976.
---------. "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve." In
WritinR and D(fference, Alan Bass, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978.
---------. Khora. Paris.: Gallilee, 1993.
Erdinast-Vulcan, Daphna. "'That which has no name in philosophy': Merleau-Ponty and
the language of literature." Human Studies, a Journal/or Philosophy and the
Social Sciences 30 (2007): 395-409.
Frege, Gottlieb. "On Sense and Reference." In The Philosophy ofLanguage, A.P.
Martinich, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Gallop, David, ed. and trans. Parmenides ofElea: Fragments. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1984.
Haar, Michel. "Late Merleau-Ponty's Proximity to and Distance from Heidegger."
Journal for the British Society ofPhenomenology 30 (1, 1999).
1&4
Hass, Lawrence. Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 2008.
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology olSpirit. A.v. Miller, trans. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977.
Heidegger, Martin. What Is Called Thinking? J Glenn Gray, trans. New York: Harper
and Row, 1968.
---------. "What Is Metaphysics?" David Farrell Krell, trans. In Basic Writings. San
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977.
---------. "Letter on Humanism." Frank Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray, trans. In Basic
Writin/?s. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977.
---------. "The Way to Language." David Farrell Krell trans. In BasicWritings. San
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977.
---------. "The End of Philosophy and the Task ofThinking," Joan Stambaugh, trans. In
Basic Writin/?s. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977.
--------. Nietzsche, 4 vols. David Farrell Krell, trans. San Francisco: HarperCollins,
1979, 1982, 1984, 1987.
--------. Bein/? and Time. Joan Stambaugh, trans. Albany, NY: SUNY: 1996.
--------. Hegel's Phiinomenologie des Geistes, Gesaumtasgabe, Vol 32. Frankfurt-am-
Main: Vittorio Klosterman Verlag, 1980. English translation HeRel's
Phenomenology olSpirit, Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, trans. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1988.
--------. Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysicss. Richard Taft, trans. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1990.
--------. Parmenides. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewiz, trans. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992.
--------. "On the Essence and Concept ofphusis in Aristotle's Physics B 1." Thomas
Sheehan, trans. In Pathmarks. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
199&.
--------. The Essence ofTruth. Ted Sadler, trans. New York: Continuum, 2002.
185
Hempel, Carl. "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance." In The Philosophy of
LanKuaKe, A.P. Martinich, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Holler, Thomas. "The Limits of Language and the Threshold of Speech." Philosophy
Today 26 (Winter 1982): 287-300.
Husserl, Edmund. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 1. Den Haag: M. Nijoff, 1950. English
translation Cartesian Meditations, Dorion Cairns, trans. The Hague, Netherlands,
1960.
---------. The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. David
Carr, trans. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
Irigaray, Luce. "L'invisible de la chair: Lecture de Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et
l'invisible, L'entrelacs-le chiasme." In Ethique de la d(fference sexuelle. Paris:
Minuit, 1984.
Johnson, Galen. "In the Timber Yard, Under the Sea." Chiasmi International 2 (2000):
249-260.
---------. "The Voice ofMerleau-Ponty: The Philosopher and the Poet." Journal ofthe
British Society QfPhenomenoloK)! 39 (2008): 88-102.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique ofPure Reason. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood trans. and eds.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Kapust, Antje. "The So-Called "Barbarian Basis of Nature" and its Secret Logos,"
Chiasmi International 2 (2000): 167-194.
Krell, David Farrell. The Tragic Absolute. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
2005.
Levin, David Michael. "Language, Thought, and Truth in the Works of Merleau-Ponty
(1949-1953)." Research in PhenomenoloK)! 9 (1979): 144-162.
Levinas, Emmanuel. "On Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty." In Outside the
Subject, Michael B. Smith, trans. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993.
Larison, Marianna. "Autour du Concept Nature dans la Dernier Merleau-Ponty."
Chiasmi International 7 (2005): 393-408.
Low, Douglas. "The Continuity Between Merleau-Ponty's Early and Late Philosophy of
Language." Journal of Philosophical Research 17 (1992): 287-311.
186
---------. "Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Reason," Journal ofPhilosophical Research 19
(1994): 109-125.
Madison, Gary Brent. The Phenomenology ofMerleau-Ponty. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1993.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard, 1945.
English translation The Phenomenolo!{Y QfPerception, Colin Smith, trans.
London: Routledge, 1962.
---------. Signes. Paris: Gallimard, 1960. English translation Signs, Richard McCleary,
trans. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1964.
---------. Le Visible et l'invisible. Paris: Gallimard, 1961. English translation The Visible
and the Invisible, Alphonso Lingis, trans. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1964.
---------. L'oeil et I 'esprit. Paris: Gallimard, 1964. English translation "Eye and Mind,"
Carleton Dallery, trans. In The Primacy QfPerception. Evanston,IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1964.
---------. Resumes du Cours, College de France, 1952-1960. Paris: Gallimard,1968.
English translation "Themes from the Lectures at the College de France 1952-
1960." In Praise ofPhilosophy and other Essays. John O'Neill, trans. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963.
---------. Prose du Monde. Paris: Gallimard, 1969. English translation The Prose ofthe
World, John O'Neil, trans. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
---------. La Nature. Paris: Seuil, 1995. English translation Nature, Robert Vallier, trans.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003.
---------. Notes de Cours au College de France 1958-1959 et 1960-1961. Stephanie
Menase, ed. Paris: Gallimard, 1996.
---------. "Philosophy and non-philosophy since Hegel." In Philosophy and non-
Philosophy Since Merleau-Ponty, Hugh Silverman, trans. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1997.
---------. Husserl at the Limits ofPhenomenology. Leonard Lawlor with Bettina Bergo,
trans. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001.
187
Morris, David. "Animals and Humans, Thinking and Nature." Phenomenology and the
COl(nitive Sciences 4 (2004): 49-72.
Morrison, Robert 1. "Merleau-Ponty and Literary Language." International Studies in
Philosophy 26: 4 (1994): 69-82.
Moyle, Tristan. "Re-Enchanting Nature: Human and Animal Life in Later Merleau-
Ponty." Journal ofthe British Societyfor PhenomenoloK)! 38 (2007): 164-180.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. "Myth Interrupted." Peter Connor, trans. In The Inoperative
Community. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Walter Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale, trans.
New York: Vintage, 1968.
-------. The Birth ofTragedy. Raymond Guess and Ronald Speirs, trans. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Plato. Republic. Allan Bloom, trans. New York: Basic Books, 1968.
-------. Phaedrus. William S. Cobb, trans. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993.
-------. Phaedo. Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, trans. Newburyport, MA:
Focus. 1998.
-------. Theaetetus, Joe Sachs, trans. Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2004.
Potter, Paul, trans. "Herac1eitus' 'On the Universe. '" In Loeb Classical Library #150:
Volume IV Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
Proust, Marcel. Ala recherche du temps perdu. Paris: Gallimard, 1999. English
translation Remembrance ofThings Past. c.K. Scott Moncrief and Terence
Kilmartin, trans. 3 vols. New York: Vintage, 1980.
Quine, W.Y. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In The Philosophy ofLanguage, A.P.
Martinich ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Rorty, Richard. The Consequences ofPragmatism. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1982.
Sallis, John. Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1973.
---------. Beinl( and LOl(os. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1975.
\&8
-------- The Gatherin!? ofReason. Albany: SUNY Press, 1980.
--------. ChorolofOJ. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.
de Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Wade Baskin, trans. New York:
McGraw-Hilt 1966.
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. Clara. In Sammtliche Werke. 1816-1832.
Stuttgart and Augsburg: J.G. Cotta, 1861. English translation Clara, Fiona
Steinkamp, trans. Albany: SUNY, 2002.
--------. Philosophische Untersuchungen uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und
die damit zusammenhiin!?enden Gegenstiinde. In Werke, Band 3. Leipzig: 1907.
English translation "Philosophical Investigations into the Essence ofHuman
Freedom and Related Matters," Priscilla Hayden-Roy, trans. In Philosophy of
German Idealism, Ernst BeWer, ed. New York: Continuum, 1987.
---------. System ofTranscendental Idealism. Peter Heath, trans. Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1978.
---------. "Stuttgart Seminars." In Idealism and the Endgame ofTheory, Thomas Pfau,
ed. and trans. Albany: SUNY Press, 1994.
---------. "Identity Philosophy." In Idealism and the Endgame o/Theory, Thomas Pfau,
ed. and trans. Albany: SUNY Press, 1994.
Schmidt, Dennis. On Germans and Other Greeks, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 2001.
Suzuki, Marcio. "La double enigme du monde. Nature et langage chez Schelling et
Merleau-Ponty." Chiasmi Interntional 5 (2003).
Vallier, Robert. Etre Sauvage and the Barbaric Principle: Merleau-Ponty's Reading of
Schelling." Chiasmi International 2 (2000): 83-106.
Vanzago, Luco. "Presenting the Unpresentable: the Metaphor in Merleau-Ponty's Last
Writings." The Southern Journal qfPhilosophy 43 (2005): 463-474.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. "Faire voir par les mots: Merleau-Ponty et Ie tournant
linguistique. " Chiasmi International 1 (1999): 57-63.
1R9
----------. "The Paradox ofExpression." In Chiasms, Fred Evans and Len Lawlor, eds.
Albany: SUN~ 2000.
Willsdon, Dominic. "Merleau-Ponty and the Expression ofNature in Art." Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology 29 (1998): 207-219
Zizek, Slav~j. The Indivisible Remainder. London: Verso, 1996.
